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Thesis Summary 
This thesis is about the making of the European Union (EU) as a political actor through the 
delineation of borders and border spaces. It speaks to one of the key questions of an ongoing 
scholarly and policy debate, regarding the dialectic nature of the EU’s borders; internal and external, 
present and absent, murderous and humanitarian are only some of the binaries that have been 
deployed to speak of these paradoxical hybrid constructs, which, as literature has argued, have long 
stopped acting and looking like simple lines on maps. As such, the project lies at the intersection of 
EU studies, Border Studies and Political Geography, and engages themes that have been common in 
these fields; borders, biopolitics, and security logics of risk. The biopolitical border is found behind 
an ever-expanding range of border technologies that regulate global mobilities; biometric passports, 
databases, surveillance systems, and techniques of risk-profiling, outsourcing, and off-shoring the 
border.  
My thesis seeks to add to these literatures, arguing for the need to embed the study of the 
EU’s biopolitical borders within geographical and historical analytical frames. To this end, it makes a 
Foucauldian contribution, by bringing in Foucault’s underdeveloped concept of a heterotopia, to 
study the spaces that these borders produce and re-articulate. Heterotopias are ‘loose’ space-times 
that unfold in multiple thresholds between inside and outside, mirroring and exaggerating the 
contradictions of the wider polities to which they belong, and enabling us to think in flexible ways 
about the physical and temporal boundaries of milieus of power. Through the heterotopic lens, 
mobility and immobility, inclusion and exclusion, emerge not only as acts that permit and forbid 
bodies from accessing an internal and prosperous subworld, but as performances of difference and 
otherness in the process of constituting the EU as such. 
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Introduction 
 
Europe’s boundaries are many and varied: including or excluding Turkey, 
Israel, Armenia. There are those waiting just outside the Schengen area, 
such as Romania and Croatia; others that dream about being part of 
Europe, like Albania and Georgia; and countries like Greece that wonder 
about a Europe that has betrayed them. Then there are our distant cousins, 
the “steppe kingdoms” of Central Asia, full members of some very 
European institutions. Which are the most European of all these?  
Philippe Rekacewicz  
 
This thesis is about the making of the European Union as a political actor through the 
delineation of borders and border spaces. The European Union (EU), continuously growing in 
salience in world politics, has come to be thought of as the spokesman of Europe and consequently 
as capable of putting the fuzzy discursive formation of Europe on a map, making for an institutional 
arrangement that occupies space in the world rather than floors in a building. However, in recent 
years, its unity has been measured up against a series of internal and external crises which have 
called into question the resilience and legitimacy of its iconic achievements; the borderless 
Schengen area, the single-currency Eurozone area, and the political area governed by the common 
institutions. The thesis takes the first of the three as an analytical lens, and focuses more particularly 
on its edges; the external perimeter of the EU. 
Some years ago, in 2011, public and scholarly attention turned to the EU’s external borders 
in Greece to observe and theorise on the revival of walls and fences in Europe. The Greek 
government had decided to lace an 11.5 km stretch of land at its border with Turkey with barbed 
Introduction 
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wire, to prevent irregular migrants from entering the country, and also Europe. It was termed a 
response to a crisis. At the time, approximately 200 people, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
and Somalia found their way into the EU every day through this small opening. While the vocabulary 
may have anticipated the framing of migration that was to follow in the coming years, the same 
cannot be said for the numbers and the needs of people involved.  The migration ‘crisis’ of 2011, had 
the continent’s prosperity, security, and cultural identity as a referent, which was threatened by 
migrants from Africa and Central Asia. This situation bears little resemblance to the humanitarian 
tragedy that has been unfolding in the years that followed the Arab Spring, where thousands of 
victims of war, families and children, arrived every day at Europe’s shores or died trying in search of 
safety. In hindsight, 2011 was not a crisis year for irregular migration, not for Greece and not for the 
EU. It was yet another year when individuals from the world’s poorer parts sought employment and 
security in the richer parts. Yet the terminology persisted unchanged, expanded and pervaded other 
spheres too; it is as if the EU has been experiencing a protracted, intensifying, but essentially 
unchanged crisis situation.   
In the four chapters that make up the thesis, I try to unpack the border politics that have 
been performed within this context through a series of empirical examples set in spaces where 
bordering happens. Rather than situated in the field of International Relations theory, this study 
finds its intellectual scaffolding in the niche but rich field of Border studies; an autonomous body of 
literature which deploys the border as a conceptual lens to study International Politics. The practice 
of locating one’s work within the scripts of a discipline, a necessary component of graduate study, 
comes with unintended consequences; the inevitable choice between re-producing or confronting 
established patterns of inclusion/exclusion of what counts as a relevant object of knowledge and 
practicing subject for that discipline. The political and analytical implications of this for IR theory and 
its capacity to understand the politics of boundedness is a theme that Rob Walker addresses very 
well in his influential book Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (1993),1 
                                                             
1
R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1993).    
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whereby IR theory is posited as an ideological expression of the modern state itself, and therefore 
liable to tautologies when attempting to denaturalize ideas of sovereignty, subjectivity, and their 
boundaries. Walker took these thoughts further in After the Globe, Before the World (2010),2 which 
emphasised the need for alternative conceptions of what IR calls the ‘international’, beyond the 
categories of ‘state’ and the ‘globe’ and the way their relationship slides alongside that between the 
particular and the universal.  
Translating Walker’s argument into the scholarly practice of surveying the literature does not 
mean to undertake anew his deconstruction of IR, but rather to avoid the inclusions/exclusions of IR 
by refusing to traverse the field in its own terms. Walker practices instead an intuitive method which 
begins with broad questions of space, “distilling many things into structural logics” which are then 
“historicized and sociologised.”3 This is an approach which this study in some ways follows, bringing 
together themes that IR considers incompatible, such as geopolitics and biopolitics, and searching 
for their interconnections in local history and geography. As such, and in lieu of the traditional 
‘literature review’, the chapters that follow engage interventions in Border Studies, by means of 
framing the arising empirical issues as research problems. The following section identifies the key 
arguments in this literature, and situates them within broader strands of border thinking. This is 
followed by a roadmap of thesis, and finally, a section on the methods that I have used in conducting 
this research, which concludes this introductory chapter. 
How We Write about Borders 
Border scholarship has taken to the puzzle of Europe’s boundaries from many fields; EU 
studies, International Relations (IR), Political Geography, Anthropology, Aesthetics, to name but a 
few. These contributions, referring to bordered space (where is Europe, its core, its periphery and its 
‘outside’) as much as to bordered people (who can legitimately live, work, and travel like a 
                                                             
2
 R.B.J. Walker, After the Globe, before the World (London: Routledge, 2010). 
3
Gary K. Browning, Raia Prokhovnik, and Maria Dimova-Cookson, Dialogues with Contemporary Political 
Theorists (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 203. 
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European), have toyed with many understandings of the border itself, as more or less present, 
visible and material. This growing literature, while intimately linked to IR, has acquired a degree of 
autonomy; turning the tables in some ways, it offers a reading of global politics and IR itself from the 
perspective of the border, calling out IR’s state-centered biases. As such, this body of work can be 
coherently organised in three successive waves around major global events which problematised the 
relation between borders, space, sovereignty, and people; a) the end of the Cold War, b) the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, c) the global recession and the Arab Spring. 
Borders for States 
Between the early 1990s and early 2000s, influenced by the collapse of the Iron Curtain and 
the disappearance of the Cold War security threats, some scholars wrote on the emergence of a 
‘borderless world’. These arguments had mostly been concerned with the increasing fluidity of the 
relationship between statehood, territory, and borders in the context of globalisation. Drawing 
inspiration from the work of Manuel Castells, and the rise of a new global and networked society 
dominated by flows and proximity,4 some of the subsequent works on borders took the form of an 
extreme shift, from a globe neatly bordered into nation-states and power-blocks, to a borderless 
world ruled by the grids and flows of economic activity.5  For the greatest part however, analyses 
offered moderate and nuanced perspectives, revolving around different versions of what Hollifield 
has called a ‘liberal paradox’: “in order to maintain a competitive advantage, governments must 
keep their economies and societies open to trade, investment, and migration” but at the same time 
“unlike goods, capital, and services, the movement of people involves greater political risks” and 
                                                             
4
Manuel Castells, “Toward a Sociology of the Network Society,” Contemporary Sociology 29, no. 5 (2000): 693–
99, doi:10.2307/2655234. 
5
  Masao Miyoshi, “A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-
State,” Critical Inquiry 19, no. 4 (July 1, 1993): 726–51, doi:10.1086/448695; Arjun Appadurai, “Sovereignty 
without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography,” in The Geography of Identity, ed. Patricia Yaeger, 
Ratio (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 40–58; Kenichi Ohmae, Borderless World: Power and 
Strategy in the Global Marketplace (London: Profile Books, 1994). 
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thus “requires a degree of territorial closure.”6 His argument echoes in this way Taylor’s description 
of the exercise of contemporary state power: looking outwards in terms of (geo)economics but 
inwards in terms of cultural/identity preservation.7  
The state-centric element in these literatures, which have focused on the shifts of state-
power rather than in the changing nature of the state in itself, has been famously noted by John 
Agnew, who instead argued for vigilance against a persistent ‘territorial trap’.8 Pointing out the 
tendency to fix the content of spatiality as either territorial or structural, Agnew claimed there had 
been little consideration for the historical context within which such spatial effects occurred, which 
in turn regimented the realist understanding of the state as a set of territorial parameters. This 
problem, he argues, has been perpetuated even by the proponents of the liberal paradox, who 
argue outside the framework of classical realism. Their thinking couples the idea of the state “as 
equivalent to a rational individual exercising free choice”9 with the “state-centred politics in which 
that choice is constrained by the presence of anarchy beyond state borders.”10 Agnew then identifies 
the three assumptions of IR theory that together create the modern (and dated) geopolitical 
imaginary; the perceived absolute overlap of state territory with sovereign space; the ‘given’ 
distinction of the domestic and international, which misses historical processes that cross-construct 
either spheres as well as their divide; the idea of a nation, or rather a national society as subordinate 
to and contained within the territorial state.  
                                                             
6
James F. Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State1,” International Migration Review 38, no. 3 (September 1, 
2004): 885, doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x. 
7
Peter J. Taylor, “The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System,” in State/Space, ed. Neil 
Brenner et al. (Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 101–14, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470755686.ch6/summary.  
8
John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review 
of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (March 1, 1994): 53–80, doi:10.1080/09692299408434268. 
9
 Ibid., 56. 
10
Ibid. 
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Borders for Bodies 
The ‘territorial trap’ has been a reliable argument demonstrating the need for reflective 
methodologies in order to theorise contemporary border practice in the post-Cold War era, which in 
some ways anticipated the distinct wave of border literatures which emerged with greater force 
after the terrorist attacks of 2001. These literatures brought further focus and reflection upon the 
border as a conceptual and productive category in itself, and unpacked the open/closed borders 
dialectic in light of changing actors and concepts regarding international security at the turn of the 
century. The emergence of the deterritorialised threat personified upon the potential ‘terrorist’ 
urged a turn towards novel security functions invested upon borders, targeting the individual mobile 
body instead of territories ‘beyond the line.’ This condition, whereby the dangers formerly residing 
‘outside’ become folded within the internal domain, links the presence of the ‘alien’, the irregular 
migrant or the refugee, to an emerging social threat; corrupting national identities, free-riding on 
welfare systems, impeding the economy and the labour market. In this paradigm, in this new 
‘topology of security’ which Bigo has eloquently described through the metaphor of the Moebius 
ribbon, “the merging of the inside and the outside”,11 the border appears implicated in an equally 
ambivalent condition, capable of differentiating, re-bordering and de-bordering at once.12 
Across this scholarship, Foucault’s biopolitics has been brought to occupy Hollifield's 
position, observing upon borders the effects of the neoliberalisation of political life, and taking after 
the dual constitutive effects of biopower as at once massifying and individualising,13 to talk about 
‘reserves’ and flows of individual bodies. Empirical studies inspired by this body of theory have 
focused on the biometric technologies proliferating at international borders, and the effects these 
                                                             
11
 Didier Bigo, “The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security (Ies),” in Identities, Borders, Orders: 
Rethinking International Relations Theory, ed. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press), 91–116, accessed September 12, 2016, 
https://www.academia.edu/3102803/The_M%C3%B6bius_ribbon_of_internal_and_external_security_ies_. 
12
 Chris Rumford, “Theorizing Borders,” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (May 1, 2006): 155–69, 
doi:10.1177/1368431006063330. 
13
 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, ed. Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2003). 
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have on producing, stratifying, and governing global mobilities. Louise Amoore has coined the term 
‘biometric border’ to capture the interconnected processes thereby exercised; risk profiling, 
encoded representations of the body, and surveillance techniques.14 Sparke, Salter and Walters, 
through similar Foucauldian lenses, have drawn attention to the diffused corporeal techniques of 
borders, and the ways in which they contribute to the control and sorting of international bodies15  
Borders for Borders 
A further call for new border grammars emerged about a decade since the terrorist attacks 
of 2001, gaining further traction as the violent aftermath of the Arab Spring began to wash up at 
Europe’s shores. Across this scholarship, which seeks to add nuance to Balibar’s notable argument 
that ‘the border is everywhere’,16 attention has been called to the human inside the mobile body, 
and to the place inside the border-space. A diverse array of studies that have come together under 
the Critical Border Studies (CBS) agenda,17 and in joint scholarly interventions of political 
geographers,18 have been valuable in this respect, arguing not only for the incorporation of new 
phenomena under the rubric of ‘bordering’,  but also for conceptual axes around which this growing 
border apparatus could be articulated. CBS, focusing on the notion of bordering practice and the 
lens of border performance, has fundamentally unsettled the idea that borders can be understood 
                                                             
14
 Louise Amoore, “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror,” Political Geography 25, no. 
3 (March 2006): 336–51, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.001. 
15
 Mark B Salter, "The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, 
Bodies, Biopolitics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31, no. 2 (2006): 179. William Walters, 
“Border/Control,” European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 2 (May 1, 2006): 187–203, 
doi:10.1177/1368431006063332. Matthew B. Sparke, “A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the 
Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border,” Political Geography 25, no. 2 (2006): 151–80, 
doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.10.002. 
16
 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Translation/Transnation 
(Princeton, NJ ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
17
 Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies,” 
Geopolitics 14, no. 3 (August 21, 2009): 582–87, doi:10.1080/14650040903081297; Noel Parker and Nick 
Vaughan-Williams, “Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda,” 
Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (October 1, 2012): 727–33, doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.706111. 
18
 Corey Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ in Border Studies,” Political Geography 30, 
no. 2 (2011): 61–69, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.002. 
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through the metaphor of a line. Re-conceptualised as an ‘archipelago of zones of indistinction’,19 or 
as a series of stitches,20 the border is decentred and its linear continuity dismantled. Most helpfully, 
the post-linear perspective has brought visibility to physical and temporal dislocations of the border, 
such as offshoring border practices to foreign territories,21 and pre-emptive bordering through 
calculative techniques of risk profiling.22 In a parallel vein, critical geography has invited further 
reflections on how such new practices and performances of bordering reconnect the border to the 
notion of place. As such, Paasi draws attention to the complex contexts of borders, their historical 
and geographical contingency, and the part they play in the “wider production and reproduction of 
territoriality/territory, state power, and agency.”23 
Across these literatures, the EU as a bounded entity has been widely acknowledged as both 
a unique case and an illustrative example of the disaggregated forms that borders take in a condition 
of ambiguous territorial and sovereign grounding.24 According to Ruggie’s well-quoted thoughts, the 
(then) European Community, “the institutional, juridical, and spatial complexes” associated with it, 
represented “nothing less than the emergence of the first truly postmodern international political 
form”,25 a condition which he associates with the ‘unbundling’ of territory and territoriality.26 These 
thoughts on the EU’s disruptive potential for structural statist categories still ring true in important 
ways. While simultaneous re-bordering/de-bordering processes may be observed across advanced 
capitalist economies, where discriminatory policies create hard barriers for some and swift passages 
                                                             
19
 Nick Vaughan-Williams, “The Generalised Bio-Political Border? Re-Conceptualising the Limits of Sovereign 
Power,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 4 (October 2009): 729–49, doi:10.1017/S0260210509990155; 
Nick Vaughan-Williams, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 
20
 Mark B. Salter, “Theory of the / : The Suture and Critical Border Studies,” Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (October 1, 
2012): 734–55, doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.660580. 
21
 Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the 
Mediterranean,” Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (2012): 843–66, doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.660579. 
22
Louise Amoore, “Data Derivatives On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times,” Theory, 
Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 24–43, doi:10.1177/0263276411417430. 
23
 Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ in Border Studies,” 62. 
24
 Stefan Borg and Thomas Diez, “Postmodern EU? Integration between Alternative Horizons and Territorial 
Angst,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 136–51, doi:10.1111/jcms.12327; 
Etienne Balibar, “Europe as Borderland,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27, no. 2 (April 1, 
2009): 190–215, doi:10.1068/d13008. 
25
 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” 
International Organization 47, no. 1 (January 1993): 140, doi:10.1017/S0020818300004732. 
26
 Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond.” 
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for others,27 in the EU this dialectic materialises in more explicit ways by creating two different and 
localisable border categories; the internal ones, which are to be dismantled, and the external ones, 
which are to be fortified. 
At the same time however, and as Walters has perceptively argued, this process and 
geometry of re-bordering/de-bordering is not entirely novel in Europe. It has origins in the 
consolidation of Western European nation-states in the 19th century, where, as Walters puts it 
  
Gradually, internal' borders (city walls and limits, parishes, provinces, 
duchies, etc), all of which were typically more significant than state borders 
under medievalism, became less important, as far as the regulation of the 
poor, the collection of tariffs and taxes, or the defense of the population 
were concerned.28  
Therefore, the ambiguities that reside in the EU’s concept of a single external border are 
most helpfully understood as connected so much to the making of the EU’s inside, as it is to its 
constitutive outside; the construction of a coherent external perimeter has been as much about 
producing the EU as a single whole, as it has been about holding a common conception of its 
external field. There is a need to disambiguate here, between holding a ‘common perception’ of the 
external field, and operating a common external perimeter in a uniform way. Van Houtum has 
claimed in this respect that “in the discriminative biopolitical and geopolitical border regime of the 
EU there is no outside; the globe is the playing field of the EU's border regime.”29 I would argue that 
such claims require further nuancing, and suggest that an EU outside, playing out at the scale of the 
global-field, is constructed differentially in many smaller ‘outsides’, which are however (supposed to 
                                                             
27
 Amoore, “Biometric Borders”; Dean Wilson and Leanne Weber, “Surveillance, Risk and Preemption on the 
Australian Border,” Surveillance & Society 5, no. 2 (September 1, 2002), 
http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3431. 
28
 William Walters, “Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border,” Environment and Planning D: Society 
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be) perceived in a singular way. This differentiation has been organised in the geographies the EU 
has drawn in its several regional partnership frameworks; the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the 
Mediterranean Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy, the Northern dimension, to name a few; as well 
as in the different border cooperation and/or border securitisation projects that these entail. Thus 
global ‘security events’, such as the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the jihadi groups in Africa, or the 
Russian military intervention in Crimea, are to be understood in their two-fold effect in respect to 
the EU’s border politics. On the one hand the EU’s outside is coherently organized against particular 
dangers coming from particular areas of the world (the south-east or the north-east), on the other, 
the EU’s perimeter indeed develops in uneven ways across its length.   
In his recent work, Vaughan-Williams has argued that the reorganisation of bordering 
practice in the EU has relied for coherence upon the figure of the ‘irregular migrant’, which is 
constructed however in an inherently unstable way. A migrant-centred EU humanitarian discourse, 
which can be found in recent EU migration and security policies such as the 2011 Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM), co-exists with practices whereby migrant lives are animalised in 
cage-like detention spaces,30 ‘left-to-die’ in push-back operations at sea,31 or dissected in ‘disease 
surveillance’ medicalised responses.32 This, the argument goes, does not owe to the oft-cited 
hypocrisy of elites, or to a gap between rhetoric and reality, as much as to the immanent ambiguity 
of border security itself, and the ways in which border security produces the ‘irregular migrant’, as a 
form of life to be ‘protective of’ as well as ‘protected from’.  
Vaughan-Williams helpfully brings in Esposito’s account of security relations as immunitary 
protection to conceptualise the operation of this potentiality.33 According to this paradigm, the 
border acts as a biopolitical immunitary system which is capable of fostering life but also of causing 
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death, so much the death of ‘others’ as the death of the self in the event of an autoimmune crisis; 
the excessive effort to self-protect which may cause for the organism’s own demise. From there, the 
EU’s border, responsible for regulating the EU’s immunity, is linked to a “complex and multifaceted 
topology”,34 not merely a protective membrane, but a diffused system where the inside and the 
outside become conflated, and threats are neutralised from within.  
One question that emerges from this line of thought when we project this complex topology 
upon the EU’s ‘actual’ border spaces is: what happens to those borders and border-spaces formerly 
acting and often still treated as ‘protective membranes’, in this new biopolitical system? What traces 
does the recent ‘muscle memory’ leave behind at the edges? If “bordering practices are increasingly 
spectral, undergoing a series of spatial and temporal displacements”35 then what can these 
displacements mean for the “stubborn territorially identifiable borders [that] persist”,36 considering 
that the latter will neither disappear, nor ‘persist’ unchanged? From there, the thesis seeks to add to 
the CBS agenda, and to the increasingly nuanced renditions of the biopolitical argument, by 
contributing a study of the EU’s external borders as simultaneously context-dependent entities, or, 
to put it in immunitary terms, as local inherited antibodies. 
Structure of Thesis 
To comprehend Europe’s spaces in their social, historical, and biopolitical dimensions, the 
analysis deploys Foucault’s concept of a heterotopia.37 Foucault himself provided a brief and vague 
explanation of this concept, which tries to capture in relational ways the essential difference of 
spaces that are somehow ‘different’ or ‘other’, while secondary literature has developed into a 
diverse and at times frustrated debate regarding its conceptual meanings and analytical uses. The 
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thesis attempts an interpretation of the concept specific to the study of borders; as a ‘loose’ space-
time category that unfolds in multiple thresholds between inside and outside, mirroring and 
exaggerating the contradictions of the wider polities to which they belong. Unlike the cleanliness 
that ideal-type theoretical models propose, heterotopias thrive on messiness and complexity, 
enabling flexible thinking about the physical and temporal boundaries of milieus of power, and 
allowing patterns to emerge across things that seem disparate or opposing. Such a heterotopic 
approach also drives the structure of the thesis. 
The book-ends of the thesis, Chapters One and Four, are concerned with two border-spaces 
which mirror one another in their relationship to the EU; Greece, a member-state and a Schengen 
exclave, and the Russian Oblast of Kaliningrad, a third-country territorial entity and a Schengen 
enclave. Noticing opposite and in some ways counter-intuitive measures deployed around both 
entities’ perimeters, as a security politics of exclusion in the case of Greece, and a security politics of 
inclusion in the case of Kaliningrad, and taking note of the links between these policies and the 
biographies of the borderlands they attempt to regulate, the overarching question that these two 
chapters address is: what happens in  border spaces at Europe’s edge, when geographical 
particularity and local history meet abstract security logics of risk? The two middle chapters nuance 
this question further, asking how these practices reformulate conventional categories of border-
thinking, such as the camp (Chapter Two), and how these security logics are translated into 
knowledge in the institutional context of the EU (Chapter Three). 
As such, Chapter One introduces the context of the so-called EU ‘migration crisis’, asking 
what kind of crisis the EU is experiencing and what means are being deployed in response. Looking 
at the historical development of the EU’s migration and asylum policy, as well as at the more recent 
responses in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the chapter demonstrates the existence of 
internalising/externalising/immobilising border dynamics, and a shift of emphasis towards the latter, 
involving practices of surveillance and identification. Subsequently, the chapter zooms in on the case 
of Greece, the EU’s signature crisis space, which offers rich opportunities to investigate both the 
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implications of these EU policies ‘on the ground’, as well as the reciprocal effects of local history and 
geography upon their border objectives. Greece is re-staged as a frontier-land immobilised in time 
and space, a condition which is related to the country’s geographical position, its ‘frozen’ security 
agenda preoccupied with the Greco-Turkish identity conflict, and the expanding use of detention as 
a means of managing migration. Overall, the chapter focuses on the ways in which the EU secures its 
borders and governs its outside through immobility and exclusion. 
Chapter Two questions the EU’s border politics in a productive sense, focusing on the 
transformations that its policies bring about to the paradigmatic space of the camp. The camp, 
thought of as a space of containment characterised by exceptionalism and sovereign excess, has 
returned forcefully in post-9/11 political geography scholarship. However, new types of camps 
trouble these standard understandings. Shedding light on the diversity of camps, and more generally 
border-spaces, the chapter takes as a case-study the informal camp which emerged in Greece’s port 
of Piraeus; an open arrangement, at the heart rather than the edge of the urban landscape, 
administered by local activists rather than agents of sovereign power. What makes this space unlike 
other informal camp-sites and public spaces turned migrant dwellings, is its unlikely proximity to an 
EU watchtower with which it only passively engages, a proximity which, as the chapter argues, is far 
from accidental, but rather indicative of the increasingly tense balance the EU is trying to strike 
across its perimeter. 
Chapter three enquires into the EU’s modes of producing the ‘border-expertise’ that makes 
its complex border machinery possible. Focusing on Frontex, the EU’s Agency for the management of 
the external borders, the chapter asks how this entity understands its present form and its position 
within a diverse context of actors and overlapping functional remits; the EU institutions, law 
enforcement, and the security industry. The chapter demonstrates tensions that coexist as parts of 
the ‘riskification’ of the EU’s borders, and explains how this process works. The main findings 
concentrate on ideas about the geography of the EU that are produced, and demonstrate the 
creation from the ground up of the EU as a heterotopia of fragmented space. 
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Chapter Four looks into the Local Border Traffic (LBT) regulation of the EU, a policy that 
simplifies border crossings for non-EU nationals living in the border areas of the EU’s north-east.  
Amongst the EU’s several LBT agreements, the one between Poland and the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad stands out in terms of its geographical scope and legal parameters, deviating from the 
standard LBT rules. This outstanding position, which owes to Kaliningrad’s sensitive and unusual 
geopolitical situation, provides rich opportunities to investigate the role of local history and 
geography in EU border policy design. Firstly, the border area in question has a rich biography of 
boundary shifts and geopolitical reinventions, which enables us to look at the LBT policy as a 
particular point upon a long line of historical attempts to politically delineate this part of Europe. 
Secondly, Kaliningrad’s appropriation as EU ‘experimental’ space through the LBT demonstrates 
ways in which EU foreign policy and border security policy intersect, as complementary processes in 
the construction of an EU ‘self’. Thirdly, the exceptional allowances of the Russo-Polish LBT 
agreement, helpfully illustrate the flexibility of the policy, as a technology of risk-based security. 
Overall, this chapter explores the ways in which the EU secures its borders, and governs its outside 
through mobility and inclusion. 
Methodology 
The thesis makes use of a qualitative methodological package that combines textual analysis 
and action research, drawing on data collected via participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews, policy analysis, as well as academic literature reviews.  More specifically, I draw on the 
experience of a traineeship held at the Frontex Liaison Office in Piraeus, and volunteer work 
undertaken in the refugee camp of Piraeus and elsewhere in Athens. In these settings, I was enabled 
to conduct interviews with persons of interest, activists, asylum-seekers, and EU officials, but also to 
gain access into the daily-workings of these spaces.  
These experiences warrant some clarifying notes, particularly with regards to the challenges 
associated with conducting research in an organisation where one works, and particularly “the risk 
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of the researcher him/herself becoming part of the situation under study.”38 Some of these issues 
are reconciled by the timeframe of the thesis (the majority of the interviews with Frontex officials 
were conducted prior to my deployment in Piraeus, and Chapter Three which deals with Frontex 
specifically was also drafted at that time), while others by means of reflection. My lived experience 
in these spaces revealed the multiple ways in which borders are being enacted through individual 
behaviours, casual racist and gendered biases, and distinct groups’ self-interests. However, my own 
subject position and ambiguous ‘belonging’ as a researcher and a woman, also became relevant in 
the ways in which I was treated as more and less ‘threatening’ at once, carefully ‘fed’ a particular 
narrative of what Frontex is and does for example, but also too easily trusted with sensitive 
information.  
Further to this, I have largely drawn on my personal notes from field visits at border-sites, at 
the Greek-Turkish border in the Evros region, the migrant community in Omonoia, central Athens, as 
well as the Russo-Polish border in Kaliningrad and the Frontex HQ in Warsaw. This has involved a lot 
of walking, in keeping with the advice of travel-writer Robert MacFarlane 
Catch the textual run-off of the streets; the graffiti, the branded litter, the 
snatches of conversation. Cut for sign. Log the data-stream. Be alert to the 
happenstance of metaphors, watch for visual rhymes, coincidences, 
analogies, family resemblances, the changing moods of the street, and the 
record ends. Walking makes for content, footage for footage.39 
This way, I was able to grasp the differentiated ways in which the inside/outside divide is 
experienced by the local communities of border areas, and to notice how this differs from the more 
extreme binary perceptions of the border that one encounters in the urban setting of the capital.  
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As Denscombe notes, “practice-driven research in local settings hardly lends itself to 
conclusions with universal application.40 To make-up for the ‘representativeness-deficit’ that 
participatory methods invite, I triangulated these retrieved ‘stories’ against EU policy debates and 
legislative acts. This has enabled me to understand not only the different agendas that propel EU 
policy-making, but also the ways in which the EU exercises its power largely unchecked; through the 
production of norms and rules that are gated behind complex administrative procedures and hidden 
in plain sight; available on the web but unavailable in the sheer size and complexity of their archive.  
                                                             
40
 Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide, (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2007), p. 130. 
Chapter Two 
 
21 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
The EU’s Crisis at the Borders of Greece: 
Governing through Immobility and Exclusion 
 
[T]here is a habit of mind which is now so widespread that it affects our thinking on nearly 
every subject, but which has not yet been given a name. As the nearest existing equivalent I have 
chosen the word ‘nationalism’ [… .] By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that 
human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of 
people can be confidently labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad’. But secondly — and this is much more important 
— I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good 
and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests. 
George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
This chapter maps some of the developments in the EU’s border politics between 2010 and 
2015, focusing on its south-easternmost edge, at the borders of Greece.  The term ‘crisis’, as used to 
describe the arrivals of migrants and asylum-seekers into the EU, started appearing in NGO circles in 
2010, to describe a humanitarian emergency at the Greek-Turkish land borders.1 Since then, the 
term ‘migration crisis’ has been uncritically reproduced, to gradually blend into a generalised EU 
crisis-discourse, recently termed by the Commission president an ‘existential EU crisis’2; conflated 
with the Eurozone debt-crisis, as well as the EU’s own political integration and legitimacy crisis. The 
discursive inflation which has been enabled in this context is evident in the metaphors and 
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references used to speak of migration into the EU. For instance, the wave of one million asylum-
seekers that arrived in the EU in 2015, was often described as only second to, and thus comparable 
to, Europe’s refugee crisis of World War II, although the latter involved 40 million displaced people. 
It has hardly been related to the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999, which seems a more relevant 
comparison, not only due to the numbers of people affected (it has been estimated that 850,000 
were displaced3), but also because the EU existed in 1999, and indeed undertook significant 
activities.  
But even when separated from the domains of economic and political integration, the term 
‘migration crisis’ still aggregates many distinct phenomena. It stands for the deaths in the 
Mediterranean and the stranded migrants and asylum-seekers in detention centres and camps 
across the EU; for the rise of extreme-right xenophobic sentiment across member-states’ 
electorates; as well as for the revival of walls and fences, and the re-introduction of internal border 
controls in the passport-free area. This indistinguishable and multifaceted crisis has been causally 
linked to the on-going Syrian civil-war, which has seen more than five million victims flee the 
country, and another 6.6 million internally displaced. 4 According to this narrative, the conflict in 
Syria is creating a violent spill-over effect in the region, the excesses of which are also felt in the EU. 
But while this connection may be relevant, it does not exhaust the story. 
The narratives surrounding the arrivals of migrants and asylum-seekers at the EU’s borders, 
as well as the growing use of the term ‘migration crisis’, have followed from and are connected to 
two other important events dating back in the mid- to late- 2000s. These are the beginning of 
systematic collection and dissemination of data on irregular migration, and the launch of EU Joint 
Operations (JOs) at external sea and land borders. What this means is that the so-called ‘crisis’ has 
unfolded at the same time as a detailed lexicon of measuring and talking about it, and indeed an 
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entire border security apparatus to tackle it was being developed. For this reason, and without 
prejudice to the seriousness and magnitude of the current situation, the term ‘crisis’ should be 
treated with skepticism as regards the particular political deployment of a sense of urgency, and the 
ways in which continuities are obscured.  
Greece, at the receiving end of these migration flows, has been a source of geographical and 
political particularity, the intricacies of which remain concealed when sweeping terminology and 
casual causality is employed. According to the mainstream narrative, Greece’s complicated coastline 
and financial hardships have rendered the country unable to perform its gatekeeping duties towards 
its EU partners, hence inviting a range of EU operational interventions. However, and as this chapter 
will go on to explore, the geopolitical rivalries between Greece and neighbouring Turkey have played 
an important part in the security measures implemented at the Greek borderlands, and in the 
competing framings of the ‘crisis’ as a ‘European’ or a ‘Greek’ problem.  
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to separate the different amplifiers of the EU 
‘migration crisis’ discourse, and to contextualise it historically and geographically. To this end, the 
analysis proceeds in two parts.  
The first part provides an overview of the Schengen area, noting the fences erected and 
controls implemented on member-states’ borders, and examining the authorized lexicon which has 
been developed to describe it.  This moment is then situated within the historical development of EU 
migration policy. Three analytical axes are identified: a) dynamics of internalisation, focusing on 
policies and practices aimed at internal political consolidation; b) dynamics of externalisation, 
including matters of transnational labour markets and EU external relations; and c) dynamics of 
immobilisation, involving biopolitical practices such as detention and surveillance. With these 
parameters in mind, the analysis arrives at the particular configuration of 
internalisation/externalisation/immobilisation which underpins the 2015 European Agenda on 
Migration (EAM), and its emphasis on the last one of the three. 
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A second part fleshes out the process of immobilisation on a bigger scale, and Greece in its 
entirety is re-conceptualised as a borderland immobilised in time and space. More specifically, a first 
section visits the Evros fence which was erected as a migrant-deterrent measure in 2011, and which 
has been assumed a symbol of the return of fences in post-Cold War Europe. It is demonstrated that 
the fence in fact had limited operational relevance for migration, opening the question on what its 
actual political drivers were. An answer is sought in the following discussion, which narrates the geo-
history of Greek-Turkish borders, focusing on the insecurities that the two countries’ age-old rivalry 
has invested upon the Evros border.  It is argued that that the Greco-Turkish conflict has acted as a 
structure of temporal immobility which produces particular logics of debarment, not directly related 
to migration, but nevertheless impacting upon incoming migration flows. The final section looks into 
the EU’s attempts at managing migration on Greek territory through a deployment of practices that 
immobilize bodies in space, and observes that the blending of the two different ‘immobilities’ result 
in policy that relies overtly on detention. Overall, the chapter brings forth the condition of 
‘immobility’ as one possible result of the encounter between the diffused and generalized 
biopolitical border, and the border where geopolitical questions and matters of territoriality persist.5 
The EU as an Area to Migrate to 
In speaking of a migration ‘crisis’, EU politicians have been assisted by a burgeoning amount 
of ‘objective’ data which describes migration in factual terms, routes of travel and ‘types’ of moving 
people, collected by its border Agency Frontex. Seven main routes have been identified as pathways 
for migration into Europe (figure 1.1), the most important of which are the ‘Eastern Mediterranean’ 
from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria, the ‘Central Mediterranean’ from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and 
Malta, and the ‘Western Balkan’, as a secondary movement passage leading from the EU’s ‘frontline’ 
states Greece and Italy further into EU mainland. Such systematizing efforts have also been deployed 
towards the moving persons, who are categorized mainly between those who migrate for economic 
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reasons and those seeking asylum- sometimes startlingly also referred to as ‘returnable’ and ‘non-
returnable’ persons.6 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Frontex drawn migratory routes7 
 
Using such a language and official data, the EU migration landscape appears as follows. In 
2007, the main source of irregular migration cited in EU circles were northern and western African 
states’ nationals crossing the Mediterranean on the Central Mediterranean route into Italy and 
Spain, in order to find employment.8 Following strengthened controls enforced by these two 
member states between 2007 and 2009, as well as the launch of Frontex operations in Italy, Malta 
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and Spain, this traffic decreased dramatically by 2010.9 It was then the turn of the Eastern 
Mediterranean route to gather the attention of smugglers and border guards, travelled mostly by 
economic migrants from northern Africa as well as ‘mixed’ flows from  Palestine, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq, seeking entry through the Greek-Turkish sea and land borders, albeit in much smaller 
numbers.10 Throughout those years, overall irregular detections continued to decrease, but even at 
their peak in 2008, they stood at 160,000 annually, or one migrant for every 3,125 Europeans. The 
aftermath of the Arab Spring brought major changes to these patterns and an intensification of 
Frontex operations in the southern borders; there was a marked increase in arrivals of asylum-
seekers as well as in fatal journeys, but also an over 50% drop in the overall numbers of people 
detected entering the EU irregularly.11 By 2013 most were departing from war-torn Syria, while the 
aggregate numbers of annual arrivals exceeded 280,000, setting a new record for the EU’s 
archives.12 Growing demand for smugglers’ services led to a new modus operandi after 2012, 
involving cargo-ships which sometimes carried more than 1000 persons, adding in even larger 
instalments to the death toll across the Central Mediterranean route. Nevertheless, in early 2015, it 
was asylum-seekers from Kosovo on the Western Balkan route who toped Frontex’s lists for irregular 
detection, at 22,000 for the month of February alone; a trend which had been growing gradually 
since 2014, and which had been linked to rumours spread by smuggling networks in Kosovo about 
upcoming changes in asylum rules in Germany.13 By the end of 2015 a fundamental shift in scale 
could be observed; there were 900,000 registered annual arrivals via sea, and more than 3,500 
deaths, almost exclusively travelling on the Eastern Mediterranean route. 14 
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As deduced from this short and perhaps convoluted overview of the EU migration landscape, 
the migration ‘crisis’ appears nothing like a singular, linearly developing phenomenon, indicating the 
challenges of producing a linear narrative out of a multidimensional matrix. This discussion is taken-
up again in Chapter Three. What can be noted at this point however is the range of problems that 
the used language and imagery creates; reducing in analytically flawed but also in dangerous ways 
the complexities and multiple layers of cross-border movement. Four problems can be noted. Firstly, 
the clandestine nature of irregular passage means that the actual routes followed by migrants are 
highly elastic and diffused, with changing departure points. Additionally, many migrants spend 
extended periods, sometimes years, in transit regions, meaning that country of origin and point of 
departure often do not align. Nevertheless, the Frontex-charted migratory routes, as shown in the 
figure above, create a different impression through their rough and sweeping arrows which have 
remained unchanged over the years. It appears that the reality of movement is manipulated to fit 
this map rather than the other way around, with the very political effect of painting a picture of 
multiple ‘invasions’. Secondly, the problems run deeper when it comes to categorisations of people, 
since those leaving their countries of origin mostly do so for more than one reasons. Persons fleeing 
war also seek to resettle in countries with strong economies and advanced asylum systems, while 
people migrating for economic reasons are often also escaping states with high human rights 
violation records. Thirdly, these figures and maps, isolate the EU from the regional context, failing to 
communicate the wider picture of refugee and migrant movement, and producing an overall 
distorting effect of amplification. While these maps and reports communicate in excess detail the 
numbers and trends in people seeking asylum in EU countries, they are quiet about the vast majority 
of the displaced who have found shelter in nearby states. According to Amnesty International, in 
September 2015 95% of the Syrian refugees, approximately four million, were in Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.15 Finally, a most serious problem with current articulations of EU migration 
is the inherent dehumanising effect of such methods of quantification and systematisations; 
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allowing for real lives to be masked underneath the intricacy of statistics, and de-sensitising public 
opinion to the detriment of those in need of international protection.  
In this context, the gradual emergence of walls and fences as a response to the mass arrivals 
of asylum-seekers has been a starting point for discussion. As elaborated in detail later in the 
chapter, Greece’s 2011 decision to erect a fence across its land-border with Turkey, allegedly to 
prevent migrants from entering the country, appeared at the time as an anachronistic, non-
EUropean instinct. Nevertheless, fencing proved a contagious trend especially in member-states in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, announced the construction of a fence along its border with 
Turkey in 2013, followed by Hungary, which embarked on its own border fence with Serbia in the 
same year. The fences were matched by internal border controls as well. In April 2011, France 
proceeded with strengthening its border with Italy, with increased border patrols, passport checks 
according to racial profiling, and halting of specific rail services.16 In May 2011, Denmark also 
announced tighter controls along its border with Germany, deploying additional personnel and 
surveillance equipment, and setting up customs booths.17  Following a joint proposal by France and 
Germany in 2012, a new EU regulation established common rules on the temporary reintroduction 
of border controls at internal borders.18  Germany began performing internal controls on its border 
with Austria and restricting train traffic in September 2015, and a month later Austria announced 
that they would erect a fence across its border with Slovenia, marking the first physical barrier 
across an internal border.19 In December 2015, a month after the Paris terrorist attacks, Council 
pressures urged the Commission to table a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code. The 
proposed regulation would enable states to expand systematic checks at external borders, not only 
                                                             
16
 Bruno Waterfield, “France Threatens to ‘Suspend’ Schengen Treaty,” The Telegraph, April 22, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/8468981/France-threatens-to-suspend-Schengen-
Treaty.html. 
17
 BBC, “Schengen State Denmark to Re-Impose Border Controls,” May 11, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13366047. 
18
 Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in 
Order to Provide for Common Rules on the Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control at Internal Borders in 
Exceptional Circumstances,” October 22, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1051. 
19
 Barbara Tasch and Mike Nudelman, “Map of Border Fences and Controls across Europe,” Business Insider, 
March 1, 2016, http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-refugees-europe-migrants-2016-2. 
Chapter Two 
 
29 
 
on entry but also on exit, towards both third-country nationals and EU citizens who enjoy the right of 
free movement.20 The return of fences and walls in the supposedly borderless EU, if not a symbol of 
its disintegration, is an indication of fundamental changes to the EU as an area to migrate to and 
seek refuge in, compared to the recent past. This theme is discussed further in the following section, 
which outlines the EU’s migration policy in historical context. 
 
EU Migration Policy in Historical Perspective 
 
While some symbolic decisions on free movement in the European Communities were made 
in the late 1960s,21 a more appropriate starting point for contemporary EU migration policy may be 
in 1985. The provisional agreement amongst Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands established Schengen as an internal area without border controls, initially outside the 
EU institutional arrangements. Over the ensuing 30-year period, Schengen expanded to include most 
EU member-states,22 and was incorporated in the EU institutional framework. Within this period, it is 
possible to locate three gradual shifts of geographical emphasis, policy focus, and perceptions of the 
figure of the migrant.  
In Schengen’s early stages, the geographical and policy reach of migration debates was 
characterized by internal dynamics, focusing on the space of the common market, and driven by 
economic security considerations. Member-states began looking beyond the informal 
intergovernmental approach after the significant rise in migration flows during the mid-1980s, which 
further increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Migration gradually ceased to be discussed 
in terms of market demands for cheap labour supply, as had been the practice in many European 
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states since the 1960s,23 and decisions on migration systems, until then an elite project of the 
economic and industrial lobbies, entered the agendas of politicians.24 As migration acquired political 
dimensions it also gradually turned into a security problem,25 although economic security still 
constituted the main frame of reference. Governments became concerned with the issue of asylum 
abuse, with migrants and refugees portrayed as impeding economic development, increasing 
unemployment for the domestic populations, and free-riding on national welfare systems. The result 
was a new dichotomy, not between 'economic' and 'political' migrants, but between the high-
skilled/'desired' and the unskilled/'unwanted',26 which in turn spelled out a priority of constricting 
the influx of the latter.  At the same time, an early version of how incoming flows were to be 
distributed internally emerged in the 1990 Dublin Convention, which established a system 
determining the member-state responsible for examining an asylum claim.   
In a second phase, towards the end of the 1990s, attention turned to the external field, and 
to the surrounding region of sending and transit countries. This shift was accompanied by ‘widening’ 
conceptions of security threats,27 congealing in what Samers has called an emergent ‘geopolitics of 
illegal migration’.28 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) had moved immigration policy to the 
community method of decision making, in an effort to address intergovernmental deficits: 
“coherence, consistency, democratic accountability, respect for the rule of law and for human rights, 
and effectiveness.”29 In this favourable for integrated policies context, the figure of the migrant 
appeared not only as a potential threat to the economy but as a threat to a European society, and 
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indeed to a European identity.30 The Tampere meeting of the European Council (1999) externalised 
these insecurities by prioritising action that would prevent migration at its source, such as visa 
policies, pre-frontier controls, cooperation frameworks and readmission agreements with third 
countries.31 Securitization of migration, and externalisation of migration control as a form of 
prevention took more acute forms after 9/11, and the Laeken European Council (2001) called for an 
incorporation of migration into the EU foreign policy remit.  
A third shift, located in the mid- to late- 2000s, has involved a geographical focus at the site 
of the border, and a re-articulation of the figure of the irregular migrant as an unstable human form 
which is ‘both a security threat and a threatened life to be saved.’32 This phase has seen the 
proliferation of practices that can be conceptualized as immobilising; the surveillance of the border 
itself and the apprehension, interrogation, and detention of migrants, as a basis for subsequent 
internal and external measures. ‘Freezing’ migrants’ mobility in time and space allows for data to be 
collected through interviews conducted with migrants upon arrival (the so-called screening and 
debriefing activities), to establish the identity of the person, and collect information on smuggling 
networks, countries transited, and intended destinations. This information, along with the dynamic 
geographical data drawn from surveillance activities, condition internal measures such as decisions 
on which country shall take responsibility for an asylum claim as per Dublin system, and 
external/foreign policy priorities, such as countries with which readmission agreements shall be 
sought. The following section considers the 2015 EAM, to further tease out the practical implications 
of these immobilizing tendencies. 
European Agenda on Migration: Crisis as Acquis Building 
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The EU introduced the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) in May 2015, in the midst of 
wide public criticism of EU inaction, after the deadliest boat tragedy to date claimed the lives of 
approximately 800 persons a month earlier outside the coast of Libya.33 The Agenda outlined the 
EU’s plans for immediate action, its mid-term strategy, and the longer-term objectives, overall 
highlighting four priorities: developing the common asylum system, developing a new European 
policy on legal migration, fighting irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking; and securing 
Europe’s external borders. It should be noted that whilst a response to the proclaimed ‘crisis’, many 
of the measures introduced were not envisioned as temporary. As stated in the Commission’s 
communication:  
It would be an illusion to believe that this is a short-term need which will 
not return. The reinforcement of Frontex and the setting up of new forms 
of cooperation with Member States should be seen as a level of support 
and solidarity which is here to stay.34  
Within the EAM priorities, internalising, externalising, and immobilising measures co-existed 
and informed one another. For example, in terms of internal measures, the EAM foresaw a 
redistribution of arriving refugees through a ‘Relocation and Resettlement’ scheme, to evenly spread 
the ‘burden’ of asylum-seekers across the EU. The scheme, initially of a modest scope of 160,000 
places, and drawing on EU funding of 780 million euros, foresaw the movement of people from the 
most heavily pressurized member-states and third-countries to other member-states, in proportion 
to their national population and economic capacity. In terms of externalising action, the EAM 
announced an overhaul of its common framework for returns, enhancing the EU’s capacity to return 
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migrants to their countries of origin, including the setting-up of a returns branch in Frontex, the 
compilation of a ‘Returns handbook’ for member states, and a new European Travel Document to be 
used for the purpose. It also included measures of intervention and cooperation with key countries 
of origin and transit:  funding for regional development programmes, Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) sea-operations in the Mediterranean, border management missions, coordination 
centres, and deployments of EU migration officers to EU delegations.  
However, action upon arrival preventing migrants’ further movement appeared to be the 
overarching priority in the EAM, and dynamics of immobility underscored the entire strategy. For 
example, the Agenda’s plans for enhancing the member states’ returns capacity retained the 2008 
Returns Directive as their legal base,35 which in effect reiterated the potential to use detention as a 
management strategy. For example, in a communication regarding implementation of the EAM 
priorities in October 2015, the Commission stressed that  
Member-States should ensure the physical availability of an irregular 
migrant for return and use detention where necessary, to avoid that 
irregular migrants abscond. As long as there is a reasonable likelihood of 
removal, prospects for such removal should not be undermined by a 
premature ending of detention.36 
Immobilising action, apprehension, interrogation, and detention were dominant themes in 
the new ‘Hotspots’ approach, forming part of the EU’s immediate response in support of the 
‘frontline’ member states, Greece and Italy. The concept of ‘hotspots’ was envisioned as a platform 
for multiple intervention by EU Agencies, Frontex, Europol, and the Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
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“when there is a crisis due to specific and disproportionate migratory pressure at their external 
borders, consisting of mixed migratory flows.”37 The official description paints a grand-scale holistic 
approach for the efficient ‘sorting’ of arriving flows of people, and their rapid resettlement or return.  
The operational support provided under the Hotspot approach, will 
concentrate on registration, identification, fingerprinting and debriefing of 
asylum seekers, as well as return operations. Those claiming asylum will be 
immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support 
teams will help to process asylum applications as quickly as possible. For 
those who are not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States 
by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol and Eurojust will 
assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle smuggling 
and trafficking networks. 
However, the practical provisions of the approach, and the negligence of the political 
context of their implementation, suggest that rather than a starting point, identification and 
containment rather acted as ends in themselves. ‘Hotspots’ foresaw the setting-up of purpose-built 
identification, first reception, and pre-removal centres, preventing further unregulated movement 
while asylum claims were examined, or deportation administratively arranged. As it emerged soon 
after they had been set-up and put into use, these centres had turned into overcrowded detention 
facilities for extended stays.38 This development had been all but unexpected; Greece’s limited 
administrative capacities to process asylum claims, and EU member-state reluctance to admit 
asylum-seekers through the relocation mechanism were known to policy makers in advance.  
Immobilising logics, emphasizing apprehension, interrogation, and detention, have thus 
been established as the preferred EU response to the surge in migration flows, as well as to its own 
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need for common action and internal coherence. The following section focuses on Greece, the space 
where many of these new border tools have been tested and applied, to examine how these 
immobilizing dynamics interact with the local bordering regime and national security context. 
Greece as Immobilised Borderland 
Owing to its location at the strategic Mediterranean crossroads between East and West, and 
to a long and complicated coastline, Greece has been at the receiving end of migration flows from 
Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, through the Greek-Turkish land and sea borders. However, 
being a ‘frontline’ state is not the only reason why it is of significance to EU border studies. The 
country mirrors in some ways the ‘special case’ position that the EU holds for border studies at large. 
Its geographical and historical particularities became a source of reflection for Balibar’s influential 
piece We, the People of Europe, which opens with the following passage 
[b]order areas—zones, countries, and cities—are not marginal to the 
constitution of a public sphere but rather are at the center. If Europe is for 
us first of all the name of an unresolved political problem, Greece is one of 
its centers, not because of the mythical origins of our civilization, 
symbolized by the Acropolis of Athens, but because of the current 
problems concentrated there.39 
Greece has been an old member but also a particular case in the Western and European 
international cooperation structures. Greece signed an Association Agreement with the EU as early 
as 1961 and launched negotiations for EU membership in 1979 to become the 12th member in 1981. 
It signed the Schengen protocol in 1992, joined the Western European Union (WEU), the EU’s 
defense arm, in 1995, and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001. The many EUropean 
memberships however are not corroborated by its history or geography. Until 1830 the country was 
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part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus did not share into the Western European experience of the 
Enlightenment that discourses of the EU’s ‘common roots’ so often have recourse to. As for the 
many EUropean maps, Greece seems too far out of the EU core, and is in fact an exclave Schengen 
territory since most of its perimeter represents an external Schengen border, except for the sea-
border with Italy.  
 
Figure 1.2 Greece as Schengen Exclave 40 
 
As such the remainder of this chapter unpacks this isolation by re-staging Greece as an 
immobilised borderland, temporally ‘frozen’ and geographically contained, and seeks to understand 
the implications of this condition for the management of migration in the EU. The following analysis 
proceeds in three sections. Firstly, the case of the Evros fence is discussed, as an illustrative 
encounter of the EU external border and the local gatekeeping regime, which involves complex 
interactions between Greece, Turkey, and the EU.  A middle section situates this encounter within 
Greek-Turkish relations, observing the role of the EU in this bilateral context. A certain ‘immobility in 
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time’ is observed in the Greek security agenda, which invests non-migration related dynamics of 
debarment upon Greek borders. A final section looks into the joint EU-Greek efforts at managing 
migration on Greek territory, focusing on their convergence in using detention as a means of 
managing migration. 
  
The Return of Barbed Wire 
 
In early 2011, the Greek government announced its intention to construct a migrant-
deterrent fence made of barbed wire and concrete in the north-eastern region of Evros, and thus 
seal the entire 200 km length of the Greek-Turkish land border. Following wide criticisms, the plan 
was quickly scaled down and government officials announced that they would only fortify the 11.5 
km ‘vulnerable’ land section of the demarcation line which did not follow the natural barrier of the 
river, as it was this section that provided an easy and relatively safe pathway for irregular migrants 
into the country. The announcement came at a time when estimates appeared frequently in the 
news that 90% of the overall migration flows towards the EU were coming through this border.41 The 
Commission expressed concern at the time over an “increasingly worrying” situation and flows of 
“alarming proportions”, stressing the need to “handle this emergency situation in the most 
expeditious and efficient way.”42  
The prospect of a fence at the Evros passage received critical responses from numerous 
sides. Humanitarian agencies stressed that migrants and asylum-seekers would be prevented from 
reaching safety and pushed to follow more dangerous paths.43 Local politicians in the neighbouring 
southern areas cited the high costs and quick-fix nature of the measure, arguing that it would merely 
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dislocate the flows of migrants towards their own communities.44 The response in Turkey was 
cautious but communicated clear disenchantment. While the Turkish foreign ministry took the 
moderate position that ‘Greece must guard its borders’,45 the Turkish minister for EU affairs 
elaborated further: “It is not the time to talk about new walls in Europe - we need to talk about new 
bridges. Europe paid the cost of walls in the recent past.”46 Turkish media unpacked this cautiously 
oppositional narrative some more. According to chief editor of Istanbul daily Sabah  
The Maritsa [Turkish for Evros] River delimits our border not only to 
Greece, but also to the European Union. Building such a fence amounts to 
putting an insurmountable obstacle between us and the EU that will 
reinforce the concept of the Schengen Area, a concrete symbol of 
restricted movement in Europe. Over and above the difficulties of 
obtaining a visa to visit the EU, a supplementary physical obstacle is being 
placed between the EU and Turkey – which makes this wall not just a Greek 
problem, but our problem too.47 
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Figure 1.3 The ‘vulnerable’ section of the Evros border48 
 
As for the EU, their response was not ambiguous. The Commission quickly turned down the 
plan, refused to co-finance the fence, and withdrew from the controversy in the following fashion 
The Commission considers that the construction of a technical barrier in 
Evros at the Greek/Turkish border is not an effective measure to counter 
irregular migration and has informed Greece that it would not accept that 
the fence be included in the 2011 External Borders Fund (EBF) Annual 
Programme. … Greece remains free to decide to finance the construction 
of a technical barrier with national resources.49 
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The EU’s distancing from the Greek fence should not be conflated with the objections of 
humanitarians, but rather viewed in the context of a perceived Greek deviation from the EU’s 
‘norms’, and choice of measures outside of what was foreseen in the Schengen toolkit. The 
Commission had declared its “readiness to co-finance other more effective measures” such as 
“special vehicles with surveillance equipment such as thermal cameras and/or X-ray system and the 
purchase of a helicopter to be used for surveillance of borderline and support of patrols on the 
ground.”50 This EU stance was in turn met with a confrontational response in Greece, where the 
announcement of the fence had found substantial support amongst Greek public opinion, with 
surveys reporting majorities between 60% and 80% agreeing to construction,51 and a 3 million euro 
contract had already been signed.52 The sentiment was summarised in the following statement of 
minster Papoutsis, published in the official governmental website  
The matter of guarding and controlling borders is a matter of national 
sovereignty. I would like to point out that it is hypocritical when some until 
now accuse Greece of failing to guard its borders according to the 
Schengen Treaty, and now emerge as critics [of Greece] for wanting to do 
what is common sense, to enhance the security of its borders. Perhaps 
some would prefer for Greece to become a centre for long-term stay and 
processing of asylum applications by migrants coming from all over the 
world and trying to reach other EU member states. However, Greek society 
cannot shoulder this burden.53 
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The episode of the fence is illustrative of the sides and tensions involved in the management 
of migration in Greece; the persistent Greek-Turkish animosity, tensions in EU-Greece relations, and 
the tortured affair of Turkish EU membership.  What is interesting however, is how limited the 
fence’s actual relevance as a barrier for migration was. Unlike the famous barriers that the Greek 
fence could be compared to at the time, such as the barbed wire surrounding the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, or across the U.S.-Mexico border, and contrary to popular 
assessments following the completion of the fence in late 2012, that “the effects of the fence were 
instantly felt”54 the barrier in Evros had not been about irregular migrants, and its impact on migrant 
movement has been dearly overestimated. Beyond the well-heard assessments, that the fence made 
for an inefficient short-term measure, another relevant point is that such a measure was also at that 
point unnecessary.  
Evidence for this irrelevance came a few months later, when Frontex released its quarterly 
risk analysis, showing that flows through Evros had already dropped significantly in the first quarter 
of 2011, a fact that could only have been known in the ministry’s circles. This was a result of 
increased Hellenic Police activities, and the deployment of 175 border guards as part of Frontex’s 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs), since October 2010. Irrelevance was also confirmed 
during interviews with Hellenic Police and Frontex officers, who retrospectively agreed almost 
unanimously that the fence’s eventual impact on the sharp reduction of irregular detections at Evros 
after 2011 had been negligent compared to that of the 1,900-strong “Operation Shield” of the 
Hellenic Police or the Frontex RABIT deployment. 
 Given this constructed link between the fence and the management of irregular migration, a 
question that emerges is: why would Greece spend such an amount of economic and diplomatic 
capital on fencing its border, at a time when both are scarce, and when other forms of assistance 
had already significantly mitigated the problem?  
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This question has not been asked in the few existing accounts that have engaged with the 
Evros border. Pallister-Wilkins, who has looked at the operational cooperation of Greek border 
police and Frontex deployed officers in Evros, focused on the intersection of humanitarian practice 
and border policing, and the nature of EU border cooperation.55 Pallister-Wilkins locates a tension 
within the very concept of protection, between the population as the subject of protection, and the 
territory as the object of protection. She argues that the EU, represented by Frontex in the field, 
occupies an ambiguous position, due to the “unreconciled relationship between member states’ 
sovereign responsibility for border control on behalf of Schengen, and attempts at solidarity, 
facilitation, and coordination in border control at the European level.”56 A question that follows from 
this claim however is: what else is invested in the member-state’s ‘sovereign responsibility’ with 
regards to that border, with reference not only to Schengen and the European population, but also 
the territory of that state, and the national population?  
Similarly, in Borg’s contribution to the literature on the Evros border, the focus is on the 
activities of Frontex as potential EU statehood performances.57 Borg’s argument is that the 
borderwork undertaken in the name of the EU can be conceptualised as a form of state-crafting, 
concerned with processes of identification/bordering/ordering. In this vein, the EU engages in a self-
making process, which produces migrants who enter Europe, and border guards who seek to secure 
it as ‘subject-positions’ that perform and construct it. However, this account is not specific to the 
locality thus bordered, formulated in such a way as to apply to other borders too, while the role of 
the Greek guards, and Greek sovereignty are not examined in any depth. 
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Finally, Topak has examined the Evros and the Aegean as spaces of biopolitical control 
“where surveillance intensifies and migrant lives are held hostage.”58 The focus of this contribution is 
on the techniques of control performed across the Greek-Turkish borderlands, and the use of 
technologies which target the bodies of migrants, such as thermal cameras, drones, and night vision 
goggles, subsequently incorporating these bodies within risk-calculations. Topak’s argument does go 
some way towards geographically contextualising these violent encounters, arguing that “while 
borders can no longer be located only at the edges of states… the practices and effects of the 
borders manifest themselves primarily at these territorial edges.”59 While valuable in proposing a 
way of embedding the old technology of the fence within the ‘novel’ biopolitical practices of the EU, 
the argument does not however problematize the ways in which the traditional connotations of 
fences still matter in any explicit way, neither is the Evros fence related to the local political context. 
With these gaps in mind, the following section will situate the fence and the support it enjoyed 
domestically in the history of insecurity that is historically associated with the Evros region, and the 
proximity with Turkey. 
 
Lands of Insecurity 
 
The Turkish threat has had a permanent presence in the Greek security agenda, so much so 
that the latter appears to be immobile in time, particularly when reviewed against the European 
context. As Moustakis and Sheehan write 
Because the primary focus of Greek security policy centred on the 
relationship and rivalry with Turkey, the end of the cold war and of the 
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Soviet Union did not lead the Greek security establishment to believe that 
a fundamental reassessment of Greek security policy was necessary, in 
contrast to most other European states.60 
The ways in which these insecurities play out in the Evros borderlands may be grouped into 
three themes; an identity conflict drawing on a nationalist and ‘traumatic’ rendition of bilateral 
history; a strategic dilemma playing out in an ongoing arms race and frozen border disputes; and 
open questions of local politics and demography in Thrace.  
 
Territorial Traumas and Orientalist Narratives 
 
The role of the Turkish Other in the development of a modern Greek identity has animated 
an almost saturated field of scholarly investigation which has traced the presence of orientalist anti-
Turkish narratives in Greek history education,61 in the informal discourses of the military,62 and in 
the political debates over individual rights and religious freedoms.63 In such narratives present 
anxieties blend with historical ‘traumas’, to present a glorified Greek identity as part of the European 
civilization and in continuation of the Ancient Greek civilisation, constructed against the demonized 
‘barbarous’ Turk, descendant of the reviled Ottoman occupier.64  
Both nations have their roots in the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, and as state-building 
projects bear many similarities. Diamandouros et al have written on “two states where the 
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conceptions of territory and population, allegiance and nationhood, religious versus secular, ethnic 
versus constitutional principles have been in constant tension.”65 Modern Greece was established in 
1830, following a 9-year War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire, and continued to append 
Greek-speaking territories throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. The peace treaties of World 
War I, settling boundaries in the Balkans and dealing with the dissolving empire, ceded the region of 
Thrace into the Greek territorial body by 1920. Greek expansionism came to a halt after a bitter 
defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, where the new Turkish National movement, fighting 
their own War of Independence under Kemal Ataturk, contested the borders imposed by the treaty 
of Sevres. The treaty of Lausanne, ending the war in 1923, established the Republic of Turkey, and 
drew its final western borders, appending Eastern Thrace to the newly founded Turkish state.66 The 
treaty also foresaw demilitarisation of the Aegean islands in close proximity to Turkey, and the 
transfer of sovereign rights to Britain over the Ottoman parts of Cyprus.  
A period of reconciliation followed the ceasefire, as official visits took place, and a friendship 
pact, the Treaty of Ankara, was signed in 1930, affirming the borders, and establishing balance of 
naval forces.67 Following the Italian invasion and German occupation of Greece during World War II, 
Greek groups tabled territorial and reparation claims, and a proposal was discussed in the Paris 
Peace Conference, resulting in the addition of the Dodecanese to the national territorial body in 
1946.68 This unsettling of the status quo anticipated the end of the inter-war deterrence and the 
flare up of identity politics that followed. According to Petridis, the finality of the 1946 borders 
marked the end of Megali (Great) Idea,69 the irredentist narrative which had the aim of uniting all of 
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Hellenism into one political community, envisioning boundaries which would include the diaspora 
communities on former Ottoman lands.70  
Most analysts locate the beginning of mistrust in the early 1950s, when the Cyprus problem 
emerged. This led to a series of crises in the 1960s and dramatically culminated in the Turkish 
invasion of 1974. Following the outbreak of inter-communal violence, and a failed coup in Cyprus 
organized by the Greek junta, Turkish forces annexed northern parts of the island which amounted 
to 1/3 of its territory. The Cyprus crisis has been termed the major turning point for Greek foreign 
policy, instating the defense doctrine of the ‘threat from the East’71 which set the pace for bilateral 
relations for the final quarter of the century. Throughout this period, the two countries engaged in 
diplomatic rows which on occasion risked war, the most notable being the race for Aegean natural 
resources in 197672 and 1986,73 and the Imia/Kardak Aegean sovereignty crisis in 1996.  
Greece’s EU accession in 1981, in many ways aggravated these tensions, by re-articulating 
the sense of difference between the two countries, interpreted as different ‘modernisation’ 
trajectories. Turkey had signed an EU Association Agreement around the same time as Greece, in 
1964, submitted a formal application for EU membership in 1987, and joined into a customs union 
with the EU in 1995. Candidacy status was awarded in 1999, during the Helsinki Council, while 
official negotiations for accession commenced in 2005. As Rumelili has shown, until the realistic 
prospect of membership was put on the table, the EU had provided an additional dividing line 
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between Greece and Turkey, re-formulating the conflict as one between a member and a non-
member, and ushering in a range of institutional asymmetries.74 
The significance of the EU-induced division can be best appreciated in the context of its 
mitigation in the subsequent period of Turkish EU-candidacy, which has been characterized as one of 
renewed rapprochement. This development both led to and was further initiated by a change in 
Greek foreign policy in 1996, under the premiership of Costas Simitis. The new government had 
shown the intention to ‘modernise’ the Greek security agenda and desecuritise many of the ongoing 
issues with Turkey, as part of adopting to the demands of ‘globalisation’ and redirecting resources 
and diplomatic capital to establishing economic links and expanding Greek interests in the region.75  
As such, and after having followed a strategy of ‘negative conditionality’, with subsequent 
vetos towards Turkey’s candidacy and towards the dispersal of financial aid towards Turkey,76 
Greece turned into a strong supporter of Turkish membership. Rapprochement was thus enabled by 
the strong Turkish incentive to undertake reforms; the traction gained by the new Greek foreign 
policy agenda; and the dynamics of EU integration and acquisition of defence and security 
competencies, which created hopes for sustainable security guarantees for Greece, and greater 
conditionality upon Turkey. This led to views that the two countries had embarked upon a 
sustainable period of friendship, enabled by a normalising instead of divisionary EU framework. 
Rumelili for example was noting at the time  
From the booming trade to the increasing number of tourists, from the 
Greek music playing in Turkish bars to the famous kebab house in Athens, 
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there are strong indications of a positive change in Greek-Turkish relations 
at the societal level.77 
In retrospect, it is possible to identify three reasons why such optimism may have been 
misplaced or at least circumstantial. Firstly, in the last decade the relationship between Turkey and 
the EU has been characterized by a credibility deficit in both sides, and the de-securitising potential 
of the membership prospect has faded-out.78 Secondly, the recession in Greece, and ensuing 
political instability, has prevented governments from decisive conciliatory action, for fear of 
domestic political costs.79 Thirdly, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement thus far described mainly 
concerned areas of ‘low politics’ such as civic partnerships utilizing EU regional funds, whilst the 
major unresolved issues, such as the border disputes in the Aegean, were not tackled in any 
meaningful way.80 The following section examines further these border conflicts, and briefly 
sketches the Greek view of the Greco-Turkish security dilemma. 
 
The Aegean Dispute 
 
Greco-Turkish relations are most often described in terms of a classical geopolitical puzzle, 
concerning territorial integrity and balance of ‘hard power’. The salience of the perceived Turkish 
threat for Greek policy is often measured in the funds that the state has traditionally dedicated on 
defence, even in the recent austerity budgets. During the recession, defence spending decreased 
from 7.1 billion euros in 2010 to an estimated 4.4 billion euros in 2015, but these figures are still 
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high, when viewed alongside the country’s shrinking economy. As a percentage of GDP, Greece has 
annually spent 2.3% of its national budget on average between 2010 and 2015, against 2.8% spent 
between 2005 and 2009.81 This remains well above the EU mean, which stood at 1.52% for the 2010-
2013 period.82 Moreover, Greece is one of only five NATO members (along with Estonia, Poland, the 
UK and US), and only second to the US, who abide by the alliance’s guidelines on spending at least 
2% of their GDP on defence.  
It has caused for skepticism that in a period of downsizing on public sector employment and 
cutting down on public services the state has not attempted reforms in the military, nor have Greek 
voters applied any pressure to this direction.83 Judy Dempsey, writing for the New York Times, 
commented on this spending as “astonishing given that Greece is in a deep economic and financial 
crisis.”84 However, in Greek popular discourses, high defence spending is as naturalised as it is 
legitimate, and matters almost exclusively in relation to the size and capabilities of Turkey.  Figures 
appear juxtaposed more often than individually. For example, the first page of a Google search for 
“Greek military capabilities” (in English), returns seven links about Greek ‘hard power’ in absolute 
terms and international rankings, as well as three links about Greek-Turkish military balance.  
Performing the same search in Greek produces nine (out of ten) articles about: the Greek-Turkish 
equilibrium, probabilistic scenarios on who would win in the event of war, and in one case an 
analysis of Turkey’s military strength only.  
At the same time, analysts approaching the question of Greek defence spending have also 
pointed out that Greece’s contributions to EU and NATO missions have been rather modest in 
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relative terms.85 Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, have explored this theme, arguing that Greece’s very 
participation in the EU (and NATO) has been less than reciprocal. The authors examine recent 
examples where Greece turned to their Western allies for guarantees of inviolability of its borders; 
and claim that Greece’s orientation to the West has been motivated by the “quest for security 
providers against the Turkish threat”86 Official political discourse in Greece corroborates their view. 
As prime minister Mitsotakis was noting in his first address to the nation in 1990 
Our country’s fate is tied to the fate of Europe. In the united Europe, our 
democratic governance is affirmed, our prosperity is guaranteed, and our 
national security is established, since the borders of Greece are the borders 
of Europe. For this reason we will actively support- and I believe that we 
will all agree to this- all efforts to quickly promote the political integration 
of Europe. Greece is our Motherland, Europe is our future87 
Three issues over the Aegean sea-borders have perpetuated insecurity. The first concerns 
the width of territorial waters and the determination of the exact location of the sea border. While 
Greece in practice operates within a 6-nautical mile zone, it has declared that it reserves rights to an 
extension of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles according to the provisions of the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).88 Turkey precisely for reasons pertaining to the Aegean 
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dispute,89 has not ratified UNCLOS90and considers Greek unilateral action a casus belli- reason and 
willingness to go to war. The second issue concerns the width of national airspace, which Greece has 
defined as a zone extending 10 nautical miles from the coast of the mainland. This means that the 
airspace extends 4 nautical miles over the territorial waters that Greece effectively exercises, but 
still within the limits set by the contested UNCLOS rules. Turkey has argued in-line with the statute 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)91 that aerial space cannot exceed territorial 
waters delimitation. The practice of Turkish non-civil aircrafts flying through the 4-nautical mile 
contentious zone and their Greek counterparts intercepting them is a regular occurrence.  
The third unresolved border issue concerns sovereignty over specific Aegean islets, a dispute 
which led the two countries to the brink of war during the Imia/Kardam crisis in 1996.92 The Greek 
claim refers to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the 1946 Paris Peace Conference which transferred 
rights over these islands and islets to Greece, while the Turkish claim has been that islets which are 
not mentioned by name in the treaties remain a ‘grey area’. Because of the Aegean islets dispute, 
the width of the continental shelf also remains an unresolved issue, with Turkey claiming the line 
should be drawn halfway between the mainland shores, whilst Greece argues that the islands and 
islets should be considered, each with their own shore and territorial waters.  
 
The contested Greek-ness of Evros 
 
Athough the Evros border has not been contested by either side, these borderlands may also 
be categorized as part of the ongoing disputes, linked to the same discourse of territorial insecurity. 
Evros takes part in the threat narrative by which, according to Heraclides, Turkey seeks to “divide 
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the Aegean into two parts, and ‘ensnare’ the eastern Greek islands; grab Greek Thrace, if given the 
opportunity; and control all of Cyprus.”93 However, Evros insecurities are also mediated by an 
exacerbated local brand of nationalism, related not only to the immediate proximity to Turkey, but 
also to the marginal position of the region in relation to the national core.94 This local nationalism 
emerged in the 1980s, in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis when the possibility of a land invasion 
entertained popular discourses. As Gkintidis has illustrated, the fierce anti-Turkish rhetoric of the 
local society in Evros became entangled with requests towards Athens for economic and 
developmental allowances “based on the premise that the region should be militarily and 
economically fortified.”95 
The minority population of the wider Thracian region has been an additional source of 
insecurity, as well as a recipient of orientalist appropriations; seen as a threat of secessionism, and 
rendering Thrace ‘insufficiently Greek’. The minority owes its presence to an exception agreed in the 
population exchange foreseen in the Lausanne Treaty, which had the aim of greater ethnic 
homogeneity in the respective homelands, and protection for ethnic and religious minorities across 
the newly drawn lines.96 While the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul and the Turkish Muslim 
population of Western Thrace had been excluded from the exchange for humanitarian reasons, the 
Greek minority diminished greatly after the Istanbul pogroms of 1955 and large-scale deportations in 
the 1960s, dropping from approximately 110,000 at the time of the Convention to 2,500 in the early 
1990s.97 The Turkish minority families today number approximately 120.000, concentrated in the 
cities of Komotini, Xanthi and Didimoteixo.98 The Greek state has followed a policy of intolerance 
towards them, such as a ban of associations with the term ‘Turkish’ in their name, on the grounds 
that allowing for these Greek citizens to identify as Turkish implies an association with the 
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neighbouring state rather than an ethnic identity.99 They therefore remain segregated, and by way 
of a vicious circle the threat they are perceived to pose is perpetuated by the Greek state. 
Resonances  
The securitization of borders that stems from the Greco-Turkish conflict intersects with anti-
migrant border fortification in interesting ways. One example can be found in the framing of 
irregular migration, which Greece associates almost exclusively with Turkish actions. Two key 
arguments have been put forth. Firstly, Turkey’s visa policy has been considered too ‘lax’, after 
granting visa-free travel to citizens of migrant-sending countries in the Middle East and Africa 
throughout the 2000s, as part of the government’s turn to the tourism industry.100 According to a 
statement of a local police chief to the media "Everyone gets to Istanbul by plane, flying on cheap 
tickets from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and so on. Then it's a three-hour car ride to Edirne [a Turkish 
city on the border] and a short walk to Greece"101 Secondly, a narrative of lack of cross-border 
cooperation with the Turkish side has been put forth, so much in terms of implementing the 2002 
Greece-Turkey Readmission agreement, as with actually apprehending migrants before they crossed 
the Evros border.  As one police officer put it “If the Turks were doing their job properly, there would 
be no need for a fence”.102 These claims however disregard important factors behind the surge in 
incoming migration; the wider trends of border controls in the Mediterranean region and the sealing 
of the central Mediterranean pathways, or the substantial removal of landmines by Greece in 2009, 
which made this route a safer and more popular option. The partial interpretations offer some 
insight into the emotional reasoning at play. 
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Moreover, the turbulent bilateral history has enabled neo-orientalist perceptions of 
migrants coming through the Evros border by association with the ‘threat from the East’.103 This 
conflation is evident in the example of the other, lesser known, fortification in Evros; a 130 km long, 
7 meters deep and 30 meters wide moat constructed by the Greek army in 2012. While the moat 
was constructed as a defence measure against the newly purchased amphibian tanks of the Turkish 
army, discussions in the media often stressed its added benefit to serve as an obstacle for irregular 
migrants.104 However, nowhere has this reductive ‘othering’ been more evident than in the 
gruesome case which the Welcome to Europe activist network brought to light in June 2010, 
reporting that local police forces had been burying the dead bodies of unidentified irregular 
migrants in mass graves in the minority-inhabited Sidero village, on the grounds that they should be 
buried in a Muslim cemetery since they were likely to be Muslims. The bullet marks piercing the 
make-shift sign “Illegal Migrants Cemetary” stood testament to the feelings of some of the locals.  
This section has argued for conceptualizing Greece as an immobile borderland, bringing 
forth the ‘frozen’ temporal logics of its security agenda, which have had their own bearing on the 
fortification of Greece’s borders. In the discussion that follows, the spatial aspect of immobilization 
is analysed as enacted through the practice of detention; a point where Greek border instincts and 
the EU border objectives intersect. 
 
Greece as Site of Detention 
 
 The practice of detention as a means of managing migration has recently entered 
the remits of scholarly research, in response to the proliferation of spaces for detention and the 
rapid growth in the numbers of detained migrants globally. In the United States, approximately 
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380,000 were in detention in 2009.105According to a European Migration Network study, the 
numbers of detained migrants across the EU neared 93,000 in 2014, a count which excluded Greece, 
Cyprus, and Portugal, and should therefore be assumed as significantly higher.106 
The emerging scholarship on migrant detention often observes the lack of attention paid to 
the international/European level, a negligence which likely owes to the great variation that exists 
across different national contexts,107but also to the lack of official aggregate data on immigration 
detention across the EU.108 As a remedy, recent contributions have deployed several lenses to flesh 
out how detention works in an international context. Mountz et al have examined the practice of 
detention as implicated in three different sets of transnational processes: containment and mobility; 
bordering and exclusion; identity, citizenship, and subjectivity.109 These authors argue that  
Detention is best understood as a process that cannot be disconnected 
from detection, deportation, and exclusion. … [D]etention produces 
paradoxical processes of deterritorialisation, externalisation, and 
internalisation of borders through the deliberate bordering and marking of 
migrant bodies.110 
Similarly, Andrijasevic sees detention and deportation as twin strategies, deployed in the 
temporal regulation of migration flows across broad transnational spaces.111 As for Martin and 
Mitchelson, they identify detention as part of modern state-building processes; as responses to the 
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globalisation of migration, security, and trade; and as sites for the production of exclusionary 
discourses.112 As such, the focus here is on the ways in which detention as practiced in Greece works 
across the national and the international; firstly as a metaphor which conditions the relationship 
between Greece and the EU as joint handlers of migration flows; and secondly in terms of actual 
detention practice, through the gaps and excesses between the common European legal framework 
and the national migration system. 
 
Detention as Metaphor 
 
In March 2016, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, whose government had assumed one of 
the hardest anti-refugee stances in the EU, addressed the Greek government in a provocative 
manner: should Greece fail to stem the flows of asylum-seekers into Europe “there will only be one 
hotspot, and it will be called Greece.”113 It came a few months after another, equally controversial 
statement of Fico, which had sparked discussions on a potential Greek expulsion from the passport-
free area if Greece failed to halt the inflow of migrants and refugees-until then a taboo issue talked 
about only behind the scenes.114 The comments caused for much unease in Greece, echoing fears 
already voiced by the country in the preceding years,115 but also reflecting a gradually materializing 
reality which mirrored Greece’s own shift from prosperous and equitable EU partner to uncertain 
member itself in need of EU support.  
As a migration destination, Greece has traditionally been both unwelcoming, offering few 
opportunities for legal long-term settlement, but also somehow open, due to informal systems of 
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labour exploitation which had been devised over the years.116 However, since the outbreak of the 
recession in the late 2000s these patterns began changing significantly, as Greece itself transformed, 
from a destination to a transit country. Up until 2009, the main source of irregular migration into the 
country was seasonal workers coming through the Greek-Albanian border, to work in agricultural 
and construction jobs.117 The seasonal circular flow which emerged in the 1990s did not involve 
secondary movement into other EU countries, and was not treated with urgency by European 
security circles. This type of migration, following a predictable cycle and offering a cheap labour pool 
covering specific labour market needs, had been gradually normalised in policy discourses on 
migration.118 Albanian migrants in Greece were given a legal status through frequent regularization 
programmes (in 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2007) rather than through any comprehensive reform of the 
Greek system.119 In this tolerant environment, a readmission agreement between Greece and 
Albania was put in place in 2005, and a visa liberalisation Agreement followed in December 2010. 
Owing to this facilitation, but importantly due to the economic hit on the sectors where Albanian 
migrants traditionally found employment, irregular migration from Albania decreased sharply. 120  
This drop in the mid-2000s coincided with the increase in Evros of economic migrants 
seeking to transit through Greece and onwards to wealthier EU states. The transit-character of 
Greece was further reified by the preferences of asylum-seekers in the coming years, who also 
sought to settle in the more affluent European north. According to Dimitriadi, who studied the 
movement of Afghanis through Greece, these journeys towards prosperous northern European 
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destinations have reflected the idea that “Europe is elsewhere”.121 Fico’s comments touched upon 
this sensitive vein and further aggravated it. These discussions suggested a further ‘downwards’ 
transformation from a transit country, to a forced reception country. These detention metaphors, 
which blend the exclusion of migrants and the exclusion of Greece from the EU are best appreciated 
when viewed alongside the grim Greek reality of detention practice, which is discussed below. 
Detention as Practice 
Taking note of the increase in EU-Greek cooperation on migration, a relevant question that 
arises is what this collaboration and its compromise strategies mean for the fate and wellbeing of 
the migrants and refugees affected. Greece has traditionally preferred strategies of deterrence for 
the management of migration; it has some of the lowest asylum recognition rates in the EU,122 and 
law enforcement are known to treat migrants and asylum-seekers in ways that have been 
characterised as inhumane.123 At the same time, established and recent EU rules, such as the Dublin 
system or the new ‘hotspots’ concept, tend to ‘lock’ migration flows in space at their point of arrival, 
thus exposing migrants to such treatment. As Lundby notes, there is a “complicity of all participating 
states in the shortcomings of the European system of immigration detention.”124 This section focuses 
on the practice of detention, as the result of the encounter between this national context of 
deterrence and exclusion on the one hand, and the EU’s immobilizing dynamics on the other.  
Greece’s dysfunctional migration and asylum system had come under international scrutiny 
even before the 2010 surge in arrivals. Between 2007 and 2009 several NGO reports brought to light 
the violent pushback operations of the Hellenic Police and the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG), the 
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practice of summary expulsions, degrading treatment of apprehended migrants, and deplorable 
conditions of detention.125 The attention also brought systemic deficiencies to light. At the time, an 
understaffed and malfunctioning Asylum Department within the Aliens Directorate of the Hellenic 
Police was responsible for examining asylum applications. Leaving the ‘first instance’ judgement to 
the competence of the police, whose work is more attuned to ‘catching bad guys’126 than to 
assessing protection needs and individual circumstances, resulted too quick and too often in 
rejections. The long queues and enormous backlog of cases further discouraged eligible persons 
from turning to asylum services. A 2008 Pro Asyl report, quoting Greek lawyers working with 
refugees and migrants, was noting  
For months, thousands of protection seekers had tried in vain to claim 
asylum – they were turned away. “Come back in two months“ asylum-
seekers were told at the entrance. This policy of closed doors means that 
people wishing to claim asylum cannot enter the building and, therefore, 
have no access to asylum procedures. As a result, people seeking 
protection are at risk of arrest127 
Since 2010 however, the Greek migration and asylum system has not been a product of 
Greek policy makers alone. The 2010 National Action Plan on Asylum Reform and Migration 
Management had been designed and implemented in cooperation with the Commission and 
relevant EU Agencies.128 The plan foresaw, inter alia, re-structuring the asylum service with the 
addition of a ‘first reception’ service, and an appeals body, and increasing the country’s reception 
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capacity with purpose-built ‘accommodation’ and detention centres of acceptable standards, to 
gradually phase out the practice of detaining migrants in police and border guard stations. The plan 
was considered at the time a milestone in Greek policy, removing migration from the exclusive 
competence of criminal and police affairs, and offering for the first time a holistic approach which 
combined the logics of deterrence, reception, and return.129 These measures were introduced into 
Greek legislation with Law 3907 of 2011,130 which also constituted the transposition of the EU rules 
on conditions of detention,  accompanied by emergency EU funding of 9.8 million euros.131  
As field and legislative cooperation between Greece and the EU increased, so have the 
voices which called upon the latter to assume responsibility for the violence in the Greek 
borderlands.132 The EU has been held liable for human rights abuses conducted in Greece directly or 
indirectly. This was for instance illustrated in HRW’s 2011 report titled “The EU’s Dirty Hands”,133 
investigating the RABIT deployment in Evros. The findings of this report showed the participation of 
Frontex officers in human rights violations through exposure of migrants to inhumane treatment, 
amongst others by putting EU manpower under Greek command in operations apprehending 
migrants, and by providing buses and vans for the transfer of migrants to police stations and 
detention centres where police violence was known to take place.  
Overreliance on detention, especially as highlighted in the 2010 plan, had been an oft-heard 
criticism against Greece and the EU.134 Detention of migrants is regulated by two EU legislative acts; 
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the 2008 Returns Directive,135 which concerns detention of irregular migrants while their 
deportation is being organized; and the 2013 Reception Conditions Directive, which concerns 
detention of asylum-seekers while their application is being processed. These EU policies set the 
limit for detention at six months, but provide for the possibility of extensions up to an additional 12 
months if a removal operation is likely to last longer.136 According to these EU rules, use of detention 
as a means of managing migration is considered a measure of ‘last resort’ when less coercive 
methods have been examined, and should be proportionate to legitimate aims, such as minimizing a 
‘risk for absconding’ or due to fears for ‘threats to public security’.137 Furthermore, member-states 
are required to provide alternatives to detention in their national legislation. These safeguards have 
been inadequate, as detention of migrants and asylum-seekers on ambiguous or even non-existent 
grounds are becoming increasingly common.138 As noted by the Open Access Now campaign, a 
person found in any of the following situations could potentially end up in detention: 
 coming to Europe without papers and/or visa and making an asylum application at the 
border; 
 coming to Europe with a tourist visa and being held at the border for the failure to 
provide the required documents or show sufficient resources; 
 entering as a tourist and staying after the expiry of the visa; 
 losing one’s job and being deprived of the right to renew a residence permit;  
 failing to gather all the documentation required to get a residence permit or its 
renewal; 
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 failing to move from one visa category (for example a student visa) to another (for 
example a work visa); 
 applying for asylum and being denied protection139 
 
The example of the Amygdaleza pre-removal centre in the outskirts of Athens is one 
example of what happens when the ambiguous legal safeguards and immobilising tendencies of the 
EU meet a national context of deterrence. Amygdaleza, the first facility specifically created for pre-
removal, is a massive construction, with capacity for 2,000 people spanning over 30,000 m2, and 
located within convenient distance from the police academy. It opened in April 2012 and was 
covered extensively by national and international media, its exact specifications reproduced and 
characterised by some at the time as being of ‘uncommonly high standards’.140 Amygdaleza 
comprised of three barbed-wire wings with separate backyards and laundry areas, and 250 container 
homes, each to host 8 detainees in approximately 30m2.141 Police officers would guard the centre on 
the outside, whilst unarmed private security guards would be patrolling inside. The Greek authorities 
framed Amygdaleza as in full compliance with the EU’s recommendations. As government officials 
noted "We maintain the rule of law, implement European solutions, protect our society’s interests, 
but also the illegal migrants’ rights.”142 The criticisms which emerged within a few months suggested 
a very different reality. The Greens of the European Parliament for example stressed “We regret 
having to report that we consider the Amygdaleza detention centre to be substandard and the 
conditions unacceptable for an EU member state.”143 Their statement echoed the opinion of the 
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Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), which reported that “Greece has focused on 
reinforcing its external borders, and started a policy which relies too heavily on detention.”144 
Conclusions 
Define, on the two-dimensional surface of the earth, lines across which 
motion is to be prevented, and you have one of the key themes of history. 
With a closed line (i.e., a curve enclosing a figure), and the prevention of 
motion from outside the line to its inside, you derive the idea of property. 
With the same line, and the prevention of motion from inside to outside, 
you derive the idea of prison. With an open line (i.e., a curve that does not 
enclose a figure), and the prevention of motion in either direction, you 
derive the idea of border. Properties, prisons, borders: it is through the 
prevention of motion that space enters history.145 
The above quote of Reviel Netz sums up perceptively the conceptual and material bearing of 
walls and fences. This chapter has encountered all three themes of fencing in one way or another. 
Firstly, in the erected barriers against migrants and asylum-seekers, the fence of Evros and the ones 
that followed. Secondly, in the expanding use of the practice of detention, and the deployment of 
Greece as a site for containing human excess. Thirdly, in the immobilising practices of surveillance 
and apprehension of the bodies of those who ‘do not belong’.  
The chapter has also explored the experience of making a crisis, as illustrative of 
transformations in the EU integration project itself. On the one hand, this indicates a departure from 
the capacity the EU has most vocally defended in the international stage; that of a broker of peace, 
and a fair normative power. While there are several examples in recent history, from Rwanda to 
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Libya, where the EU failed to act in a decisive manner as a ‘force for good’, this particular 
catastrophe is of importance because it has been taking place on EU territory and waters.  
On the other hand, the so-called ‘migration crisis’ has exposed existing or created new gaps 
in conventional understandings which view the EU project as a process driven by rationalism; 
whether in a disciplinary framework as do functionalist and neo-functionalist accounts of 
integration, or in a politico-philosophical sense with reference to Descartes and the European 
modernity of Reason. Acting in concert should have been enabled both by the existence of an 
enormous administrative apparatus, and by raw interest-calculation. Assessing the current waves of 
migration in their actual rather than politically inflated scale, compared to past episodes as well as to 
the regional context, and  investing in integrating refugees, is widely believed to be in the EU’s and 
the member-states’ best interest. A more welcoming approach could minimize the potential for 
future conflict within the host societies, initiate stabilising spill-over in the volatile eastern 
Mediterranean region, retain international capital by upholding legal and normative standards, and 
gain from a young and flexible workforce which can make positive contributions to the Eurozone’s 
slow and damaged economy. That no support for such action exists owes not only to a lack of 
diplomatic virtuosity, but also because it requires resolving a difficult EU policy dilemma; the pattern 
of drawing on a politics of fear for the expansion of the EU’s border control apparatus, when it is the 
same politics that fuels nationalisms and disintegration. In the words of Rosemary Righter “terrorism 
and immigration have rooted themselves in more or less the same area of the popular cortex, and 
confidence that things are “in control” can be restored only at national level.”146  
Finally, this chapter has suggested we view Greece as a European borderland, which has 
meant to disentangle from statist geographical projections and maps where borders between 
countries are the dominant ways of organizing the image, but also from amalgamated over-
ambitious maps of a borderless EUrope. The following chapter develops further this form of spatial 
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thinking, which breaks down pre-given lines and re-constructs them in historically, geographically, 
and politically contextualized ways.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Power and Life in Situ: 
The Refugee Camp of Piraeus as Biopolitical Heterotopia 
Introduction 
We have thus far examined some of the bipolar tensions that underwrite the EU’s 
borderwork; the discontinuous assortment of common legislative provisions and state-of-the-art 
border security technologies on the one hand, and ‘modern’ forms of gate-keeping, such as barbed-
wire fences along member-states’ borders on the other. This chapter is concerned with exploring the 
EU’s ‘Janus’ border politics in a productive sense. Building on the theme of containment, it 
investigates the transformations that combined border policies bring about in the paradigmatic 
border space of the camp. 
In March 2016, in the short ten days between the sealing of the Greek-Macedonian border 
which blocked the Balkan pathway and the signing of a deal between the EU and Turkey on 
stemming migration flows to Europe,1 approximately 50,000 asylum-seekers found themselves 
‘trapped’ in Greece, the country that most had come to think as a transit corridor rather than a 
destination. In the port of Piraeus, the first point of arrival to the Greek mainland after the Aegean 
crossing, an unofficial refugee camp emerged within days. Families uncertain of their next move 
took shelter in passenger lounges, and local volunteer groups quickly organised basic aid 
distribution. The camp was sensationalised by national and international media as an iconic space of 
solidarity and resistance. Cameras captured Greek citizens donating food and clothes, volunteers 
stacking aid boxes in containers, and famous actors, athletes, and benefactors talking to refugee 
children. What most of these media reports disregarded was the watchtower that stood erect a few 
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meters away, the EU Regional Task Force (EURTF) premises, the command post and nerve centre for 
Greek and EU border officials’ activities. 
Diken and Laustsen, following Agamben, have claimed that the camp “can only be defined in 
relation, or perhaps rather in ‘non-relation’, to what is historically termed a ‘city.’”2 Stimulated by 
this observation, the camp is examined as much in terms of its own town-like qualities, as in relation 
to the actual ‘town’ within which it is encased. The camp’s juxtapositions, of the agents of sovereign 
power and those who defy it, did not take place in a vacuum. It unfolded upon and tied into a 
geographical and historical canvas of urban, human, and economic displacement. The city of Piraeus 
has an ambivalent relationship to the Greek capital, seen at times as one of its many suburbs, and at 
others as an ‘equal’ urban counterpart. Its modern identity is intimately tied to its refugee heritage 
having become the new home to more than 100,000 uprooted Ottoman Greeks in 1922. As the main 
shipping and commercial port in the country, it is an internationalised hub for people and goods on 
the move, and recently the site of intense strike action, at the heart of controversial debates 
regarding the privatisation of the port and the loss of Greek economic sovereignty.  
There are three ways in which the camp in the port’s passenger terminal sheds light on 
place- and subject-making processes taking place at the EU’s external perimeter. Firstly, the 
presence/absence of the sovereign enables us to investigate a form of camp that challenges 
dominant categories cited in camp literatures, inspired by Schmittian and Agambenian notions of 
spaces of sovereign exception. Secondly, its emplacement within the space of daily urban life 
provides rich opportunities to investigate the localised effects of border policy, and the ways in 
which the latter blends with local histories and geographies, economic processes and class struggles. 
Thirdly, the proximity of the refugee tents and the watchtower makes visible the existence of two 
contending biopolitical logics of human distribution, which brand some lives more ‘worth living’ than 
others: the excess life of the refugee and the executive life of EU workforce. 
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To make sense of this complexity, Foucault’s concept of a heterotopia can be a valuable tool. 
Heterotopias are ‘loose’ space-times that lack a determined identity; they ‘stand out’ within their 
surroundings, acting as mirrors of the polity to which they belong, and exaggerate the polity’s 
contradictions by bringing them in greater proximity. The heterotopia, which blends in helpful ways 
the spatial and temporal boundaries of spaces associated with the exercise of power, can shed light 
on the novel ways in which camps are entering the daily experience of urban life. 
The chapter begins by reviewing recent contributions to camp literature, identifying a 
‘social’ gap in the conceptual space that has been opened up between two paradigmatic camp 
forms: the exceptionalist camp of sovereign excess, and the camp as an instrument of diffused 
biopolitical control. A second part narrates a journey through time and space in the refugee camp of 
Piraeus, taking note of the numerous figures who bring it to life, enacting complex power relations 
and delineating shifting spatialities. The Foucauldian notion of a heterotopia is then introduced as a 
helpful -although not unproblematic - conceptual tool, and a particular reading is proposed, tailored 
to the analysis of border-spaces. Subsequently, the city of Piraeus is examined, as urban, human, 
and economic space, and the pervasive theme of displacement is brought forth, as the key 
resonance between the city and the camp. A final part returns to the camp, to examine the uneasy 
proximity of the refugee tent and the watchtower, and to question the biopolitical logics of 
population distribution that bring it about. Observing an overlap of geometries and sovereignties, 
which unsettles the Agambenian adage that the excluded is ‘taken outside’, it is argued that the 
blurring of the boundary between the included and the excluded is indicative of the increasingly 
tense balance that the EU’s ‘janus’ border politics attempts to strike. 
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Theorising Camps 
Following Zygmunt Bauman, who termed the 20th century ‘the age of the camp’,3 but also 
Agamben’s claim of the camp as the ‘global nomos of our time’,4 the camp is neither a novelty nor a 
naturalised ancient practice, but a historical formation whose genealogy appears enclosed within 
what can be broadly called European modernity. Recent IR and Political Geography scholarship, 
often driven by a moral imperative, have critically examined the European and Western origins of 
camps as well as their persistent presence since;5 their inception during the Boer War,6 their 
proliferation in the early 20th century colonies in Africa and Cuba,7 and their re-deployment ‘back 
home’, in the Stalinist and Nazi death camps8, and more recently in the signature human container 
of Guantánamo Bay,9 and the migrant detention centres across the EU area. But beyond providing 
fruitful motivation to remove camps from the “realm of the unspeakable”,10 this proliferating camp 
scholarship has also called attention to the human management model of containment and control, 
and its conditions of possibility and re-invention. If, to paraphrase Agamben, the camp is ‘that which 
remains’11 of the pre-EU era, the missing link between the geographies of colonial geopolitics of 
race, Auschwitz, and biopolitical security regimes after 9/11, EU topologies can hardly escape the 
camp’s grasp. 
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Camps, as enclosed spaces with a determined function, appear in many forms, including 
recreational ones. However, the two infamous camps of the last century, Auschwitz and 
Guantánamo, have caused for a widespread perception of the camp alongside the lines of exception 
and detention. These two absolute camps, perhaps non-comparable in terms of their lethality, 
represent the extremes of their respective eras, and they carry together similar connotations of 
exceptional circumstances, lawlessness, and internment. However, as Minca puts it, camps have 
become “constitutive hubs of much broader geo-political economies”,12 and several blind-spots 
remain when this body of camp literature is projected upon the multiplicity of forms that camps 
take. This literature is briefly reviewed below, to identify some of these gaps, and possible ways of 
addressing them that have been put forth. 
Spaces of Exception 
Camp literature has mostly focused on the works of theorists of exception, Schmitt and 
Agamben, to analyse the workings of power within the camp. Across those arguments, two 
contending paradigmatic forms of the camp emerge as protagonists; the camp as an exceptional, 
spatiotemporally dislocated space, and the camp as a biopolitical instrument of population 
management. In this literature, the expected problem of privileging one over the other seems less 
pressing than the problem of identifying ways in which the two relate and potentially reinforce on 
another.  
An exceptionalist camp geography follows from a ‘purist’ reading of Schmitt’s corpus, and 
particularly of his earlier works. In Political Theology (1922), Schmitt defined sovereignty as the right 
of the ruler to decide on the exception, and considered this decision to be the actualisation of the 
sovereign’s power.13 For Schmitt, who was developing these thoughts as the Weimer crisis was 
unfolding, unbounded state-authority was necessary to maintain the integrity of the state and the 
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nation in the face of conflict, war, or other emergency situation. This authoritarian and decisionist 
conception of politics, and the clear lines it draws between inside/outside, friends/enemies, 
order/disorder, has also translated into what has been called a ‘methodological extremism.’14 
Schmitt’s bold articulations enforce this view. “The exception is more interesting than the rule. The 
rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything.”15 Following this political and scholarly 
approach of clear distinctions, Schmitt’s camp emerges as a ‘borderline’ situation, an absolutely 
contained and exceptional space at the verge of the normal juridical, spatial, and temporal order. 
Newer Schmittian readings have emerged in the last decade and a half, following the wide 
taking of Agamben’s work, and the attention that the concept of exception has received in the 
context of the Global War on Terror.16 These ‘post-Agambenian’ renditions,17 draw on Schmitt’s later 
works and particularly the 1950 Nomos of the Earth which was translated into English in 2003.18 
They have focused on different aspects of his thought. Such are the existing structure of rules 
conditioning the decision on what counts as exception, already present in Political Theology,19 but 
also his dual post-war turn from the domestic to the international, and from the juridico-political to 
the relation between law, politics, and space. This latter relation comes together in the ideas of a 
European Grossraum (Great Area), and of “an original constitutive act of spatial ordering”20, one 
which he termed nomos. Minca and Rowan, who have undertaken a careful analysis of the 
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development of Schmitt’s spatial thought in historical context,21 shed light on the geopolitical visions 
the concept of the nomos entails:  
At the crux of Schmitt’s argument lay the notion that international law 
concerned above all the management of war. The existence of ‘free’ spaces 
for competition between European powers in the ‘New World’ and the 
world’s oceans allowed European land to become a space of order and 
relative peace from which conflict was displaced ‘beyond the line.’22  
Within these more nuanced readings of Schmitt, and notwithstanding the dangers of reading 
too much relevance into his politically qualified geographical interpretations, the conceptualisations 
of the camp that can be drawn are consequential in a different way; the camp’s own ordering is 
somehow of lesser sovereign interest in itself, but rather serves as a container for the excess of the 
order that is being established inside. In this vein, Johns performs a reading of Schmitt which de-
privileges the state, to study the strategies of internment and control in Guantánamo Bay.23 It is 
convincingly argued there that such strategies have been sustained through their own normalisation, 
and their making as un-exceptional through the evasion of any actual decision. The paper concludes 
that Guantánamo Bay is “to a hyperbolic degree, a work of legal representation and classification: an 
instance of the norm struggling to overtake the exception.”24 This is a view similar to the one that 
Aradau has put forth, arguing that Schmitt’s nomos, taken as order and orientation in space imposed 
by the most powerful, can help us understand Guantánamo as a space appropriated by a law in the 
process of transformation.25 
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The exception has a different meaning in Agamben. Drawing on Benjamin’s critique of 
Schmitt, which has crystallised in the proposition that ‘the exception has become the rule’, Agamben 
has reframed exceptionalism as the dominant paradigm of contemporary sovereign politics in the 
west. This rendition of the exception focuses on the subject and the sovereign act that places some 
subjects outside the law while still taking hold of them, included by virtue of their exclusion. 
Agamben’s contra-distinction to Schmitt’s thesis is precisely about the existence of such 
indistinction: “[W]hat Schmitt could in no way accept was that the state of exception be wholly 
confused with the rule.”26 However, the point that the philosopher makes here is not just about an 
exception that is somehow non-transcedental or non-eschatological, which is Agamben’s reading of 
Benjamin’s critique.27 It is about going beyond the exception as an inversion of the hold of law, 
arbitrary and violent, and as constitutive of a structure of itself, one which he terms, borrowing from 
Jean-Luc Nancy,28 the structure of the ban. 
Agamben considers the camp to be the paradigmatic space of the sovereign ban, the 
principles of which have been projected and extended to become “the hidden matrix and nomos”29 
by which western societies are ordered. Agamben defines the camp as “the space that is opened 
when the state of exception begins to become the rule.”30 In other words, the camp is not the space 
that encloses the exception but the zone of indistinction that erupts between them when exception 
and rule approximate, taking the form of two poles, and activating a charged field between them. It 
is within this field that the ‘originary sovereign act’31 is performed, to include by exclusion and 
produce bare life. This production invites the separation of life into biological (zoē) and political 
(bios), a divide present already in ancient Greek philosophy, and consists in the reduction of the 
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subject, or rather of some subjects, into the elements of the former, their living organism taken 
control of, their politically qualified being suppressed.32  
The concept of bare life has opened fruitful ways into connecting the biopolitical rationality 
of population management to the realities of contemporary camps. Minca’s work has been 
invaluable in this respect, having elaborated in a series of reflective papers the theoretical 
implications of spatialising the state of exception, as well as the ways in which the latter is entering 
our everyday geographical experiences. 33 In Minca’s words “[t]he space of exception is, then, an 
unsettling point of contact between the broader structure of the norm and the individual, between 
geography (in its cartographic, geometrical sense) and biography.”34 Therefore, one of the ways in 
which Agamben’s camp is particularly useful is that it remains open to a certain indeterminacy. The 
camp “pure, absolute, and impassable” is at the same time a phenomenon that undergoes 
“metamorphoses and disguises.”35 Indeed, Agamben has been critical not only of the sovereign 
power of the state, which is not alone in producing bare life in camps, but also of liberal 
humanitarianism: 
The separation between humanitarianism and politics that we are 
experiencing today is the extreme phase of the separation of the rights of 
man from the rights of the citizen, in the final analysis, however, 
humanitarian organizations – which today are more and more supported 
by international commissions – can only grasp human life in the figure of 
bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret 
solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight36 
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In this vein, Edkins has unpacked the ways in which this ‘secret solidarity’ works, examining 
the famine relief camps of the 1980s in Sudan alongside NATO’s refugee camps in Macedonia after 
NATO’s own ‘humanitarian’ bombing campaign in March 1999. It is demonstrated there that aid 
workers and NATO both engaged in sovereign power performances and arbitrary decisions, 
producing “a form of life that can be saved (as bare life), not as people whose communities and 
livelihoods have been destroyed, but who still have political views.”37  
Post-exceptional Camps and the ‘Social’ Gap 
The research focus on exception and detention, which has matched the intensity of the 
phenomena described, has somehow obscured the differentiation that exists across camps, even 
within those that one might associate with power, borders, and international mobility. Beyond 
government-run detention, identification, transit, and refugee camps, or humanitarian camps run by 
international organisations, there are also informal camps such as the one near the outsourced UK 
border in Calais, or the one in Idomeni near the Greek-Macedonian border, supported by NGOs, 
activist groups, and volunteers. There are camps that have turned into permanent settlements, such 
as the Afghani settlement in Pakistan, referred to by some media outlets as ‘tomorrow’s cities.’38 It 
has been estimated that over 10 million lived in a protracted refugee situation39 in 2011.40 However, 
there is not enough empirical engagement in Political Geography with camps that do not fit one of 
the standard parameters of exception, urgency, and detention, and existing camp-theory seems to 
leave a lot of these instances unaccounted for. 
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The ‘post-Agambenian’ Schmittian approaches manage to work around the problems of 
Schmitt’s anchors to 20th century geopolitics, such as a static understanding of national and 
international territory,41 and they capture important ways in which the space of the camp is being 
deployed under neoliberalism. Nevertheless, the focus of these contributions on Guantánamo but 
not in other, fuzzier instances of encampment, seems to somehow reflect the methodological 
extremism accorded to Schmitt. Furthermore, these works do not seem to aim at grasping and 
interpreting the societal aspect of contemporary camps. This is understandable. Schmitt’s aversion 
to pluralism and liberal constitutionalism, which he saw as inherently undermining the state and its 
capacity to handle emergencies, also prevented his theory from accessing the societal in much 
depth. As Huysmans notes Schmitt’s project, underpinned by the intention “to separate the concept 
of the political from its historical form”, implies a state that is “clearly distinct from societal forces.”42 
However, either by reference to the multiple forms of social engagement, the growing footage of 
camps in the media and first hand interactions of Western citizens with camps and camp figures, or 
to the more fundamental parallels which some scholars identify in our increasingly camp-looking 
societies,43 the relationship between society, the camp, and exception appears just as demanding of 
attention as are the strategies by which camps are brought into existence and operate. 
Similarly, and as famously noted by Connolly, a certain finality seems to accompany 
Agamben’s concept of bare life.44 Amoore and Hall have extended this reflection on Agamben’s tight 
sovereign categories of subjects and subjectivities, by examining the role of the clown in border 
activism. The clown, it is argued, draws in a complex genealogy of proximity to sovereign power, and 
occupies a hybrid, privileged and dangerous, inside/outside position which cannot be inscribed 
within the categories that Agamben’s sovereignty draws. This figure, the authors note, brings out 
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two interrelated problems with the acute deployment of the Agambenian argument: the neglect of 
“the politics of subjects who are not readily made objects of biopower”45; and the re-production of 
dichotomous identity references and indolent understandings of resistance as merely ‘counter-’ or 
‘anti-’ sovereign, which misses the multiplicity of ways in which resistance and sovereign power 
reside within one another.  
The way out of this problem, it has been argued, does not deviate from Agamben’s thinking 
entirely. It rather involves re-focusing on the philosophers’ lesser-known discussions about a ‘form-
of-life’, a ‘whatever being’,46 which is not tied to any identity, and which go beyond the condition of 
sovereignty and well into the realm of subjecthood and ways of being.47 Nevertheless, applying the 
concept of a ‘form-of-life’ within Agamben’s own descriptions of the camp is less than 
straightforward. When considering Agamben’s camp, firmly defined in terms of sovereignty, death, 
and the production of bare life, and trying to picture at the same time the ‘whatever being’ inside it, 
the gap between the ‘two Agambens’, the negative and the affirmative, the critical and the 
constructive, which Antonio Negri has remarked upon48 becomes visible, and requires bridging. 
Whilst Foucault is not one to emerge often in the exception literatures, some scholars have 
considered his thinking as an alternative to these approaches.49  In his paper Foucault in 
Guantánamo, Neal proposes a Foucauldian take on the camp, as an alternative to Schmitt, 
Agamben, as well as Waever’s securitisation theory, whose respective exceptionalisms, it is argued, 
perpetuate the primacy of the sovereign, and remain tied to dualistic understandings and separating 
lines. “If these limits do not attempt to mark off the domain of sovereign power, then at least the 
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decision over the shape and location of these limits is accorded to sovereign power.”50 Neal turns to 
Foucault’s earlier, ‘archaeological’ thought to develop a different account of exception. Archaeology, 
the author contends “[W]ould not seek to find beneath the appearance of exceptional statements 
and practices the return of the formal conditions of sovereignty, security or the metaphysical 
possibility of ‘the exception.’”51 It would rather entrench any instance of rupture within a plural grid 
of “temporally and spatially dispersed regularities”52 and, quoting Foucault, “divide up their diversity 
into different figures.”53  
It appears however that Neal’s argument as to why Agamben’s theory is in this respect 
inadequate lies on a selective reading of Agamben. Neal takes issue with Agamben’s exceptionalism, 
viewing it as an expression of a logical-philosophical rather than a political problem: “Giorgio 
Agamben proffers a less political and more philosophical totalization of exceptional sovereign 
decision by erecting it as a central pillar of the whole paradigm of Western politics, projecting the 
problem backwards and transcendentalizing it in a rather vain way”54 However, Neal only engages 
with the philosophical problematisations of Agamben’s exception, and does not make reference to 
the more concrete analytical descriptions, and particularly the logic of a zone of indistinction. Even in 
his privileging of Foucault’s archaeology over genealogy, some doubts emerge as to whether the 
paper is concerned with tangible manifestations of ‘exception’, as the title suggests, or with the 
discursive play between contending theories. 
At any rate, Neal insightfully identifies both a need and a way to access the historical and 
geographical conditions of possibility of camps, although his approach as argued does not preclude 
Agamben’s camp from being considered alongside. As Vaughan-Williams writes, in Agamben’s logic 
of the field, “entities within it are not mutually exclusive phenomena but physically continuous 
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within their milieu of interaction.”55 It is therefore, in keeping rather than disagreeing with Neal’s 
line of sight that this chapter later on restages the camp as a zone of indistinction within Foucauldian 
thought. 
The following section, which precedes this discussion, narrates a journey through time and 
space in the refugee camp in the port of Piraeus, attempting to bring out the multiplicity of subjects, 
modes of subject-making, and grids of power relations, as illustrative of the challenges that 
theoretical approaches to new types of camps will need to accommodate. 
A Walk in the Camp 
The refugee camp of Piraeus’ passenger terminal operated between March and July 2016, 
hosting a shifting population; peaking at approximately 5,300 persons around the time of the EU-
Turkey deal on March 20, and decreasing over the course of the next few months, as people were 
gradually transferred to state-run facilities.56 During this time, the terminal assumed a town-like 
configuration, extending concentrically from the EURTF watchtower, making use of the existing 
passenger lounges complex, and the port’s internal shuttle bus. Let us walk through the different 
areas of this tent-city, as they appear and disappear over time. 
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Figure 2.1 The Piraeus refugee camp over time 
 
It is March 20, and we are entering the port through Gate E3. This is the smallest lounge of 
the complex, hosting no more than 300 people, almost all of them Syrian families with small 
children. The dwelling consists of an indoors area, which fits approximately 20 tents, and a small 
‘garden’ area outside, with benches which are also used for sleeping. It is run by a small group of 
local activists who support the homeless of Piraeus, unlike the rest of the camp which is 
administered by the larger network of local actors, the ‘Pan-Piraeus Initiative in Support of the 
Refugees’. This lounge stands out due to its orderly administration and friendly atmosphere. Located 
at the furthest end of the complex, and right off a central street, this hub interacts the most with 
daily normality, but it is also fenced by bushes which, according to the volunteers, “make all the 
difference” in maintaining order, providing privacy for the families, and keeping away criminal 
elements.57 There are birthday parties and games, which one-time volunteers and passers-by 
attempt to photograph, only to be informed by members of the group that cameras are not allowed.  
It is April 1 as we are getting on the port’s shuttle bus, heading to Gate E2. The vehicle is 
packed with young male asylum-seekers, although there are also a few uniformed officers of the 
Hellenic Coast Guard on their way to work, and some tourists with large suitcases on their way to 
some Aegean island. As we get off the bus in front of Gate E2, a disenchanted driver complains 
about the smell that he has to endure all day, adding that this was ‘not his job.’ The atmosphere is 
entirely different in the biggest of the dwellings, an enormous and dimly lit open plan area which is 
hidden from street-sight, tucked behind an even larger, derelict stone structure, an old barn 
decorated in sea-themed graffiti. Over 2,500 are camped there, in truly unhygienic conditions, with 
access to only 20 chemical toilet booths. A middle-age female cleaner, a low paid employee of 
private contractors is “trying her best to help these people”, at the same time warning young female 
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volunteers off socialising with Muslim men. The members of the Pan-Piraeus Initiative are pulling 12-
hour shifts, distributing aid, and mediating conflicts that erupt over the few available tents. The large 
numbers and shielded architecture makes Gate E2 an attractive pole for smugglers who flood the 
area in the night hours, spreading misleading information that the Greek-Macedonian border may 
still be crossed. During the hours of daylight however, it is the preferred shooting location for 
camera crews, who secure hours of emotive footage of refugee children getting vaccinated at the 
children’s ‘hospital’ which operates there. The state remains mostly absent, with the exception of 
the regular patrols of the Hellenic Coast Guard officers.  
It is April 10 as we board the bus again, and a fresh instalment of refugees arrives, having 
just been transferred from Gate E3; the first of the three dwellings to be evacuated, cleaned, and 
returned to tourist use. 
It is May 1 as we arrive at the passenger lounge beside Gate E1, which stands across, and is 
fully visible from, the watchtower. It acts as a sort of headquarters, collecting aid from individuals 
and organisations, organising the storage of goods and consumables, arranging for distribution of 
food to the other buildings, and hosting meetings where a daily schedule is devised for shifts, eating 
times, curfew etc. Anyone who is not an asylum-seeker can let themselves into the storage room 
where the food is kept, and help themselves to a snack. Anyone can turn down a refugee asking for a 
snack, instructing them to wait until dinner-time. Children of gypsy families who live in the area are 
also turned away. Organisation however leaves a lot to be desired. Sacks of bread and milk are going 
off somewhere in the back, after having been wrongly stacked along with the biscuits. The same 
boxes of baby-formula are being carried back and forth from the container to the storage room 
several times. Somehow belatedly, UNHCR, as well as Greek and international NGOs, have also set-
up container offices there. Some workers of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) are briefing 
refugees on asylum procedures, but they don’t coexist easily with the volunteer coordinators and 
soon abandon the task. Further down a confused man in ancient Greek warrior attire, distributes 
food to a refugee queue, at the same time cursing at them in Greek “Go back to where you came 
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from.” Approximately 1,500 remain in the port now, most of them in and around Gate E1, as Gate E2 
has also been dismantled. 
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Figure 2.2 The refugee tents and the watchtower at Gate E158 
 
The EURTF, the EU’s new multi-agency entity, stands erect right in the middle of the 
remaining tents, visible to everyone but known to few. It resides inside/outside a domineering 
edifice of Greek sovereignty, the white and blue building that hosts the Greek Ministry for Shipping, 
and the headquarters of the Hellenic Coast Guard.  The 11-storey watchtower communicates with 
the 6-storey main building through a bridge on the latter’s top floor, and access is a complicated 
procedure. The officials residing up there only passively engage with the refugees below, 
manoeuvring through tents to reach the parking lots each morning. 
As we exit the terminal on May 30, the initial utopian atmosphere of a solidarity town has 
entirely evaporated. It has been replaced by fights between asylum-seekers of different national 
groups, and by volunteer and donors’ fatigue, the latter also discouraged by warnings of the Greek 
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Ministry for Public Health on the risks of infectious disease in refugee camps.59 Although the 
evacuation of the port in time for the beginning of the tourist season had been framed as a matter 
of urgency, the last tent of the camp will only be folded in late July. 
Emerging Questions 
The short-lived refugee camp of Piraeus does not find adequate explanations in the theory 
thus far discussed. An open arrangement, in the heart rather than the edge of the urban landscape, 
administered by local civil society, and passively monitored from a distance, it escapes 
understandings of the camp as either insular spaces of sovereign excess or diffused posts of 
biopolitical control. It is included in the multiple networks of those who inhabit it, those who 
administer it, those who profit from it, and those who watch it remotely. Through this indistinction, 
many of the standard divisions of social space seem to collapse as the refugees’ space of living 
becomes conflated with the locals’ space of resistance, the border guards’ and the smugglers’ space 
of work. As such, three lines of questioning emerge. 
Firstly: What resonances exist between the lines that structure the camp and the lines that 
structure the city, as well as between the lines that are thereby collapsing? 
Secondly: How can we conceptualise the role of the societal in its heterogeneity beyond the 
binary understandings of sovereignty/resistance, inside/outside, and subjugation/solidarity?  
Thirdly: What kind of sovereignty is implied by the presence/absence of the state and the EU 
in the camp, and what are the power effects of the passive surveillance habitus?  
The following section introduces Foucault’s concept of a heterotopia, tracing the theoretical 
ground within which answers to these questions will be sought.  
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Different/Other Spaces 
Foucault’s concept of a heterotopia is discussed in the posthumously published script of a 
lecture that Foucault delivered in 1967 to an amphitheatre of architecture students, named Des 
Espaces Autres (Of Other Spaces). The lecture had been based on a radio broadcast that he had given 
a year earlier, titled Utopies et Hétérotopies, and discussing literary themes, while a suggestive first 
use of the term appears in the preface to The Order of Things where the disorderly taxonomy of 
Borges’ Chinese encyclopedia is briefly described as heterotopic.60 Arrested between space and text, 
forgotten by the author, and never properly reviewed for publication, the concept comes with much 
promise but also with many limitations. This section first looks at how Foucault presented the 
heterotopias to his audience, and then offers one interpretation, embedding the heterotopia into his 
corpus, and outlining ways in which it can help us think about bounded political space. 
Outline  
Foucault’s essay can be broken down in three parts. A first introductory section arranges the 
historical and theoretical context by means of a brief ‘history of space’; a second part recounts a set 
of epistemological reductions; and a third part develops the six principles of an emerging 
heterotopology as “a sort of systematic description that would have as its object, in a given society, 
the study, analysis, description, and ‘reading’… of these different spaces”61 
According to Foucault, during the Middle Ages, a spatiality of hierarchy arranged the realm 
of social living, a space of localisation where things had a certain place, either naturally or violently 
assigned. Between the 17th and 19th century, this rigidly organized space of hierarchy, was 
supplanted by the modernist space of extension.  Under the influence of Galileo’s scientific 
discoveries and the Cartesian turn, which opened up “an infinite and infinitely open space”62 to be 
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submitted to rationalism, a ‘thing’s’, an object’s or subject’s place would be no more than a slowed-
down point in its continuous movement. Arriving at Foucault’s present moment,63 the question of 
space has been turned into a problematique of sites, and of grids of relations between sites; “Today 
the [space of] emplacement substitutes [the space of] extension”.64 
Against this backdrop of transitions, Foucault narrows down the empirical field of 
heterotopology in three successive steps, three complementary reductions: ‘outer spaces’, ‘mirror 
spaces’, ‘real spaces’. Firstly, heterotopias are not to be found in the phenomenological ‘inner 
space’, the spatial structure of subjective experience, “the space of our primary perception, the 
space of our dreams and that of our passions.”65 Heterotopology rather concerns the heterogeneous 
space in which humans live, and the set of relations that “delineate emplacements that cannot be 
equated or in any way superimposed.”66 Secondly, across this totality of a common lived space, 
Foucault singles out those spaces that act as society’s mirrors, the utopias and heterotopias, which 
have the curious ‘property’ of being in relation to all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspend, 
neutralize, or invert the set of relations designated by them. Thirdly, heterotopias are distinguished 
from the utopias, the mirror-spaces which have no-real place (ou-topos), and which reflect “society 
itself perfected” or “society turned upside down.”67 Heterotopias are by contrast the real places that 
make up our societies, and which contradict such ideal representations. “[A] sort of counter-
emplacements, a sort of effectively realized utopias”, Foucault writes, “a kind of places that are 
outside all places, even though they are actually localizable . . . places [that] are absolutely other 
than all the emplacements that they reflect”68 
Having provided an outline for the spaces that shall be considered as heterotopic, the 
second part of the script offers the six principles of the heterotopology. 
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1. Heterotopias fall into one of two categories; they will be either heterotopias of crisis, 
hosting individuals in a state of breakdown (adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant 
women, and the elderly are cited as examples here); or heterotopias of deviation, 
populated by individuals who are in some way deviant when compared to the societal 
norm.  
2. While considered a universal element of human civilisation, heterotopias are shifting in 
meaning and function over time. They are variable historical constants which operate 
“according to the synchrony of the culture in which they occur”69 
3. Heterotopias are spaces of juxtaposition, making it possible for several spaces which are in 
themselves irreconcilable to come together in “a single real place“70 
4. Heterotopias are connected to different rhythms of time; time may be accumulating ad 
infinitum (here we are given the example of museums and libraries) or assume a transitory 
form (as in the case of an annual fair or festival): “The heterotopia begins to function fully 
when people find themselves in a sort of absolute break with their traditional time.”71 
5. Heterotopias will be at once accessible and insular, and they will exercise a particular 
system of opening and closing. Entry might either be forced (as for example in the case of 
a prison) or enabled by a specific permission and subject to particular gestures, rituals, 
and acts of purification.72 Even then, Foucault continues, one’s entry may not be 
conclusive: “one believes to have entered and, by the very fact of entering, one is 
excluded.”73 
6. Heterotopias will perform one of two functions in relation to the remaining space of 
society; they will act either as a site of illusion “that exposes all real space . . . as even 
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more illusory”74 or as one of compensation, making up for the actual space in which we 
live, which is “disorderly, ill construed, and sketchy”75 
How to Read Heterotopias 
This chapter has been the hardest one for me to write, and by this I refer to the process of 
arranging the document in a coherent manner, once all the concepts and all the data are in place. I 
had been warned:   
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine 
language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because 
they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in 
advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but 
also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and 
also opposite one another) to ‘hold together’.76 
Whilst widely used to reflect on a host of real and metaphorical spaces, from Facebook77 to 
the body of the vampire,78 heterotopias appear to have received more criticism than praise in the 
spatial disciplines. Critiques converge on a view that while Foucault’s work showed the intention to 
tackle questions of space, his engagement lacked explicitness, depth, and momentum. Thrift has 
claimed that Foucault’s contributions to the spatial disciplines have been held back by blindness to 
the ‘aliveness’ of space and reluctance to incorporate affect in his analysis, which he attempted to 
ameliorate by inventing ‘non-categories’ such as heterotopias.79 Similarly, Saldanha finds Foucault’s 
effort to speak of spatial differentiation to be laid with structuralist flaws and underpinned by an 
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inadequately dynamic take on space.80 An underlying common frustration however has been that 
‘anything and everything’ can be a heterotopia. As de Cauter and Dehaene eloquently note “when 
putting on heterotopian spectacles, everything tends to take on heterotopian traits.”81 It has thus 
acquired the reputation of an umbrella term that may help us describe space, but has little to offer 
analytically.  
Frustration with the concept of the heterotopia is largely justified. The tight structure, 
conceptual formulas, reductions, and visual examples encourage a ‘standard’ reading of the 
heterotopia, as a textual map or a factual script. However, it is in this reading that the heterotopia 
becomes most problematic. Foucault’s essay, caught up in numerous tensions of terminology and 
denotation, proceeds with posing dilemmas and refusing to take sides. A comparison of the four 
different English translations of the essay illustrates this issue clearly, as translations of the French 
autre of the title have been divided between writing on ‘different’ and ‘other’ spaces.82 This binary 
ambiguity clashes with Foucault’s deceptive clarity in the use of straightforward dualisms 
(crisis/deviation, infinite/transient, illusion/compensation), in the sense that no framework emerges 
within which to make sense of them. 
Nevertheless, I feel that heterotopias can be a useful tool, in helping us capture the elusive 
in-betweenness of contemporary border spaces, precisely because they are inherently dialectic 
concepts, unfolding in multiple thresholds, between difference and otherness, norm and reality. As 
Foucault writes  
[P]erhaps our life is still ruled by a certain number of oppositions that 
cannot be touched, that institution and practice have not yet dared to 
undermine; oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example, 
                                                             
80
 Arun Saldanha, “Heterotopia and Structuralism,” Environment and Planning A 40, no. 9 (September 1, 2008): 
2080–96, doi:10.1068/a39336. 
81
 Michiel Dehaene and Lieven de Cauter, Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 6. 
82
 Miscowiec who first translated the text, as well as Dehaene and de Cauter whose translation this chapter 
uses, have opted for Of Other Spaces, whilst Hurley titles his translation as Different Spaces, a take that 
Johnson agrees with in his review essay Unravelling Foucault’s ‘Different Spaces’ 
Chapter Two 
 
90 
 
between private space and public space, between family space and social 
space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of 
leisure and that of work. All these are animated by an unspoken 
sacralisation.83 
To this end though, a different, looser reading of the essay is required, one that refrains 
from seeking to extract fixed meanings, structures, and transposable formulas, allowing for the 
binary ambiguity to transform into dialectic multiplicity. The reading that helped me unlock 
heterotopias for the project at hand was, as Strausz contends, an ‘experimental’ and ‘experiential’ 
one, involving a certain “scholarly presence, a mode of being and a form of doing that turn[s] 
discourse into a contested site to be thought and to be in.”84 Foucault’s own work takes us some of 
the way to translating this into analytical practice. As Strausz notes amongst others,85 a certain 
metamorphosis takes place in Foucault’s work, which distinguishes the author of the History of 
Sexuality (and Of Other Spaces) in 1966 from the lecturer at the College de France in the 1970s, and 
which involves the notion of parrhesia. Whilst this turn has mostly been linked to the so-called ethics 
of subjectivity, the project of the making of the self, the caring for the self, and the governance of 
multitudes through the dissemination of modes of governing the self, what it also stands for is a 
more explicit approach to the ‘telling of the truth’.  
Truthful spaces 
Foucault’s turn to the telling of the truth-as-it-is, also plays out spatially in the implicit re-
appearance of the heterotopias problematique in the first of his 1977-1978 lectures, titled Security, 
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Territory, Population.86 There, Foucault discusses the different treatments of multiplicity in space, by 
the modulations of sovereignty, discipline, and security articulated in examples of three town-
planning models, the succession of which amounts to a coming politics of accommodating reality. 
The first example, which echoes the space of localisation, is a fictional town, at the head of a 
“well ‘capitalised’ state.”87 The paradigmatic space of sovereignty, which represents the imperative 
of the law and the ruler, is sketched upon a concentric circles model. The circles are organised in 
three societal, functional, and geographical orders; a) the peasants of the countryside, b) the 
artisans in the small towns, and c) the sovereign and the officers at his service in the centre.  It is 
thus identical to the architectural form that Foucault has also referred to as the panopticon, or 
Bentham’s utopia.  
 
Figure 2.3: the geometry of sovereignty 
 
The second example, resonant with the space of extension, is a model-town, which is built 
from scratch, in order to organise the hierarchical distribution of elements across space.  The 
resulting geometry is one of squares, rectangular blocks, and divisionary central streets, creating 
separations such as between the living quarters and the trading quarters, or the wealthy areas and 
the poor ones. This is the space that Foucault identifies with the roman camp. 
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Figure 2.4: the geometry of discipline 
 
Foucault’s third topological example, evoking the space of emplacement, is a real town 
(Nantes) representing “the real development of towns that actually existed.”88 Planning space 
according to the dispositif of security will involve a range of spatial techniques, for optimally 
managing existing space rather than work on a blank canvas, taking into account natural and 
artificial givens. This space will not (and cannot) have any one definite form. It will not be subject to 
any one a priori logic. It will rather work on estimates of probabilities of future events, materialising 
in an oscillating geography of overlaps and surveillance 
 
Figure 2.5 the geometry of security 
The resonance which becomes evident when reading the three town-examples as an 
analytically tighter articulation of the history of space enables tracing these tangible schematic forms 
back to a spatio-ontological ground, the delineation of space through the movements of localisation, 
extension, and emplacement. But further to this, heterotopias have an organic part to play in the tri-
fold schema of sovereignty- discipline- security, as ‘passages’ between these pre-defined and ad hoc 
topologies.  As Foucault writes 
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 [T]here is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new 
causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the 
disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do 
not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico-
legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, 
of course the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway 
become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the 
dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation 
between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and 
mechanisms of security.89 (my emphasis) 
Heterotopias can therefore help us unpack these complex edifices, and operationalise the 
potentiality, simultaneity, and connectivity of heterogeneous postmodern spaces, taking into 
account the binary oppositions at play. Considering both the camp and its surroundings as 
heterotopias, as spaces of porosity,90 enables us to keep sight of the ways in which they remain 
connected, even when both undergo transformations. 
The two works that have been discussed, taken as discursive/textual spaces, partake in a 
movement in themselves, as the first and middle steps in the tri-step passage from fiction, to model, 
to reality. This is a movement parallel to the one that Neal brings forth in his analysis: “Foucault 
urges a move in the other direction, to resist the move from the particular to the formal, from the 
dispersed to the unified, from the different to the same.”91 If the essay on the heterotopias is read as 
a discursive space of fictional unity and if the lecture of Security, Territory, Population is taken as the 
discursive space of models and hierarchy, then a third part to follow will be the description of a real 
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space, which will redeploy these previous elements for its own tactical purposes within its specific 
task.  
Before the chapter proceeds with unpacking the ‘real spaces’ of Piraeus, an 
apology/clarification is in order. I have omitted from this discussion Ed Soja’s reading of Foucault’s 
heterotopology. Soja’s chapter “Heterotopologies: Foucault and the Geohistory of Otherness” which 
sits right in the middle of his monograph Thirdspace, offers one of the most lucid, critical, and 
constructive engagements with heterotopology that I have come across. It involves an intersectional 
review of post-colonial, feminist, and post-historicist spatial critique, tapping into the wide range of 
‘differences’ that are implied by the heterotopological epistemology. The author does not hold back 
on the shortcomings of Foucault’s presentation of the concept, but finds through them a promising 
“intentional disordering and disruption.”92 Soja’s analysis argues for the incorporation of 
heterotopias within the radical project of an ‘alternative envisioning of spatiality’. Heterotopias “are 
meant to detonate, to deconstruct, not to be comfortably poured back into old containers.”93 I have 
drawn inspiration from this discussion, and particularly from Soja’s three-sided sensibility of 
‘spatiality-historicality-sociality’, aligned as much with Foucault’s trinity of space-knowledge-power, 
as with Lefebvre’s trialectics of space, and I have borrowed from his analysis the idea of a time-space 
journey. Nevertheless, I feel that this approach entails a taxing and not entirely necessary dilemma; 
heterotopias can either work within a radically reformulated conceptual framework or they will not 
work at all. I would like to suggest here that heterotopias can still be usefully incorporated in 
analyses of contemporary spaces, where ‘old containers’, camps, cities, states, are not entirely 
shattered but rather reshaped and repurposed. When it comes to EU politics, where the concept of 
the state seems peculiarly resistant, I would argue that this is quite significant. 
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Spaces of Piraeus  
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Following the 2011 administrative reform, the Regional Unit of Piraeus consists of five 
municipalities; Korydallos, Keratsini-Drapetsona, Nikea-Ag. Ioannis Rentis, Perama, and Piraeus,94 
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covering an area of 50 km2 with a population of 449,000.95  It is one of five electoral districts96, and 
one of eight subordinate regional units97 of the Attica region; a second-level local administration 
entity supervised by the Decentralized Administration of Attica, with Athens acting as its centre. This 
complex administrative overlap has only added to controversies regarding the urban agency of 
Piraeus, sometimes mentioned as a Mediterranean port-city in its own right, at others as a coastal 
outgrowth of Athens. A distinct local identity, colloquially called Piraeotes as opposed to Athenians, 
harbours great internal differentiation; the bourgeoisie of the old town centre in the southeast, the 
working class and refugee-descendants of the north-west, the port-workers, ship-owners and 
maritime agency executives at the coastal intersection, all have a distinct claim to it. The following 
sections examine how a common theme of displacement features in each of these spatial, human, 
and political categories. 
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Figure 2.6: Schisto area, Piraeus, from left to right: migrant relocation centre, industrial park, 
cemetery. 
Planned Space and Urban Displacement 
Piraeus’ present urban geography has been the result of three interconnected spatio-
political processes; the development of the Athens-Piraeus bi-city relationship, the development of 
Piraeus’ own urban fragmentation, and the urban practices of Europeanisation following Greece’s 
EU accession in 1981. The three are examined below. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Map of the Athens-Piraeus Metropolitan Complex 
 
The Industrial Era: Commercial Satellite 
Rhetoric on Piraeus’ individual identity draws on a proud place-history, as the grounds of 
victory over the navy of the Persian Empire in the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C., and a major trade 
and civilisation centre of Ancient Greece between 400 and 86 B.C. This era however was followed by 
a period of desertion, lasting approximately 15 centuries, after the Siege of Athens and Piraeus by 
the forces of the Roman Republic. The lack of historical continuity renders these links between 
modern-day Piraeus and its glorified past weak. The abandoned fishing-village was rediscovered 
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between 1833 and 1838, first by inhabitants of the Aegean island of Chios escaping Ottoman 
violence, then joined by poor sailors from the nearby island of Hydra, as well as stevedores from the 
wider Mediterranean basin, mainly Italy and Malta, making up 8-10% of the local population in the 
1860s.98  
At the time of its modern establishment, when “a town [was being] built where previously 
there was nothing”99, Piraeus had been envisioned as a less than equal part of a “bipolar urban 
complex”.100 Following the declaration of Greek independence in 1830, and the decision to relocate 
the Greek administrative centre from Nafplio to Athens in 1834, an official Piraeus municipality was 
formed in 1835. The new city was built upon the architectural plans of Kleanthis and Schaubert, who 
had also provided the plans for Αthens, including Pireos Avenue as a connecting artery between the 
two. The urban transformation of the emergent Athens-Piraeus area in many ways epitomised the 
transition from the rural geographies of the Ottoman Empire to the industrialised capitalist 
European model, placing the emphasis on the development of infrastructure and transport 
networks. Subject to these forces, the two cities’ assigned roles were evident in the early days of 
their development. According to Leontidou, “in the 1830s, the two towns started to develop 
interdependently and grew rapidly, especially as a result of the centralism of the Greek State: Athens 
and Piraeus, comprador city and its port, unproductive and productive, bourgeois and proletarian 
cities.”101  
The Twentieth Century: Fragmented Regional centre 
Part and parcel of the industrialisation processes of these first founding decades, by the 
1860s Piraeus was already on an individual trajectory, gradually developing a more clearly defined 
urban geography of its own. The Athens-Piraeus railway connection that was built in 1869 provided 
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both an additional connection to the capital, but also an internal “dividing axis”102 between the 
‘right’ side, which included the Chiot settlement and the main administrative functions of the town, 
and the ‘left’ side, which had been reserved for settlers of all other origins.103 Piraeus enjoyed 
growth ahead of the national average at the turn of the century,104 sheltered in some ways from the 
political and economic instability that consumed the rest of the country, including the turmoil of the 
1897 Greco-Turkish war, and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).  
In the absence of a planning policy during these turbulent years, the expansion of Piraeus 
continued by means of a building sprawl dictated by arising needs. This allowed for economic forces 
to substitute previous town-planning decisions, as the city expanded to all directions. Its mixed 
population continued to increase rapidly, also owing to the exodus of rural Greeks to the urban 
centres. The 1834 plan had been drafted at a time when no more than 300 settlers resided in 
Piraeus, and foresaw a town of 15,000 people. The population of Piraeus however grew to 50,000 by 
1896,105 and to 135,000 by 1920.106 The enlarging trend continued, accelerated by the 
industrialisation of the first decades of the 1900s, and by a range of modernising projects 
undertaken by the newly-established Piraeus Port Organisation in 1930 which expanded the territory 
of the port, but also made it more insular.  Shipyards, dry-docks, and manufacturing plants laid the 
dividing lines for the city, between an eastern residential and a western industrial zone.107 The arrival 
and settlement of 100,000 refugees from Asia Minor between 1922 and 1925 enhanced the pattern 
of expansion and fragmentation, also adding a more disadvantaged residential area to the canvas. 
The refugee quarters (Prosphygika), emerged behind the industrial zone, with approximately 83,000 
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people settling across the areas of Drapetsona, Keratsini, Kokkinia and Korydallos, while only 15,000 
settled in the south-eastern coast.108 According to Belavilas 
The new 'second' city which was thus created lacked infrastructures, 
suffered from the pollution caused by the factories and was inhabited by 
an exclusively working-class population. Piraeus was divided in two, with 
the harbour and the industrial zone serving as the barrier between its poor 
and wealthier districts.109 
The European Era: Neoliberal City of Sites 
The early stages of de-industrialisation, combined with the rapid growth of the shipping 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s, allowed for the port to gradually substitute the factory as the 
economic heart of Piraeus. Post-war reconstructing activity, took place under the new law of 
Antiparochi, a uniquely Greek land-exchange arrangement, whereby small land-owners relinquished 
plots to contractors, receiving in return apartments in the building blocks thereby erected. This 
visual renewal was ideologically imbued, as Antiparochi had been associated with the planning 
directions of the Marshall plan. Propagating the liberal economic doctrine and small private 
property, it was encouraged with tax deductions and became “the unique system for condominium 
building until the late 1970s.”110  
Already by then Athens, Piraeus, as well as Thessaloniki, had become subject to pressures 
emanating from the country’s aspirations for EU membership.111 The emergence of new ‘urban 
economies’112 connected in a ‘global cities network’113 fostered new commonalities for these cities, 
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but also separated them in encouraging self-reliance and the development of urban authenticity. 
These pressures were written into the 1985 Master Plan of Athens, which structured the 
governments’ efforts to “rationalize [the] city’s development […] laying the foundations for future 
suburbanization” according to the model of a “polycentric city.”114 
These neoliberal transformations in some ways also pushed the two adjacent centres of 
Attica, Athens and Piraeus, closer together, gradually to resemble a common core. The early 2000s, 
and the regeneration activity that took place in preparation of the 2004 Olympic games in particular, 
has been called a turning-point in this respect, mainly in that it granted to private interests extended 
rights in the re-articulation of the two cities’ social, urban, and infrastructural fabric. For the 
development of required infrastructure in Athens and Piraeus, an emergency statutory framework 
was introduced115 so as to circumvent long bureaucratic procedures for investors, and “for the first 
time, public works, state property and enterprises of public interest were privatised.”116 These large-
scale redevelopment projects, which lacked a conscious planning direction, reified the new 
orientation of the local economy towards tourism and leisure, and further enhanced urban 
fragmentation117 by disproportionately upgrading the centre’s infrastructure, and causing for the 
periphery to appear all the more peripheral. Circulation has followed this centre-to-centre logic. 
Having joined the Attica Metro Network in 2011, Piraeus’ centre’s connectivity to Athens has been 
identified as a priority project of the EU’s Cohesion Policy programmes, and a major investment of 
186 bn euros from EU regional funds has been approved by the Commission, to extend Athens 
metro Line 3 to the port.118  
                                                             
114
 Vasiliki Makrygianni and Charalampos Tsavdaroglou, “Athens Urban Space Riots: From December 2008 
Revolt to Mobilizations in the Era of Crisis,” Quaderns-e de l’Institut Català d’Antropologia 0, no. 18(2) (2013): 
40–52. 
115
“Law 2730/1999 on Planning, Integrated Development, and Execution of Olympic Installations,” Official 
Government Gazette, no. A 130/25.06.1999 (1999). 
116
 Belavilas and Karatzas, “Planning and Architecture in Greece in the Neoliberal Era.” 
117
 Erik Swyngedouw, Frank Moulaert, and Arantxa Rodriguez, “Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large–Scale 
Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy,” Antipode 34, no. 3 (July 1, 2002): 542–77, 
doi:10.1111/1467-8330.00254. 
118
 European Commission, “EUR 186 Million of EU Regional Funds to Extend Athens Metro Line 3 to Piraeus,” 
2014, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/cretu/announcements/eur-186-million-eu-regional-funds-
extend-athens-metro-line-3-piraeus_en. 
Chapter Two 
 
103 
 
  
Chapter Two 
 
104 
 
Lived Space and Human Displacement 
The conditions of these people upon their arrival in Greece was pitiable beyond description. 
They had been herded upon every kind of craft that could float, crowded so densely on board that in 
many cases they had only room to stand on deck . . . In one case, which I myself beheld, seven 
thousand people were packed into a vessel that would have been crowded with a load of two 
thousand. 
Henry Morgenthau in Piraeus, 1922 
Piraeus’ urban and economic development cannot be separated from its heritage as a site of 
human displacement for approximately 100,000 between 1922 and 1926.119  An overview of the 
‘Greek refugee problem’ of 1922 is useful, not only in contextualising the urban fragmentation of 
Piraeus after this defining moment, but also because it draws interesting parallels between the 
present and the past. The EU’s refugee crisis and the one of 1922 remain connected, seen as 
externalities of the imposed redrawing of the Middle-East, enabling a historical comparison as 
regards European and international cooperation in the presumably non-political sphere of 
humanitarian relief.  
Over 1.2 million reached Greece as a result of the population exchange foreseen in the 
Lausanne Treaty (June 1923), most of them Greeks but also some 50,000 Armenians, from Asia 
Minor. Greek leadership of the 1920s had been in some ways culpable for the humanitarian disaster, 
after following an expansionist course in Asia Minor at the time of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution, 
which was to be avenged. However, as a local consequence of the World War I settlement at large, 
the humanitarian crisis was an international problem, as the human flow of 1923 had been the 
product of international law, the first ever diplomatically legitimated ‘forced migration’.120 
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The exodus of refugees to Greece had begun before the conclusion of the Lausanne 
conference, which merely formalised the ‘unmixing’ of peoples that was already underway.121 The 
first wave of displaced had fled the coast of Ionia during the ‘Catastrophe of Smyrna’ in September 
1922, to arrive at the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki.  In a second wave, following the armistice of 
Mudanya in October 1922, the Ottoman Greeks of Eastern Thrace began to cross the Evros river into 
Western Thrace and Macedonia. Dispersed arrivals of refugees continued between 1923 and 1926, 
originating from the depths of Anatolia and the Black Sea shores, including many belatedly 
repatriated prisoners of war.122 
Humanitarian agencies, mainly American and British, had arrived in Greece in October 1922. 
Provision of immediate relief, and their mid- and long-term resettlement, were tasks well beyond 
the capacities of the poor and war-ridden Greek state, whose distressed economy remained under 
the supervision of an International Financial Committee since 1897, and whose population at the 
time did not exceed 5 million. The humanitarian tragedy quickly gathered international interest and 
sympathy, communicated across the Atlantic in dramatic terms by the Greek prime minister 
Eleftherios Venizelos,123 and by prominent figures, such as Henry Morgenthau, former U.S. 
Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire.124  But while public sentiment and narratives of humanitarian 
responsibility had been important in urging foreign governments to take action, support did not owe 
to the power of benevolence alone. Negotiations often revolved around wider matters of regional 
balance of power in a shifting global stage, and the extent of international intervention was 
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contingent upon the intra-European and trans-Atlantic interests and rivalries.125 The nature of these 
agencies’ work however was temporary. Thus, when American agencies withdrew from Greece in 
June 1923, their departure signalled the end of the ‘emergency response’ period, and the beginning 
of the new ‘normal’, whence ways to deal with the long term implications would have to be devised 
at the national level.  
The involvement of European governments in the rehabilitation of refugees had been deep-
reaching in terms of producing internal order. Whilst solutions were to be sought within the Greek 
state’s and the refugees’ own capacities, action would be taken under the supervision and technical 
advice of the League of Nations. Greece had received a reluctant reaction to an appeal for a loan 
from the League of Nations’ financial committee, the latter suggesting a much smaller sum, not due 
to a different assessment of the costs of such an undertaking, but rather because the securities that 
Greece could offer in support of the request were deemed unreliable.126 Thus, the Refugee 
Settlement Committee was formed in 1923, an international body under the League of Nations 
which enabled the government to negotiate two loans (in 1923 and 1927) for a combined 19 million 
pounds, which was to be used for refugee resettlement rather than humanitarian relief.127 The RSC, 
to whom these funds were disbursed in their entirety, was to be actively involved in resettlement 
policy, endowed with the mandate to establish refugees in permanent homes and into productive 
employment.  
The eventual distribution of refugees across the country was therefore a result of the 
combined objectives of the RSC, the Greek government, and the refugees themselves. 
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 Local Population  Refugees % 
Athens  459,211 129,380 28.17 
Piraeus 251,659 101,185 40.21 
Greece 6,204,684 1,221,849 19.68 
 
Table 2.1: Distribution of Refugees in Athens/Piraeus (1923-1928)128 
 
For the Greek government the outcome of the exchange was linked to the consolidation of 
the new borders and normalisation of relations with Turkey, and thus a high foreign policy priority. 
Planning for new settlements was linked to the agrarian reform which had also commenced in 1922, 
concerning land allocation for indigenous Greeks, and the re-population of the territorial 
acquisitions of the Balkan Wars and the borderlands drawn in Lausanne.129 Greece’s territory and 
population had doubled after 1913, but these territories had not become assimilated within the 
national core, and remained a source of insecurity. In the words of Eleftherios Venizelos “After the 
collapse of the Greater Greece, we can consolidate the borders of Great Greece only when 
Macedonia and Western Thrace have become not only politically but also ethnologically Greek 
lands.”130  
For the RSC, emphasis was placed on delivering results on their mandate for permanent 
housing and productive employment. The make-up and circumstances of the refugee population 
were not conducive to rehabilitation. They had arrived with no possessions, while the vast majority 
were women and children, since all men of military age had been detained by the Turkish forces and 
deported in labour camps.131 Searching for solutions within these limitations, RSC policy had been to 
categorise refugees as ‘urban’ or ‘rural’, in order to facilitate their rehabilitation by providing 
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suitable opportunities for work, either in the emptied rural lands in Macedonia and Thrace, or in the 
emerging centres of Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki. In agreement with the government’s line, 
emphasis was given to rural rather than urban resettlement, and agricultural rather than economic 
integration.132 Besides the land availability in the rural north, other factors drove this prioritisation. 
Firstly, agricultural establishment and occupation was faster and incurred lesser expenses than 
creating new opportunities in the cities, where small-trade was already to an extent saturated.133 
Secondly, urban resettlement was viewed as potentially threating to urban public order, running the 
risk of creating slums of proletarianised workers if no decent employment opportunities were 
available. 
By 1930, the year when the RSC was dissolved, the settlement of urban refugees was more 
or less final. In total, a combined area of 839,044 hectares was ceded by the Greek government to 
the RSC for the resettlement programme; roughly two thirds were ‘exchangeable’ properties in the 
countryside, which came to the Greek state’s ownership after the departure of Bulgarian and Turkish 
populations, and one third were plots in and around the urban centres.134 However, in spite of the 
RSC and the Greek government’s directions, it has been estimated that 50% of the refugees 
eventually settled in urban areas.135 Promises of land in the rural periphery were of little allure to 
those, especially from Smyrna, who had been in ‘urban’ and ‘educated’ professions in their former 
lives, and thus these families chose to disregard the locality assigned to them.  According to an RSC 
report of the time. “[T]he refugees, in preferring the large towns, were not obeying a blind instinct, 
but were actuated by a sense of confidence in their capacity for work and their ability to adapt 
themselves to their new surroundings.”136  
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Economised Space and Displacement of Labour 
Piraeus port affairs constitute a national rather than local matter, given the port’s 
contribution to the national economy. Piraeus represents the central hub of Greek international 
commercial transactions. Between 2000 and 2013, annual net receipts from maritime transports 
accounted for 3.7% of Greek GDP on average, while annual net receipts from the tourism industry 
accounted for 4.2%.137  In spite of the economic downturn, Greece has remained a leading ship-
owning country, accounting for 16% of the global Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT)138, an indicator for 
the strength of a nation’s maritime economy. However, during the economic crisis, the country’s 
capacity to respond to the shrinking global growth rates in commercial fleets was compromised,139 
while foreign merchant companies began avoiding transactions with their Greek counterparts in fear 
of bad payments, leading to a decreased flow of imports.140   
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Figure 2.8 Map of Piraeus Port 141 
 
The controversial debates on how the port of Piraeus could best contribute to restoring the 
national economy have revolved around the operations of Piraeus Port Organisation (OLP), the chief 
administrator of the port for the biggest part of the 20th century. OLP was founded in 1930, to 
replace the previous more informal ‘Piraeus Port Committee’ which comprised of delegates from 
Athens and Piraeus local governments and Chambers of Commerce.142 Centralisation was seen at the 
time as an answer to deficiencies in the operation of the port, such as frequent strike action, unrest, 
and mismanagement, largely attributed to an oversupply of labour after the arrival of refugees.143 
Ironically, it was a similar line of argumentation, over inefficient operations and an idle unionised 
workforce, which underlined the efforts to privatise the port and weaken the powers of OLP since 
the early 2000s.144  
Two major developments between 2010 and 2015 have accelerated the neoliberal 
transformation of Piraeus port operations. Firstly, the lifting of cabotage restrictions, which 
facilitated the operations of foreign ships within the port,145 and secondly, the privatization of port 
services, with the gradual concession of terminals and control rights to Chinese shipping giant, Cosco 
Pacific. The concession of the port’s container terminal to Cosco, the first concession of its kind in 
Greece but also one of the last in Europe, was only finalized in 2011, after seven years of highly 
politicised negotiating rounds. Cosco invested over 200 million euros in improving works, including a 
new pier for larger container ships and upgraded infrastructure, and was awarded a further contract 
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in March 2016, as part of an asset liquidation programme agreed between Greece and its creditors 
for a controlling stake of OLP’s shares (67%), which would grand the Chinese firm rights to run and 
control the port. 
The privatisation of Piraeus port and the sale of OLP can be seen as processes of multiple 
displacement, removing the workers, the local society, and the Greek state from the space of the 
port. On the one hand, this has provided a platform for the internal class divisions of Piraeus to be 
re-articulated and re-affirmed. For example, the Municipality of Piraeus, allocated a seat in the new 
Management Board, had been a cautious advocate of the privatisation.146 As Mayor Yiannis Moralis 
stated “Although we hold a different opinion with regards to the particular approach to 
privatisation, for our local authority  supported the involvement of private interest but stood against 
the sale of shares,  I feel this may be of benefit to the city.”147 By contrast, in the working class 
municipalities of the north-west, where many port-workers fearing for their jobs lived, mayors sided 
with the Greek Left’s discourse of a ‘fire-sale’ of Greek assets and the de facto loss of national 
economic sovereignty.148 As Mayor of Keratsini-Drapetsona Christos Vrettakos put it “The port’s 
privatisation is going to have dire consequences for our cities, leading to deeper economic decline, 
and alienation from port activities.”149  
This polarisation within Piraeus has also been articulated around the role of the EU in the 
privatisation process. It has fuelled anti-EU sentiment in the working-class areas, which have been 
known as more Eurosceptic than their counter-parts in the centre.150 Privatisation has been seen as 
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in-line with the Commission’s long-standing aim of maritime transport liberalisation. The regulation 
on the abolishment of cabotage restrictions amongst member-states had been one of the earliest 
efforts towards consolidation of the internal market, voted in 1992,151 whilst the Commission has 
regularly issued interpretative communications which gradually extend the scope of the regulation 
(in 2003, 2006, 2014). Since 2007, the Commission’s liberalisation efforts have been subsumed 
under the development of an Integrated Maritime Policy, which has sought to eliminate 
protectionist measures, targeting state-aid as undermining EU-rules on competition. As such, the 
narrative that attributes responsibility upon the EU for Piraeus’ loss of revenue, jobs, and access to 
public space, has been prevalent amongst striking workers and vocalised in aggressive chanting 
during their demonstrations. 
The presence of the local volunteers in the camp, port-workers and refugee descendants 
amongst them, brings Piraeus’ past into the present, and weaves together the struggles of the city 
with the struggles in the camp. Amongst the painted walls and placards that the port’s camp had 
been embellished with, these connections were made explicit. “Piraeus knows what being a refugee 
means”, “Europe is Illegal, not the Refugees”. Indeed, many of these past and present ‘resistances’ 
overlap, particularly in their relation to the EU; the oppressed against the powerful, the periphery 
against the centre. To stop the analysis here however would be precisely to replicate a range of 
problematic dichotomies as regards identities produced and resistances performed. The following 
section turns again to the biopolitical logics at play in the space of the port, to situate this multiply 
delineated camp within Agamben’s zone of indistinction, where more complex and interlocking 
networks of power can become visible. 
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Contending Logics of Distribution 
As discussed so far, the workings of power in the port’s camp do not find adequate 
explanations in the space of exception. The camp was not treated by the Greek state under 
conditions of urgency. In fact the long-standing humanitarian camp of Idomeni was evacuated first, 
although its remote location and large population (over 10,000) meant a far greater logistical 
challenge. The lack of urgency in the evacuation of the port’s camp is telling of a well-managed 
rather than absent threat, capitalising on the ‘fortunate’ proximity of the watchtower. We are 
therefore compelled to ask: how did this proximity come to be, and what forms of sovereignty does 
it imply? A partial answer is traced by engaging the dialectic of the two distinct distribution logics 
that brought it about a) the distribution of the ‘human excess’ that migrant life represents and b) 
that of EU regulatory power, and the executive life that embodies it. To this di-polarity however, a 
third figure needs to be inserted, the voluntary administrator of life in the camp, holding these 
sovereign categories together as soon as they challenge them. 
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Distributing Human Excess  
When considering the EU’s response to the inflow of migrants and asylum-seekers, and 
particularly the emphasis it has placed on processes of biometric identification, its role as a 
biopolitical machine needs less arguing than does its effectiveness in achieving its purported 
biopolitical aims. 
 
Figure 2.9: Asylum Claims in the EU in 2015152 
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The lack of symmetry of the map above, accounts for the failure of implementing a common 
EU approach of proportional rationality for the distribution of asylum-seekers. The Commission’s 
plan to relocate 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy across the EU represented one such 
attempt to restore proportionality; according to the relevant Commission proposal, decisions on 
which member-state should take responsibility for which asylum application, and for how many in 
total, would be taken according to a distribution key “using objective and quantifiable criteria (40% 
of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum 
applications, 10% of the unemployment rate).”153 Nevertheless, due to lack of political will, the plan 
materialised in less than 700 relocations in the first 10 months. The asymmetry of small circles over 
large areas, as they appear over Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, and over high-GDP 
countries, such as the UK, or EEA member Norway, paint a picture that contravenes the expressed 
EU norm, of channelling the movement and settlement of global mobilities according to an optimal 
formula. Of course the actual map is in many ways a coherent one. One would expect Germany, with 
its robust economy, Sweden, with its strong institutional framework for protection, and Hungary, at 
the exit point of the Balkan corridor, to be bearing the brunt of the human influx. The map, with its 
layered asymmetries of injustice, depicts the failure to depoliticise (entirely).  
This is not to say however that the impact of the distribution plan and of its algorithmic 
sensibility was non-existent in crafting this human geography. It has rather been indirect. Even in its 
failure to convince reluctant member-states to take in more refugees, the plan still articulated the 
‘authorised’ version of the technocratic EU migration discourse. In the negotiating attempts to make 
it mandatory and permanent, the relocation plan acted as a contending pole against which anti-EU 
narratives were reinforced. Explicitly in the discourses of far-right politicians in member-states, 
including France, Germany, Hungary, and most vocally the UK in the lead-up to its EU referendum, 
refuting common solutions, restricting movement on national borders, and withdrawing from 
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humanitarian obligations became a trope of re-asserting sovereign control over national borders 
against the dictum of the unelected EU super-state.  
Distribution of Refugees across Attica  
In contrast to the League of Nations’ response to the refugee flows of the 1920s, this time 
European intervention on the resettlement of asylum-seekers within the state appears to have 
stopped at the border of the state in question. Again, this is not to say that the EU has had no say in 
the internal distribution of refugee flows in Greece. Thousands of people have spent extended 
periods of time in the EU’s overcrowded ‘hotspots’ in the Aegean, although the latter had been 
designed for short-stays for the purposes of registration and identification. However, responsibility 
about planning for their longer-term rehabilitation was mostly assumed by the Greek state, assisted 
by humanitarian organisations. 
The scenario of a confined and unwilling refugee population in Greece had been discussed in 
the months preceding the closure of the Greek-Macedonian border. Greece and UNHCR had agreed 
during the Western Balkans Leaders’ Meeting, already in October 2015, to cooperate on increasing 
the asylum capacity of the country. The Commission and UNHCR launched the ‘Reception and 
Relocation’ programme in January 2016 to provide 20,000 additional reception places for asylum-
seekers in Greece, funded with 80 million euros from the 2016 EU budget.154 However, acting pre-
emptively proved beyond the capacity of the Greek public administration, and the capabilities of 
humanitarian actors involved. Families took camp in public spaces, squares and parks, while in many 
cases, local governments opened public buildings, schools, and stadiums to stranded families in their 
towns. The government’s efforts towards this initial improvised distribution, according to interviews 
given by officials155, involved two key security priorities: a) to evacuate the ‘unofficial’ camps and 
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move asylum-seekers to state-run facilities, controlled by the police, the army and the Ministry of 
Defence, and b) to scatter said facilities across administrative units in the country in proportion to 
their population, aiming for many small premises rather than fewer large centres so as to prevent 
the creation of ‘small ghettos’.  
Apart from these governmental priorities however, variable local responses also weighed in. 
When Ministry officials addressed a request to Attica’s municipalities to offer up reception spaces 
within their administrative territories,156 some local communities came forth as more welcoming 
than others.  For example, the leasing of a building by the International Organisation for Migration in 
the wealthy area of Attiko Alsos in central Athens raised strong opposition amongst local residents, 
who took the matter to the Council of State.157 By comparison, the pleas of the Mayor of Perama, 
the Piraeus district which hosted the largest reception centre in the mainland, had not been about 
excluding the area from sharing in on the burden, but rather for Piraeus to not be “the only port in 
the country where ships full of migrants will arrive”158, a request echoed by the mayor of 
neighbouring Keratsini-Drapetsona who requested that “each local society shoulder their share of 
the burden accordingly.”159 It could be argued that these latter local administrations were to some 
extent accepting an inevitable consequence of the proximity of the port, and thus making a virtue 
out of a necessity in accommodating refugee presence within their communities. Nevertheless, the 
overall distribution of refugees across Attica seems too skewed, and the reactions of residents 
comparatively too timid, to entirely dismiss the hold of (self-) perceptions of Piraeus as a haven for 
the displaced. Data of the Central Coordinating Body for the Management of the Refugee Crisis, 160 a 
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hastily arranged entity under the command of the Greek army, shows that Piraeus came to host four 
times as many refugees as the whole of Attica, as a share of its population. 
 Local Population  Refugees % 
Attica  3,812,230 9,714 0.25 
Piraeus 449,000 4,510 1 
Greece 10,787,690 57,679 0.53 
 
Table 2.2 Indicative Refugee Distribution in Attica/Piraeus (2015) 
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Distributing Executive Life 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Distribution of EU Decentralised Agencies 
 
The EU’s algorithmic logic of distribution emerges more clearly in a map of the EU as an 
administrative district, portraying the allocation of EU executive workforce in the regulatory 
agencies. These agencies are commonly presented in a technocratic vein, as scientific or managerial 
organisations which ‘help the EU institutions make and implement policies’. A small number of them 
are Executive Agencies based in and around the Brussels citadel, working closely with the 
Commission on specific tasks, for a limited period of time, and under a common legal base. Most of 
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them however fall under the category of Decentralised Agencies,161 the term decentralised referring 
to their organisational structure as much as their location. 
The distribution of the EU’s regulatory agencies, which extend EU power and influence 
across spheres of daily life, has been a quiet affair; having raised no major controversies amongst 
public opinions and policy circles, it has mostly been accepted as a fair and straightforward process. 
Article 341 of the EU Treaty maintains that the seat of EU institutions is to be determined by 
common accord of the governments of the member-states.162 Per this principle, the European 
Council of December 2003 agreed “to give priority to Acceding States, once they have joined the 
Union, in the distribution of the seats of other offices or agencies to be set up in the future.”163 The 
presence of an EU Agency or office was thus commodified, equated with the conferring of actual 
agency and a level of influence to the host state, and underlined by the intention of geographical 
spread and proportionality. The Common Approach, which was adopted in 2012, was hailed as a 
breakthrough in this respect. An overhaul considered in-line with austerity politics and the need for 
effective use of EU funds, the new framework instituted the practice of impact assessments, regular 
evaluations of work programmes, resource planning, and a streamlined governance structure.164  
There are several issues which muddle this straightforward story of transparency and 
technocracy. Firstly, questions of accountability arise, since these agencies have been set-up on a 
case-by-case basis, operating with a fragmented legal basis, and with little oversight. Observers have 
addressed a range of critical questions in this respect, including conflicts of interest of management 
board members, lack of effective scrutiny of their operations, and an overall dubious position within 
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the EU’s administrative landscape.165 Secondly, even though at first glance the localisation of these 
entities appears indeed ‘neutral’, a closer look reveals expected geographical/cultural 
appropriations; the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is seated in Valetta, the Maltese capital, 
the European Banking Agency (EBA) in London, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt. As such, efforts that have gone towards presenting agency 
distribution as non-content specific, and non-geopolitical, need to be questioned. One such example 
can be found in the FAQ section of the Frontex website, under the question “Why is Frontex based in 
Warsaw and not in a country with a higher migratory pressure?” to which an all too brief response is 
provided: “Since the role of Frontex is that of a coordinator, the location of its HQ is practically 
irrelevant as its operations take place at all external borders.”166  
On one hand, these issues bring forth the tensions between the de-politicising efforts of a 
biopolitical machine, and the messiness of the political reality that it aims to regulate. Another 
matter that is of interest however has to do with the threshold concerning the minimum living 
standards of EU officials.  The general rule of distribution has been that while the decision on the 
state to host an Agency is taken at the EU level, the particular localisation of an Agency within a 
country is taken by the host-state. The Common Approach however inserted a set of ‘objective 
criteria’ for choosing the location of an agency. Some of these had to do with ensuring that material 
conditions will allow the agency to fulfil its mandate, such as assurances that the seat would be set 
up in time for commencement of work, or accessibility of the location. Other provisions, however, 
were of a very different nature, having to do with the ‘quality of life’ of the executives, such as 
access to the labour market for spouses or the existence of international education schools for 
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employees’ children.167 What emerges strikingly from the conflation of these different sets of 
parameters is the link that is forged between the localisation of executive power, and the element of 
care, turning personal happiness and wellbeing into an ‘objective’ criterion to partake in the 
allocation mechanisms of executive power. In ensuring the ‘vital’ character of the workforce’s life, 
the EU executives are also produced as a form of life, by the same biopolitical machine, only 
differently configured. 
The EURTF as Encampment 
The new multi-agency entity in the port of Piraeus has been somewhat of an oddity within 
this generalised agency distribution discourse, one which I argue bears striking resemblance to a 
camp. There are three ways in which the EURTF may also be seen as an instance of encampment.  
Firstly, the EURTF resides in a zone of physical indistinction. As discussed earlier, its peculiar 
architectural configuration places it in an inside/outside position in respect to the adjacent signature 
building of Greek sovereignty. This architecture however has material implications too, which 
establish an administrator-beneficiary relationship between the two. The EURTF relies on the Greek 
state for its vital services; electric power, heating, telecommunications, cleaning services, and, 
importantly, security.168 In other words, the EURTF depends upon the Greek sovereign for its 
administrative subsistence. 
Secondly, the EURTF resides in a zone of political indistinction, where the law and the fact 
become confused, and the decision between the two is regularly revised. Occupied by EU officials 
since 2010, the tower previously hosted the first-ever regional Frontex branch, which was also the 
first Frontex premises outside the headquarters in Warsaw. It was set up to coordinate the tactical 
operation Poseidon, the tactical continuation of the emergency RABITS deployment. It therefore 
came into being as a response to an operational need, excluded from the general discourse on 
agency seating. It was envisioned at the time that the office would oversee not only joint operations 
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on Greek territory, but also Frontex activities within the wider Eastern Mediterranean region, 
including Cyprus, Malta, and Italy. According to then-executive director Ilka Laitinen, “The pilot FOO 
will complement HQ’s unity with a regional approach”169, and if successful more regional offices 
would follow modelled upon it. Therefore, whilst set up in an exceptional manner, the intention had 
been to create a new rule, which would make up for the Agency’s absence from its field of 
operation. This course was not followed through. In 2013, the Frontex Operational Office was 
demoted to a Frontex Liaison Office (FLO) and saw its personnel considerably reduced, a move 
interpreted as having to do not only with shifting attitudes towards the regional approach at large, 
but also, according to rumours amongst personnel, with curbing the influence and powers of the 
office itself vis a vis the Warsaw HQ. The office was restructured again in January 2016, incorporated 
within the new multi-agency entity, the EURTF, set-up by a Frontex-Europol agreement on 
cooperation.170 According to media reports, the decision to restructure and incorporate the FLO 
within the new multi-agency entity was itself an uncertain one, the result of pressures from Greece 
and Cyprus within the agency’s Management Board, against the intention to remove it altogether.  171 
The new entity, along with its twin in Catania, was identified as a temporary response to present 
needs, and was thus further removed from the norm-setting framework. 
Thirdly, the EURTF is also in some ways a container of human displacement. One of the 
heralded breakthroughs of the approach to joint border controls that the EURTF was established to 
consolidate was the large-scale deployment of a mobile workforce.  In October 2015, Frontex 
requested no less than 775 border officials to support Greece and Italy in registering and identifying 
people arriving via sea, the travelling missions of whom would be managed by (also temporarily 
deployed) staff at the new coordinating offices. According to Frontex executive director, border 
force would need to increase to match the pressure created by increasing numbers of irregular 
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arrivals: “We are facing a migratory and refugee crisis. Because of this, Frontex has called on 
Member States for the first time to provide such a large number of border guards.”172 In this way, 
the EURTF offices and the camp’s tents emerge as interconnected; their mobile populations 
fluctuating in tandem. 
Witnessing the Heterotopia 
The architecture of power within the port of Piraeus, and the proximity of the EU’s border-
guards and the refugees which does not involve their engagement in a relationship of camp-ruler 
and camp-inmate, problematizes the theory in interesting ways. Not only are these EU officials in 
some ways also within an spatial condition of encampment, but the presence of refugees within 
sovereign power’s intimate field of operations, seems to completely invert a central claim of 
Agambenian camp-thinking, that “what is excluded in the camp is […] taken outside.”173 What we 
have here examined is an instance where the excluded have rather taken inside, literally surrounded, 
the embodiment of power.  
Α comparison of the two distributing logics discloses a common mode of fragmenting the 
sovereign decision - namely that while the decision on the state which is to host an asylum-
seeker/EU official is taken at the supra-national/EU level, the decision on their precise location 
within the national territory, be it in refugee camps or luxurious office complexes, lies with the 
hosting state. In some ways, this brings back Schmittian notions of sovereignty, as posed in his 
German theory of the state, which draws a distinction between the concept of sovereignty and that 
of the state.  
What is gained by this distinction is that individual states may retain their 
status as states without being endowed with sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
the old definition, in phraseological variations, is always repeated: 
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Sovereignty is the highest, legally independent, underived power. Such a 
definition can be applied to the most different political sociological 
configurations and can be enlisted to serve the most varied political 
interests. It is not the adequate expression of a reality but a formula, a sign, 
a signal. It is infinitely pliable, and therefore in practice, depending on the 
situation, either extremely useful or completely useless.174  
Considered along these lines, the EU’s absence/presence seems not to detract from its 
sovereign powers, but rather to affirm a particular biopolitical type of sovereignty, whereby the EU 
regulates its presence, intensifying it where deemed necessary – as in the Aegean waters that are 
regularly patrolled via air and sea vessels - and withdrawing from its field when a passive presence 
seems adequate - as in the case of refugee camps or on the tables were resettlement policy is being 
produced. As Aradau writes “The sovereign decision can be withdrawn from the ‘weight’ of spatial 
divisions and the necessity of territorial appropriations, it can be kept at a distance from the 
concrete necessity of space.”175  
On the other hand, the juxtaposition of the two antithetical populations in a single space 
echoes the Agambenian logic of a gray zone, where the political is depoliticized and the biological is 
politicised. Indeed, it is only within such a depoliticised vein, that the two distributions can even be 
brought in comparison - for the personal circumstances of the generously remunerated, comfortably 
travelling, and well-insured EU executives bear little true resemblance to those of war victims paying 
large sums of money to smugglers and risking their lives travelling in overcrowded dinghies. This 
generalised depoliticisation, communicated through impact assessments, technocratic and non-
geopolitical discourses, and a formula for the decision, is similarly responsible for the lack of 
astonishment at the violence that underlines this juxtaposition. Even though both the executive life 
of the EU official and the excess life of the migrant are re-produced as bare life, as mobile biological 
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bodies rather than politically qualified beings, the important distinction, which re-politicises the 
field, consists in that the biological life of the former is cherished and the latter abandoned. We can 
see the material manifestation of biopower, in its double rendition of ‘letting die’ and ‘making 
live’.176  
Between these two poles constituted by the EU’s biopower, the volunteers of Piraeus which 
make the camp possible form an aporetic figure when viewed outside their own geographical, 
historical, and political context. They are not secret ‘collaborators’ as the agents of liberal 
humanitarianism have been characterised, for their efforts are not reimbursed. Enmeshed in their 
own narrative of oppression, they identify with the ‘undermen’ rather than the ‘overmen’, standing 
in solidarity and shared anti-EU sentiment. However, they cannot entirely cross over to the ‘other 
side’, either. They also exert power over asylum-seekers, giving them permissions, intervening at 
their level of subsistence, producing them as ‘bare lives’ to be saved. In some ways, they correspond 
to an inverted version of the Sonderkommandos of Auschwitz, the detainees who undertook the 
task of managing the gas chambers, in return for a chance of survival.177 The volunteers of Piraeus 
are there, administering life instead of death, bearing witness and making-up for, in improvised 
ways, the gaps of non-responsibility of sovereign power. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has narrated the story of a camp that ‘came to be’, an open and porous space, 
where solidarity and subjugation, surveillance and abandonment, law and fact, appear to go hand in 
hand. Although the camp disappeared within the course of one summer season, its brief existence is 
indicative of something more permanent. It has been argued that the unlikely proximity of the 
refugee tent and the watchtower in the port of Piraeus, far from accidental, is a symptom of the 
increasingly tense balance the EU is trying to achieve across its perimeter. Only this condition of 
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approaching a breaking point appears now to have permanent characteristics. This camp of peculiar 
proximities and juxtapositions is another one of the camp’s ‘disguises and metamorphoses’ that 
Agamben urges us to look out for, a zone of indistinction, but also a reflection of the contradictions 
that drive the EU’s political project at its external perimeter. 
The European Commission has taken to regularly updating the public on the Migration and 
Refugee crisis- continuing to call it a crisis in July 2016, after four consecutive months of dramatically 
decreasing arrivals.178 They publicize on their website minute facts and details on the incoming 
migrant and refuge flows. They make available thematic reports, such that anyone can know how 
many people were returned from Greece to Turkey on a particular day, whether standard 
procedures are in place in particular disembarkation locations, or what the per-day fingerprinting 
capacity of a country is. Of these reports, the one titled “Hotspots- State of Play”,179 caught my 
attention. The report was made up of two tables, one for each country with Hotspots- i.e. Italy and 
Greece. Each table had one column for each hotspot-location, (Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Porto 
Empedocle/Villa Sikania, Trapani, Augusta and Taranto in Italy; Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos 
in Greece), and two rows; one for ‘total reception capacity’, noting the numbers of migrants and 
refugees, and one for ‘EU presence’, noting the numbers of EU officials. 
What struck me were certain ironies in the ways the EU’s state of exception was being 
written down, codified, and reported on, in these regular state-of-play documents. The first irony 
exists in the very unexceptional ways in which the state of exception is being turned into knowledge, 
reduced into spread-sheets reminiscent of accounting practices rather than war. But in a different 
sense, I felt the irony of a certain ‘playfulness’ in the treatment of information that was once 
reserved for operational Risk Analyses publications referring to specialised audiences. These reports 
appear to be re-writing the rules of the ‘game’, in a language that is accessible, thus including binary 
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us/them categories. It recalls Agamben in this sense, “One day humanity will play with law just as 
children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free 
them of it for good.”180   
Of course these categories encompass far greater complexities. To speak of an ‘EU 
presence’, is a political articulation, constitutive of and constituted by the EU itself, in the making of 
itself as a unitary entity and a political actor. To take it at face value however would be to leave aside 
a substantial part of the reality of what an EU presence on the ground actually is. As indicated in the 
filled boxes of the table, the ‘EU presence’ consists of a heterogeneous assortment; agency officers, 
most of whom are seconded national officers from different member-states, other member state 
experts, interpreters, cultural mediators, and interim staff. It is the heterogeneity that emerges 
through these filled boxes that unlocks the puzzle of power relations at the EU’s perimeter. In this 
context, the following chapter investigates the role of Frontex as a collector and producer of such 
box-filling knowledge, and the conceptions of Europe they insert in this way into our geopolitical 
imaginaries and everyday geographies.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Frontex’s Europe 
Introduction   
Having looked at the ways in which EU migration and border policy impacts upon the real 
spaces that make up its external perimeter, this chapter enquires into the production of knowledge 
that informs this policy. To this end, I look into Frontex, the Agency responsible for the management 
of the EU’s external borders, soon to be subsumed under (or expanded into) the more powerful 
European Border and Coast Guard. I ask what type of an institution Frontex is, what its putative and 
implicit objectives are, and how these objectives relate to the integration of Europe’s borders and to 
the project of constructing the EU as capable of articulating a unitary voice in foreign policy tables, 
and undertaking security work in a uniform way. I argue that the Agency undertakes its work 
through a series of juxtapositions: between intelligence and operational activities, between urgency 
and normalisation policy instrument, between processes of depoliticisation and re-politicisation. It is 
in this context that we are to view the creation of the new European Border and Coast Guard, which 
marks a further step towards internal EU security and indeed towards encroaching upon (certain) 
member-states’ sovereignty.  
A first section outlines these current public debates by visiting some of the responses to the 
recent tragedies at the EU’s southern sea borders, which shifted media and public attention to 
Frontex, and exposed the obscured dilemma of upholding the border and/or saving lives. A second 
section traces the origins of Frontex, going through the post-Lisbon adopted and proposed 
legislation affecting it. It shows how the debate on a Union-led versus an intergovernmental 
approach to the conduct of Schengen area has shaped the policy processes that give Frontex its dual 
nature as an intelligence agency and an operational actor. A third section considers the theoretical 
framework of risk as a conceptual matrix within which antithetical elements can co-exist. In order to 
identify the ways in which border knowledge is produced in this context of riskification, the chapter 
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visits the work of the Risk Analysis Unit and third-party experts. It is argued that certain 
interpretative problems exist in their produced texts, which have to do with the divorce of the 
border from its context. Problematic as the fragmented findings of these documents might be, we 
find that the texts containing them are presented and consumed as apolitical truthful manuals; they 
form the basis for subsequent policy work, granting authority to particular geographical imaginaries. 
In the fourth section the chapter touches upon the ‘smartening’ of the EU’s bordering infrastructure 
with the use of biometrics, conceptualising it as a tri-fold attempt: to keep up with the pace of 
technology, to re-configure the role of human labour in border-work, and to maintain a profitable 
border security-industrial complex. The conclusions serve to bring together these ideas in the 
argument that far from a ‘technician’ of border management, Frontex is enmeshed in deeply 
political activities, which divide the EU’s perimeter according to perceived threat parameters. These 
have the combined effect of generating a topological configuration of the EU, which I suggest we 
conceptualise as a heterotopia of fragmented space. 
Deathcount and Milestones 
As has been discussed so far, the current border regime, immigration rules, and visa and 
asylum policy leaves economic migrants and asylum-seekers, mainly from the troubled regions of 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, with only one option for entering the safety and 
prosperity of the EU: through an immediate encounter with the physical border rather than a virtual 
or remote one, such as a visit to an embassy or a distant application procedure. Frontex has been at 
the centre of the debates sparked by calls for an effective distribution of responsibility over the 
violent happenings that such encounters entail. 
Many of Frontex’s most important steps towards centralising border control across the EU, 
be it in the launch of new operational capabilities, human resource and budget expansion, or indeed 
a change of mandate, have followed events of loss of human life: the deaths in the Mediterranean, 
as well as those wrought by the recent terrorist attacks in European cities. Not only do these 
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parallels of death and policy intersect temporally, but they also seem to match one another in terms 
of scale, in tandem with the increasing use of emergency rhetoric.  
When thousands began boarding ships to flee violence in Libya in 2011 over 1500 annual 
deaths at sea were recorded, marking the deadliest yet year for this region according to UNHCR.1 
The loss of life was linked to the need for a better control over what is happening at the border. The 
context supported the articulation of an alleged migrant-centric, humanitarian approach in the re-
launched Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,2 which remained at odds however with the 
increased cooperation in border patrols and asylum with countries in the region which have dark 
records with regards to fundamental rights, such as Egypt and Libya.3 
The link between border fatalities and border control decisions was forged stronger in 
October 3 2013, when almost 300 people drowned in a single incident, as the overcrowded ship they 
had boarded in Libya capsized just outside the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa. At the time, 
EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström blogged an ambitious proposal in 
response to the incident: to re-organise the operational activities of Frontex in the Mediterranean 
into “one comprehensive coast-to-coast operation from Spain to Cyprus”, with a focus on search and 
rescue operations (SAR) “so that more lives can be saved.”4 This proposal, which would require 
generous funding and political capital, failed to gather the consensus of member-states.5 It is 
debatable whether it was articulated in a realistic manner, since Frontex alone did not have the 
capacity for such a large-scale operation.6 What this incident did provide grounds for however was 
the approval of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the decision on which was 
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adopted only weeks later.7 This large-scale surveillance mechanism, an investment estimated at 244 
million euros for a period of 6 years, using state-of-the-art technologies such as satellite imagery and 
unmanned aerial vehicles, was hailed as a major step in improving situational awareness for 
operational stakeholders- including for SAR operations. In an address given to the Council by 
European Parliament president Martin Schulz, this expenditure was put in congratulatory terms:  
Just two weeks ago we adopted EUROSUR, which will be operational in less 
than two months' time. We will continue to fight for adequate funding, 
including for Frontex, whose budget the Council seeks every year to 
reduce, but which we have each time successfully defended.8  
In November 2013, the European Parliament and the European Council reached an 
agreement on the EU’s budget for the 2014 financial year after a difficult and lengthy negotiating 
session. While the agreed overall EU spending at 135.5 billion euros marked a 6% decrease,9 a cut 
considered not deep enough for some of the pro-austerity governments,10 the budget for Frontex 
increased by 2 million, following a strong case made by the Parliament.11 This point needs to be 
appreciated together with officials’ statements, like Budgets Committee chair Alain Lamassoure’s: 
“The Parliament has taken its responsibility by accepting a lower budget. But we managed to get the 
priorities right.” 12 
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In April 2015, another migrant-filled boat capsized at 30 km off the coast of Libya, marking a 
new record death-toll; 800 lives were lost. Making headlines worldwide, the incident was termed a 
wake-up call at the time, and more calls urged concerted EU action to better save lives and better 
guard borders, from humanitarian groups and right-wing politicians respectively. The event provided 
the necessary backing for the long-promised European Agenda on Migration, one of the key 
measures of which was the strengthening of Frontex’s mandate.  
In each of these occasions, the discourses legitimating operational expansion and financial 
expenditure have been articulated around two objectives: a) to respond rapidly to situations when 
lives are at stake; and b) to uphold, secure, and seal those same borders from unwanted migratory 
pressures. Take as an example the Commission’s response to the European Parliament’s approval of 
EUROSUR 
EUROSUR[…]will make an important contribution in protecting our external 
borders and help in saving lives of those who put themselves in danger to 
reach Europe's shores. It will strengthen the information exchange and 
cooperation within and between Member States' authorities, as well as 
with the EU border agency Frontex. Information on incidents and patrols 
will be shared immediately by the newly established National Coordination 
Centres and Frontex. This will increase our possibilities to prevent cross-
border crimes, such as drug trafficking or trafficking in human beings, but 
also to detect and provide assistance to small migrant boats in distress13 
Commissioner Malmström at the time maintained that the two objectives could be seen as 
necessarily connected and interdependent; a strict approach to bordering and a focus on keeping 
people out would eventually discourage traffickers as much as migrants from ever setting out on life-
endangering journeys, leading to a decrease of the death-toll of what has been called the 
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Mediterranean cemetery.14 Similarly, the European Agenda on Migration, with its focus on patrols 
and registration of arriving people, was linked to the protection of vulnerable individuals, as put by 
Commission vice-president Frans Timmermans:  
The tragic loss of life in the Mediterranean has shocked all Europeans. Our 
citizens expect Member States and European institutions to act to prevent 
this tragedy from continuing unabated. The European Council clearly stated 
that we need to find European solutions, based on internal solidarity and 
the realisation that we have a common responsibility to create an effective 
migration policy.15 
The particular link established between the Agenda, with its focus on identifying arriving 
persons on the one hand, and the protection of human life on the other, implied that member-states 
would somehow accept asylum-seekers if frontline member-states performed better as gatekeepers 
and security-cleared them upon arrival. The underpinnings of this argument were however better 
clarified in a direct statement made by EU Council President Donald Tusk: "Let's avoid hypocrisy: it is 
not a question of international solidarity anymore, but a problem of European capacities. Europeans 
would be less reluctant if the EU's external border was really under control."16 
That these links have proved feeble was not a surprise for scholars and EU watchdogs, who 
had been noting that the two objectives are fundamentally contradictory, constituting an 
unresolvable dilemma rather than two parts of a single way forward.17 Increased surveillance would 
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rather lead migrants towards even more dangerous routes. It was uncertain whether EUROSUR 
would have the capacity to detect small boats. No enforcing mechanism had been put in place in 
order for an SAR operation to be launched by either Frontex or a member-state, neither had it been 
clarified exactly how EUROSUR was supposed to use its capabilities for SAR. As it turned out, 
EUROSUR has enabled the interception of migrants in neighbouring countries before they had 
reached the border, and allowed for responsibility to be passed on to these countries, where often 
no safeguards exist that fundamental rights would be respected.18 As for the impact of the European 
Agenda on Migration, as already discussed, it enabled detention of asylum-seekers in the newly-
established hotspots, which constitutes a breach of international law. 
What emerges from this brief review of the deathcount and milestones nexus that 
constitutes the operational environment of Frontex is the disjunction between presented objectives, 
measures conjured, and achieved results. The constitutive dilemma of this disjunction emerges in 
many forms: saving lives versus ‘inviting migrants in’, border security versus right to asylum, 
humanitarianism versus efficiency. All these renditions tie into another intra-institutional and 
intergovernmental dilemma upon which much of the Frontex discourse unfolds, and which has to do 
with the contested desirability of one shared border. Whilst the ‘shared border’ has been put forth 
by Frontex as an “important common interest”,19 Frontex publications are mostly cautious enough to 
always refer to the EU’s ‘external borders’, with emphasis on the plural. It is only through casual slips 
and oversights elsewhere20 that we can see how the idea of a single unified perimeter survives 
outside the Warsaw headquarters in EU politicians’ circles. Both a symbolic achievement and a result 
of spill-over from other areas of co-operation, the border-work of Frontex has amounted to re-
inventing the idea of the border down to its fundamental elements. It resonates with important 
political questions concerning the heart of the EU project; what kind of border is the one which 
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circumscribes a geopolitical area of the sort that the EU aspires to be, and which provides the 
particular brand of security that the EU identifies with? The expanding EU border acquis, increasing 
securitisation of migration, and accumulating media and public interest suggest this to be a 
pertinent question, and although it is not known what this acquis aspires to be, the constant re-
invention of its rules indicate that it is not there yet. The following section undertakes a brief 
overview of the tensions that have accompanied its gradual development, and the role that Frontex 
has been invited to play. 
Situating Frontex: Intelligence Agent or Boots on the Ground? 
Since its commencement, Frontex has been repeating in its communications its nature as an 
agent of intelligence rather than one of force, as well as its supplementary rather than leading role. 
As stated in a 2011 publication for dissemination to the press: “The activities of Frontex are 
intelligence- driven. It must be stressed that Frontex does not replace, but complements and 
provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the Member 
States.”21 The aim of this section is to investigate the extent to which such claims can still be made 
with credibility in 2016, in light of its new mandate which has enhanced both its operational side as 
well as its executive authority. 
The birth and evolution of Frontex have been central themes of a growing number of policy-
studies, situating their questions along institutional as much as security lines of sight.22 Pollak and 
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Slominski situate its establishment within a specific post-2000s wave of EU ‘agencification’,23 a 
pattern of delegating authority to non-majoritarian institutions by manufacturing of a portfolio of 
public tasks to be performed, entering in this way policy areas previously subject to more 
accountable forms of governance.24 In the same vein, Wolff and Shout have argued that the 
establishment of Frontex marked an instance of professionalising and depoliticising policy work, 
setting-up Agencies as independent regulatory instruments in response to an EU political legitimacy 
crisis.25 From a security angle, Neal has argued that Frontex represents the failure of the 
securitisation of migration after 9/11 to produce urgent responses and solidarity between states. On 
the other hand, Vaughan-Williams finds in the evolution of Frontex a partial response to the societal 
threats revived in the post-9/11 terrorism wave, a link that was established firmly in the 2004 EU 
“Declaration on Combating Terrorism.”26 
This variety of perspectives seems to reflect the ambiguous context within which Frontex 
has been operating. As has been argued in the literature, the construction of migration as a 
European security question and the politicisation of asylum had been underway long before the 
terrorist attacks of 2001.27 The impact that 9/11 did have on EU security policy however was to 
accelerate cooperation, enabling the construction of a common external threat, as well as an 
internal security dimension. As such, the efforts to create a European border guard have been 
shaped both by discourses securitising the link between migration, terrorism, and the threat coming 
from ‘outside’, as well as by regular internal processes and functional spill-over. But whilst the 
former, external dimension has implied some kind of unity, the latter, internal element has involved 
a great degree of differentiation between the Commission’s centralising tendencies, and the 
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Council’s heterogeneous position that pushed towards intergovernmental directions. This section 
sketches the institutional evolution of Frontex through such experimental processes of trial and 
error, alongside the construction of a dual role for the EU as an external and internal security actor. 
Border Forum 
A look into Frontex’s more informal predecessor demonstrates the range of challenges that 
the subsequent entity was expected to resolve, and why a professionalised model was considered a 
suitable option. The Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), was an 
intergovernmental initiative established by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). SCIFA comprised a 
common forum where senior national officials could meet in order to exchange views and draw up 
strategic guidelines on matters of borders and migration.28 In the context of growing migration 
flows, and within the emergency aftermath of 9/11, the European Council of Laeken in September 
2001 noted the need for a more operational component to these informal groupings, and called for 
“arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to 
examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could 
be created.”29 In response, the External Borders Practitioners Common Unit (PCU, also known as 
SCIFA+) was set-up in 2002, comprising the members of SCIFA as well as the heads of national 
border authorities, with the task of coordinating national projects through ad hoc border control 
centres30 and conducting common integrated risk analyses. 
 The PCU had emerged as a compromise solution between the Commission’s references to a 
European border force in the May 2002 Communication Towards Integrated Management of the 
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External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,31 and the Council’s preferences for 
intergovernmental cooperation, as noted in the Plan for the Management of the External Borders of 
the EU.32It was abandoned only a year after its inception. As a first attempt at practical cooperation, 
it demonstrated many deficiencies, operating in a fragmented manner under multiple national 
mandates,33 and became highly politicised.34 Whilst the PCU was eventually criticised by both the 
Commission and the Council, and both bodies expressed opinions in June 2003 that a new 
institutional structure should be considered, their concerns were divergent; the former noted the 
structural limits of the PCU with regards to performing operational tasks,35 while the later pointed 
out the absence of a monitoring mechanism and of a method for independent evaluation.36  
When the establishment of Frontex as an Agency for external border cooperation was put 
on the table in November 2003,37 the proposed regulation represented again the fused position of 
centralising and intergovernmental logics. Whilst the depoliticised guise of an Agency marked a 
significant shift towards professionalised supranational control, Frontex would still be under close 
intergovernmental supervision, its Management Board consisting of national officials as well as 
Commission representatives, unlike the general Agency-framework which falls entirely within the 
Commission’s control. The carefully formulated mandate reflected this balancing, outlining 
centralising tasks for Frontex but framing them as supplementary: a) to coordinate operational 
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cooperation between member-states; b) to contribute to training border guards, including the 
establishment of common training standards; c) to conduct risk analyses; d) to follow up research 
and development; e) to assist member-states if increased needs arise; f) to coordinate joint returns 
operations. (my emphasis) 
A is for Apolitical 
The need for ‘depoliticising’ reasoning to counter intergovernmental obstacles can also be 
positioned in relation to the wider internal tensions concerning the contested proprietorship of the 
ASFJ policy agenda, especially during the years following the failure of the European Constitution, 
and the signing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty as a watered-down version of the rejected charter. The 
treaty had the difficult task of bringing more coherence across policy areas, by undoing the divide of 
the previous ‘pillar structure’, without intruding too much within member-state sensitive remits. 
One example of such sensitivities was the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, drafted by the 
French Presidency and adopted by the Council in October 2008, which paid much attention to 
upholding member-state competences and, according to Carrera and Guild, “attempted to bring 
legitimacy to (and universalise at the EU level) certain national policy responses and practices of 
particular member states.” 38  
It was during such post-Lisbon policy readjustments, which have been described by Kaunert 
and Leonard as “inroads into various areas of security-including internal security matters”,39 that the 
Stockholm programme was introduced, outlining the goals for the Area of Freedom Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) for the period between 2009 and 2014, and including border management both in its 
internal and its external security priorities. The programme placed a renewed emphasis on the 
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professionalization of security and the potential of data technologies,40 and hinted at the future 
form of Frontex within this context. The programme added technical tasks to the scope of Frontex’s 
work, reporting mechanisms and data processing responsibilities, and while no concrete reference 
to a European corps of border guards was made, the latter did appear as a future possibility.  
While the Commission-authored 2010 Action Plan implementing the programme stated that 
“[t]he Union will pursue an integrated approach to the control of access to its territory in an 
enlarged Schengen area”,41 a legislative package that followed in 2011 suggested otherwise. It 
comprised an amendment to the 2010 proposal for the foreseen Schengen Evaluation mechanism, 
as well as the proposal for a regulation to establish rules for the temporary reintroduction of internal 
border controls in emergency circumstances. The amendment to the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism involved again compromises, such as between the existing intergovernmental system of 
peer-review, and the Commission’s proposal for on-site visits of teams under the control of the 
Commission, eventually agreeing that the member-states and the Commission shall be “jointly 
responsible for the implementation of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism”42 In keeping, the 
2011 Frontex amending regulation was framed as in line with “the objective of the Union to develop 
a policy with a view to the gradual introduction of the concept of Integrated Border Management”,43 
although still maintaining the provision that “the responsibility for the control and surveillance of 
external borders lies with the Member States”44. Importantly however, the amendment introduced 
the European Border Guard Teams, comprising seconded border guards to be deployed in JOs and 
rapid border interventions 
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As it were, the depoliticised Agency model appears to have held this common EU border 
authority together, even though its priorities and modus operandi are often caught between a wide 
range of institutional forces, competing interests, and diverse or even contradictory expectations. 
Frontex has been as often expected to demonstrate measurable impact in fulfilling its mandate, as it 
does to carry out its operations in line with the EU’s principle of proportionality, taking cautious 
steps and refraining from major and rapid change so as to avoid leading hesitant member-states 
back into an attitude of mistrust. It is from this fragmented institutional and policy ground, however, 
that it has been possible for Frontex to assert relevance in different areas, and to access diverse 
opportunities to obtain momentum, presence, and bargaining power in neighbouring remits, such as 
foreign policy and internal security.  
This very short review has located Frontex’s position within policy and institutional arenas, 
as well as its dual organisational identity as intelligence agency and as aspiring operational actor 
associated with physical presence, within its aim of integrated border management. The view of this 
position from within the organisation is illuminating in several ways, and examined below. 
View from Inside  
The 2010 special Frontex publication “Beyond the Frontiers- Frontex: The first five years”,45 a 
commemorative volume which was printed in many copies in a luxurious hardback edition, included 
a conversation with then Executive Director Ilka Laitinen reflecting on the Agency’s work thus far. 
The interview unfolds over 10 small pages, which include photographs, maps, and congratulatory 
quotes. It presents the ‘authorised’ Frontex view on the main interlocutors, stakes, and discourses, 
and the challenges that have become re-appearing themes in its attempts to evolve into a single 
European border guard. Excerpts from this conversation are directly quoted below, in order to relay 
the interesting tone of the discussion, and to highlight three points: a) the reliance on member-
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states for staff and equipment b) the gap between operational needs and executive authority, and c) 
the need for greater access to and liberty to process information. 
 
Q: It sounds as if the Commission gave you a relatively free hand. Do you 
think that the structure of the organisation, or the way it is operating, 
would be different if the Commission had been more rigid?  
IL: That could have been the case. The staffing certainly could have 
developed differently. … I remember very well when I asked the 
Commission what were the options to recruit people. I was told that it 
needs time. Then I asked ‘What about national experts?’ ‘Yes, but it is not 
how we do it.’ ‘Is it illegal?’ I asked. ‘That’s not the ordinary way, but no it 
is not illegal.’ ‘OK,’ I said. ‘Then that’s how we do it.’ I think we gained 
about six to seven months by just hiring national experts. But that meant I 
was the only statutory staff member until the end of 2005.  
Q: What changes would you like to see to the mandate of Frontex? 
IL: Frontex needs equipment so that we are not too dependent on the 
Member States, so that we don’t have to make too many compromises. 
…We need more reaction capacity to cope with unpredictable events. … 
We also need incentives to Third Countries. It would be a good thing if 
Frontex could be the European actor in terms of capacity building programs 
in Third Countries, so that we have something to give them. (my emphasis) 
Q: Are there any other changes you would welcome? 
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IL: Yes. A third change relates to information management. I think it was 
good that from the beginning we were extremely clear that we must be an 
intelligence-driven organisation. But what we are missing is the opportunity 
to process information that contains personal data. We understand that it 
is a very sensitive issue from the data protection point of view and we 
know how important it is to have protection in place. But having seen 
developments over many years, I am quite convinced that if we are not 
able to process all information, including that which contains personal 
data, we will not be able to fulfil the potential of the agency. 
Q: Does that make you feel that you are fighting criminals, for example, 
those who traffic in human beings, with one hand tied behind your back? 
IL: That’s right. It’s intensely frustrating when you really think the answer 
to a crime is in the information, but you cannot touch it to analyse it 
properly. … It is a choice between data protection and operational needs 
(my emphasis) 
As Horsti notes, Frontex is no stranger to word-games, having a dominant role in shaping the 
public debates on migration and borders by acting as a ‘discursive technologist.’46 Horsti shows how 
Frontex responded to critiques from both humanitarian activists and from those “concerned with 
national sovereignty”47 when reporting on their operations. Official accounts must demonstrate that 
Frontex is indeed capable of tackling a serious problem and also of doing so in a ‘humane’ manner. 
The existing tendencies have developed into the “current humanitarian discourse (which) has 
become a sign of the present-day administration and operation that appears both neutral and 
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politically correct.”48 Similarly, one other understanding that emerges when looking at the discursive 
and other interactions of major players: Frontex is often taken as the EU’s spokesperson in its 
routine communications with member-states’ border authorities and often has o respond to 
anxieties about the transference of sovereign powers.  
Related to this, Kasparek addresses the interesting contradiction of public perceptions of 
Frontex and how the Agency views itself. He argues that the link between Frontex and the 
securitisation of migration is not matched by the discourses of Frontex officials, the latter stressing 
the Agency’s responsibility over issues of the management of the border only, which fails to render 
Frontex into a significant actor in European migration management.49 As one Frontex official put it, 
there seems to be “a difference between perceptions and reality”50 when it comes to the 
expectations of Frontex and what the Agency has been able to deliver. This statement can be read 
alongside a particular Frontex ethos, a biopolitical self-limiting consciousness where the founding 
principle is not rooted in what the Agency has been enabled to do but in what it (perceives it) cannot 
and should not do. There have been clear red lines to Frontex’s powers such as the powerlessness to 
enforce an activity or course of action to a member-state, outline instructions to deployed officers 
that oppose the command of the hosting member-state authorities, or the incapacity to effectively 
deny entry, which remains the responsibility the member state, a sovereign act reserved for a 
sovereign actor.  
Thus, Frontex’s work as negotiator between member-state border authorities appears to 
have educated the Agency staff on the practical limits of Europeanisation in the field of border 
management, owing to the fact that member-states “differ appreciably on what constitutes the best 
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means to wage the fight against illegal immigration.”51 Lessons learned from this practice have been 
a very gradual and careful implementation of major reforms, preparedness for long multilateral 
negotiations, patience and persistence in the face of slow or only partial member state compliance. 
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that Frontex had been advocating for a number of years 
for their role to remain one of facilitating member-states in carrying out border related activities, 
but not to officially or nominally replace their exclusive authority on sovereign matters. In short, 
Frontex has worked on a moderate profile, as an improving mechanism rather than one of radical 
change which can be associated with political intent. The drawbacks of such an approach, prolonged 
implementation times, and gaps between set benchmarks and achieved results, have at times been 
seen as reluctance and lack of decisiveness. As eloquently put by one Commission official during a 
Frontex-hosted conference in 2013, in spite of increasing resources and accumulated experience, 
“our borders are becoming less and less Europeanised with time.” 
We have seen so far how Frontex’s beginnings have run parallel to the process of EU 
integration itself, evolving through the similar challenges of proposed centralisation restrained by 
member-states’ drive to maintain control. Through these challenges, the Agency has still enjoyed 
immense growth since the organisation was founded, its budget growing from 6 to 88 million euros, 
and staff recruitments from 30 to 294 employees between 2005 and 2010.52 The growing trend 
continues enhanced in the proposal for an EBCG, projecting a budget increase from 143 million 
euros and 402 staff in 2015 to 322 million and 1,000 staff for 2020 - also considering that these 
figures tend to inflate from their initial projections. If, as Monar notes, the creation of Frontex 
represented “an important step towards a more integrated and ‘institutionalised’ management of 
                                                             
51
 Wolff, S., (2008), "Border management in the Mediterranean: internal, external and ethical challenges", 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(2), p. 259. 
52
 Frontex, “Frontex General Report 2010,” 2011, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2010/frontex_gener
al_report_2010.pdf. 
Chapter Three 
147 
 
external borders”,53 then the Agency’s new name and mandate are likely to signify the first 
definition of European integrated border management.54 The innovations introduced and red lines 
affirmed by the new mandate, illustrate the results of integrating the emergency reasoning enabled 
by the crisis-framing, with the patient politics of the managerial Agency framework. 
The New Frontex Mandate 
Many of the long-standing concerns over operational capacity and executive powers were 
partially addressed in the Commission’s proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard, but yet 
again the new mandate did not reflect the equivalent of a European border force, primarily because 
it still did not create a body of border guards under exclusive EU command, or grant the EU the ‘right 
to intervene’. Furthermore, far from a response to the securitising discourses that afforded visibility 
and legitimacy for the European Agenda on Migration, the proposal for setting up the new Agency 
had been based on studies and discussions conducted well before the ‘landmark’ year of 2015, with 
the mass-arrivals of refugees and terrorist attacks in European cities. However, the Agenda and the 
new mandate had been approved in a popular context of urgency, the same one which saw the 
militarisation of the Southern perimeter with the launch of the EUNAFOR MED Operation Sophia in 
the South Central Mediterranean and the deployment of NATO ships in the Aegean, and entails 
some elements of ‘hard’ power. 
The proposal expanded Frontex’s operational, executive, and regulatory capacity in 
important areas. Most notably: a) it introduced the Vuneralibity Assessment Mechanism, enabling 
the Agency to conduct itself assessments on potential weaknesses of external border control and 
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determine where EU intervention might be required; b) it enabled a degree of operational autonomy 
in the form of a Rapid Reserve Pool of 1,500 border guards,55 and the permission to acquire its own 
equipment c) it afforded a greater executive say and leading role in returns activities, as well as 
enhanced capacity to cooperate with third-countries; and forged more extensive cooperation 
channels with other law enforcement agencies. 
Human rights groups and international watchdogs correctly pointed out the extensive reach 
which the new mandate granted EBCG in sensitive activities such as returns, patrols, and 
screenings.56 The new mandate raises concern as regards the supervision of such activities. More 
specifically, the proposal was not accompanied by the necessary clarifications in relation to 
responsibility for SAR operations, personal data protection safeguards, as well as fundamental rights 
precautions. What can be seen as worrisome in this sense is that the new mandate opens more ways 
for bending international protection norms. In contrast to the violent practice of illegal pushbacks, 
which has at least called national authorities to clear legal liability in some occasions, the ways in 
which the EBCG activities could interfere with the right to asylum are rather indirect and dispersed; 
sealing the cracks through which the current Asylum system works by reinforcing the surveillance 
capacities; and performing interceptions and disembarkations according to the EU’s questionable 
‘safe countries of origin’ list. 
Further to these humanitarian concerns, policy thinkers close to Brussels have read the new 
legislation with some confusion, noting a contradiction in the way member-states agreed upon a 
proposal that made binding those same provisions they had previously not fulfilled, such as the 
mandatory deployment of national officers at the request of the Commission. Dimitriadi has noted 
that "it is paradoxical that member-states are willing to support a new framework of operation that 
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commits them to pledges, tasks, and responsibilities that they refused to carry out under Frontex."57 
In the same vein, Ripma commented that  
It seems contradictory that Member States would be willing to accept more 
binding obligations under this proposal, while nothing prevents them from 
furnishing the Agency with the necessary tools now. Likewise, it would be 
naive to think that greater powers and a new name for Frontex might 
suddenly remedy structural flaws in some Member States’ external border 
management systems.58  
This confusion needs to be read against the context of a securitising effort which has been more 
successful in raising insecurities than in mustering support for common solutions.  
Having traced the contending elements which render Frontex a dual entity, the following 
section looks into the ways in which Frontex participates in the production of border knowledge 
through the practice of risk analysis, constructing itself as a depoliticised engineer of expert border 
solutions. 
Frontex as Author of Risks  
As discussed, a number of critical security scholars have expressed the view that the birth of 
Frontex may not be amenable to explanations borrowed from securitisation theory.59 Neal helpfully 
elaborates on this point, noting that in the creation and evolution of Frontex one reads the 
conceptual language of modalities of risk.60 This does not owe to a lack of securitising attributes, 
such as urgency and exceptionalism; the debates following each tragic event in the Mediterranean 
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demonstrate how speech acts securitising migration in the EU are in place and relevant. As Neal 
highlights, it is rather in the parting between urgency discourses and the routine institutional 
environment in which EU policy is being decided, where the inception of Frontex should be 
located.61  
I would like to add to Neal’s argument and conceptualise this risk modality of Frontex as a 
dialectic between emergency and technocratic reasoning, which have supported respectively, but at 
different speeds, the highly politicised development of operational capacity on the one hand, and 
the somehow less sensitive intelligence-driven activities on the other. Rather than formulating the 
question as a dilemma between emergency solutions and normalisation, I would like to re-stage and 
unpack this binary and propose that the residue of the ‘failure’ of turning securitising discourses into 
‘urgent action’, namely the surge in intelligence-driven activities, is in fact lending credence to 
securitising discourses by producing ‘emergency knowledge’, and eventually contributing, albeit at a 
slower pace, to greater operational autonomy and physical border presence. 
Theorising risk  
“Risk” is likely to be one of Frontex’s most frequently used terms. As Petersen explains, the 
rapid spike in uses of the term “risk” in academic and practitioners’ discourses reflects the 
emergence of a field of ‘risk studies’ within the debates that concern the expansion of the 
contemporary security agenda.62 Within this field, Aradau and van Munster identify “the emergence 
of a ‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new configurations of risk that require that the 
catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs.”63 Rasmussen, reading Beck’s thesis on 
the emergence of a ‘Risk Society’,64 argues in this same vein that political actions are becoming 
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increasingly reflexive and overlapping with security praxeologies.65 These, as much as the security 
agents that enact them, are both shaped within the same social setting which is governed by a 
particular security rationality66. Rasmussen extracts from the Risk Society thesis what he calls the 
three constitutive elements of reflexive politics, which he suggests are particularly relevant for 
international security thinking. The first of those is the logic of ‘management’, an insight that 
suggests politics to be the constant attempt to navigate a field of possibilities, regulating 
transformative processes, and replacing political ends with means. The second is the ‘presence of 
the future’, and it refers to a logic that populates strategies of eliminating risk, “defining present 
problems by their perceived future consequences”67 in a forward-oriented politics which derogates 
the present time. The final element of an international risk society is the ‘boomerang effect’ which 
describes the spatial and temporal breakdown of the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’. In effect, 
threats can often be “the consequences of one’s own actions”68. This point, which establishes the 
reflexive link, focuses on how political actors are looking inside as much as outside and, as they draft 
a range of scenarios that can potentially cause fear and insecurity, they identify a part for 
themselves, constructing a version of the self as equivalent to a risk.  
A short survey of texts and other discourses that Frontex takes credit for reveals a presence 
of these elements. As an entity which has thus far identified with intelligence much more than ‘hard 
power’, Frontex had taken its raison d’etre to be the conduct of risk assessments and authorship of 
risk analysis reports. On its website Frontex underlines that “risk analysis is the starting point for all 
Frontex activities, from high level strategic decision-making to planning and implementation of 
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operational activities.”69 The majority of these reports are tailored analytical products, produced by 
the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) in collaboration with the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), 
a practitioners’ group composed of analysts from member-state authorities. These analyses are 
classified, presumably due to their sensitive operational nature, since they contain detailed 
information on the tactics and modus operandi of law enforcement. As a result, the work that goes 
into them remains unaccountable. As Carrera points out, the European Parliament is absent from 
the entire process, and therefore “the very source legitimising the operation cannot be at all 
contested, reviewed and in the end made democratically accountable.”70 
The less detailed Frontex Annual Risk Analyses (FRAN) and the FRAN Quarterlies, are made 
available online to anyone. The Quarterlies in particular act as a public newsletter about movement 
and activities at the EU’s external borders, but it can also be taken as a profile of the Agency itself, a 
demonstrable portfolio with illustrative examples of their work. Starting as a working group of 
member-state professionals under the aegis of Frontex, with its roots in the PCU, RAU was aimed at 
working out definitions and common understandings of attributes and indicators and agreeing on a 
standard procedure of data collection, validation and harmonisation. In Beck’s words, it would be 
the institutionalisation of the ‘definitional struggles over the scale, degrees and urgency of risks’71. 
The CIRAM (Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model) which had been requested by the Seville 
European Council meeting in 2002 and adopted in January 2003,72 had the same purpose of fine-
tuning the existing different approaches to risk management, by recognizing acceptable definitions 
of threat as a function of risk, vulnerability, and impact.73 
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The following image and passage, found on the first page of every risk analysis document, 
sheds light on the ways these analysts perceive their work 
Figure 3.1: Frontex Risk Analysis symbol 
 Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow 
drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow 
represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation 
towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of 
ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual 
exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents 
the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse 
sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical 
products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to 
form a reliable basis for its operational activities.74 
 
The language of this concise description is aimed precisely at establishing scientific 
neutrality, suggesting that its operation reside outside the arena of political games. As Belina and 
Miggelbrink suggest, the risk management approach has allowed Frontex to “place itself in a central 
                                                             
74
 Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, “FRAN Q1 2013,” 2013, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2013.pdf. 
Chapter Three 
154 
 
position in the implementation of a European border regime, but does this in the guise of a pure 
services agency meeting the expectations of its customers”.75 
 
Analyse (all of) that: the Work of the Risk Analysis Unit 
Frontex’s emphasis on risk analysis has presented its own challenges, the first of which is 
that a constant and regular flow of data, one of the Agency’s most important resources, is also a 
significant liability, since full compliance of member-states is required. As suggested earlier, a lack of 
disciplinary procedures to ensure timely cooperation means that at its very core, Frontex’s work is 
dependent on good working relations and individual states’ capacities, and is thus easily 
compromised. Georgiev has addressed the problem of data collection and data quality, citing as an 
example the request towards member-states to submit a completed questionnaire on the impact of 
the economic crisis on their border management activities in 2009, to which frontline member-
states, the ones that the questionnaire most concerned, did not respond.76  
Similarly problematic, this approach relies on a static framework made up of indexes, 
figures, routes drawn on maps, and seeks to make deductive statements in order to represent 
accurately the changing geographies of migration, including the many arteries of movement which 
remain undetected. Problematic as such a framework may be, it still forms the basis for the resulting 
documents, which in turn sometimes resembles a pieced together text of disconnected comments 
and figures. For instance, in the executive summary of the FRAN Quarterly, reviewing activity during 
the third quarter of 201277, all of the following comments reside alongside each other in the short 
space of three pages with large margins. 
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These points contain contradictions, which make it difficult for the document and its 
empirical findings to ‘speak for themselves’ in harmony. It remains unclear whether operational 
efforts towards tackling irregular migration into Greece over the stated period could be considered 
as successful or not. Instead, these observations read as independently existing and malleable, 
fragments of discourse that can lend themselves to success stories as much as to accounts of 
disappointment. Much of the ambiguity may be attributed to what law enforcement circles call the 
‘dark figures’ paradox whereby an increase or decrease in registered incidents could owe both to 
higher/lower crime rate or to an increased/decreased monitoring practice.78 However, the large 
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 Firstly there was a massive reduction in detections of illegal border crossing 
compared to previous third quarters, widely attributed to increased operational 
activity by the Greek authorities … fewer detections than in any previous third 
quarter 
 Despite the clear impact of the Greek operational activities on the number of 
detections of illegal border crossing, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
absolute flow of irregular migrants arriving at the region has decreased in any way 
 Document fraud on flights from Istanbul increased once the Greek operations 
commenced 
 Perhaps somewhat predictably there were increased detections of illegal border-
crossing at both the Turkish sea border with Greece and land border with Bulgaria 
 Secondary movement from Greece to other EU member states were still detected 
in very high numbers 
 Greece reported more than half of all detections of illegal border crossing 
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amount of statistical data that has to be interpreted also makes it difficult to unpack the 
complexities of the numbers they make reference to. The information gathered represents a matrix 
with too many dimensions whilst the articulable conclusions that can be drawn can only refer to one 
at a time.  
Another example, also illustrative of a ‘presence of the future’ bias, is found in the 
predictions about clandestine movement originating from Albania published in the 2012 Work 
Programme, the Agency’s annual operative plan. There we find that “following the introduction of 
visa free travel for Albanian holders of biometric passports in 2011, illegal border crossings along the 
green border between Greece and Albania is expected to decrease”79. Turning to the subsequent 
reports we find in Q3 of 2012 that after all “Albanians continued to be detected illegally crossing 
their land border with Greece” with only a slight decline to be observed, while increasing detections 
of counterfeit border-crossing stamps were reported.80 Fast-forwarding to the first report of the 
following year, we find that “Albanians detected illegally crossing their land border into Greece was 
the single largest phenomenon in Q1 2013”, continuing “to feature highly in several indicators of 
irregular migration […] with more than 1000 detections, they were the most commonly detected 
migrants illegally crossing the external land border”81 .  
The problem with the original assumption had been its failure to recognise the overall 
geographical and political context, i.e. that seasonal migration from Albania owes to poverty at 
home, which means that the cost of a biometric passport would still constitute a barrier for many. 
Further to this, trends established rely upon a very narrow set of parameters. The slight decline 
observed in 2012 could not have anticipated the subsequent surge as it was an observation referring 
to a very short period of time, and to green border crossings, between rather than at BCPs, which is 
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only one way of irregular entry. In short, these findings are so specific that the knowledge they 
produce ends up collapsing into singularity. As this example demonstrates, having access to detailed 
of information does not ensure accuracy or sound forecasting. One Frontex risk analyst mentions 
with regards to the credibility of findings that, “the numbers give us the trends but they cannot be 
followed blindly. Errors do happen.”82  
But more than simply human errors, the difficulty of eliciting comprehensive and accurate 
observations can also be a result of too much or too disparate data. These risk analyses cannot be 
perfect representations of the ground, as they are themselves structured upon a problematic 
fragmented knowledge base,83 carrying forward and multiplying, information and previous 
assessment deficits. In this light the logic of management becomes apparent, in the attempts to 
manipulate a dynamic process in a particular way whereby “events are de-singularised and placed in 
the context of a certain political project”,84 producing in turn fragmented policy.85 
These shortfalls have not compromised the emphasis and trust put into Frontex’s risk 
analyses. It is in unquestioned confidence that risk analysis conclusions met the EUROSUR proposal, 
bringing forth an interesting association. In the latter, we encounter the following passage:  
Better awareness of what is going on at the external borders is only of 
limited value if not complemented by an improved capability of EU 
Member States to react to challenges faced at their external borders. For 
this reason, Member-States shall divide their external borders into borders 
sections (Article 13), to which- based on risk analysis and the number of 
incidents occurring- impact levels shall be attributed (Article 14). 
Depending on which impact levels have been attributed, the national 
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coordination centres and the Agency shall take counter-measures in order 
to lower the impact on the border section in question86 (my emphasis) 
What this passage effectively points to is a process of re-drawing of the EU’s perimeter for 
particular operational purposes. Here, different borders (border sections as per official document) 
are brought together into aggregate categories that are based not on the member-state that they 
belong to, but according to the seriousness of the threat that they pose for the bigger entity they are 
now delineating. This is similar to the process that aggregates all external EU borders into land, sea, 
and air categories, which are coordinated by different sectors at Frontex, as well as to the 
delineation of operational areas, SAR regions, Common Patrol Areas (CPA) for Joint Operations (JOs).  
 
Figure 3.2 Operational Areas, JO EPN Hermes 201487 
Through these operational mappings, and the surveillance and patrolling activities they initiate, 
alternative carvings of the continent are produced which, as per Rasmussen’s ‘boomerang effect’, 
involve the breakdown of the existing spatial form of the self (and the other).  
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From Border Practitioners to Border Consultants  
The ways in which the professionalized risk modality has affected the EU border acquis 
become evident when one considers its impact on the sensitive issue of EU ‘boots on the ground’. As 
Carrera points out, the setting-up of an ESBG had “never disappeared from the EU agenda as a long-
term policy vision”88. However, the ways in which it has been approached have been transformed, 
alongside changing understandings of obtaining and processing border knowledge. The 
establishment of a European border corps, the European System of Border Guards (ESBG), was the 
object of a feasibility study which began in the summer of 2013, contracted to consultancy firm 
Unisys. It is worth comparing this study to one that was undertaken in 2002 on the same subject, for 
their different conceptual and methodological approaches can demonstrate two very different ways 
of producing border expertise. 
The first study,89 undertaken at the initiative of member-states Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, concluded neither in favour of nor against the setting up of an EU border force, but 
their findings are not so important here. The Study Group responsible for the 2002 project was made 
up of border practitioners, officers of the border authorities of the participating countries, academic 
advisors and national experts, and one representative of the European Commission (DG Home 
Affairs) and Europol each. Their study begun by acknowledging that the project had “a high symbolic 
value, derived from the idea of “border”: a challenging idea that the European peoples and the 
European States are confronted with, i.e. preserving and reinforcing the conditions of well-being and 
internal peace within the Union”90. A pre-study phase lasted four days, when a questionnaire to be 
used during the visits to member-states was drafted. As for the research part, it was carried out 
“with an empirical methodological approach, neither finalised to the research of theoretical 
formulation detached from reality, nor oriented to the discovery of justifications of the correctness 
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of ‘ideal’ solutions”91. Reporting on their visits, the members of the Study Group stated that they had 
acquired “a new and articulated picture of the structures, of the organisations, of the procedures 
and of the other relevant aspects of the border police in the 15 EU countries”92. In short, their 
approach was to study the field without pre-conceived ideas, avoiding drafting scenarios and 
imagining the future. 
A very different set of guidelines governed the 2013 study.93 Firstly, instead of entrusting the 
project to border practitioners and persons with expertise in the field, the 2013 study was 
contracted to a consultancy (Unisys) which conducts a variety of projects for diverse customers, 
from building societies to banks and air-carriers. Unlike the 2002 study which had started by 
acknowledging the sensitive issues it would work on, the approach described by Unisys is one 
reminiscent of managerial techniques, focusing on efficiency rather than subtlety. In line with the 
risk assessment model, the drafting of anticipated scenarios was endorsed, and the initial phase 
included a period of desktop research where three models were drafted describing varying degrees 
of EU executive control,94 as well as the drafting of a questionnaire which was then taken to 
member-state authorities. Their answers were subsequently used to further develop those initial 
models.95 This shift from a political to a managerial approach to extracting and producing knowledge 
resonates with the logics of risk within which Frontex operates. The remainder of the chapter is 
concerned with situating the element of technology in this context, the relationship it forges 
between policy and the security industry, and the balance of border work to be conducted by 
humans and machines. 
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Making Borders Smart 
Checking everyone in the same way is very old-fashioned.96 
 
As discussed, the 2008 Stockholm programme inserted an approach “overtly oriented 
towards the reinforcement of the reliance on technology within the context of EU security 
policies”97. This has been linked to the post-2001 security agenda, where “techniques of imagining 
the future have taken on new political significance”98. At the heart of these narratives lies a 
technological determinism stressing the importance of incorporating computerised technologies in 
security responses; proliferation of information systems and expertise is being presented as a one-
way solution to the threat of being surpassed and having to face an untraceable ‘enemy’ several 
steps ahead. This particular security-temporality, focused on future events and the pace of 
technology, is present in the biometric border which absorbs such technological innovations, 
becoming versatile and performing as and when needed; as a filter of diverse mobilities, a recording 
device of the biological form, or a barrier to undesired mobilities.99  
This border is also present in the operations of Frontex, which has developed as an 
accelerating organisation, always in a state of becoming. As one Frontex official put it, the Agency is 
“not an accomplishment but an ongoing process”100. According to the Frontex Perspectives on 
Biometrics for Border Checks, an academically styled paper written by senior Frontex officials, the 
border acquis is becoming free from “requirements [that] were written at a time when biometrics 
was not a common good as it is today."101 Biometrics “make the concept of automated border 
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crossing feasible”102. Automated Border Control (ABC) is defined as the use of automated identity 
verification systems at BCPs which work “without the need for human intervention”,103 a definition 
that recalls what Amoore identifies as the “all border security dreams of an automated gate, a digital 
decision and risk-based rules”104.  
These investments are of course costly. Between 2002 and 2013, 500 million euros were 
spent on developing and eventually rolling-out the revised Schengen Information System (SIS II), the 
central Schengen database containing alerts on persons suspected of criminal activity, stolen 
objects, and entry bans.105 The development of the Visa Information System (VIS), the system 
containing visa data of Third Country Nationals (TCNs), cost 134 million between 2004 and 2011.106 
The Agency which was set-up in 2011 to run and maintain SIS II and VIS (as well as Eurodac), the 
European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, 
security and justice (eu-LISA), had a budget of 67 million euros for 2015.107  
 The proliferation of data technologies in EU border security seems to be unfolding at a new 
scale after the announcement of the ‘smart’ borders package. Modelled on the US-VISIT system of 
automated border controls at airports, the concept of the ‘smart’ border was suggested by the 
Commission in 2008, and a proposal for a regulation came in 2013. It introduced a system of 
scanning all 10 fingerprints of persons over the age of 12 who cross an external air border, and its 
costs have been estimated at 1.1 trillion euros between 2015 and 2020.108 The package consists of a 
Registered Traveler Programme (RTP) and an Entry/Exit System (EES), which “will help facilitate a 
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more open and secure Europe, relying on state-of-the-art technologies.”109 More specifically, the 
RTP concerns all third-country nationals, who will be vetted and subjected to thorough screening 
before offered a readable machine card which entitles them to a faster crossing of the border. 
Similarly, the EES records the movements of travellers across the borders, and is also aimed at saving 
time, while an additional feature which has been presented as an advantage is that verification of a 
person’s identity can be done even in the absence of travel documents, if for example a traveller has 
lost their passport. Overall ‘SMART’ borders are framed as a four-fold solution; reduce queues at 
borders, control the period of stay of TCNs, systematically identify and report overstayers, and 
improve the identification of individuals in the fight against terrorism. Malmström spoke of the 
necessity to come to terms with the speed of technological innovation in this way: 
 In this 'digital era' made of tablets, smartphones and high-tech devices, 
our border guards still use a manual system based essentially on stamps in 
the passports. […] (With an EES) for the first time, it will be possible to have 
a real time picture of which third country nationals are present in the 
Schengen area110 
The ‘SMART’ borders package, characterized by Jeandesboz as “mass surveillance with a 
straight face”111 has been received with suspicion by the media, who reported on the package along 
the lines of “a scheme to track every non-EU citizen.”112 These reports echoed the position of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) who said that “[the Commission’s] stated aims of 
replacing a 'slow and unreliable' system with its finger print system do not sufficiently justify the 
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expense and intrusions into privacy.” 113 A European Parliament-ordered study also found that the 
Commission’s impact assessment, based on the study delivered by Unisys, had been ‘creative’ with 
the given figures - failing to report a 25% margin of error in the cost estimates - and was “designed 
to legitimize the policy option already chosen by the European Commission.”114 Given all these 
sounded alarms, questions emerge with regards to the particular link which is being established 
between the ‘common good’ of biometric technologies and border security. As explained below, this 
link is implicit, multifaceted, and directly related to questions of human agency and the 
development of the EU security industry. 
Borders, Workers, Traders 
One important aspect in the uses of computerized controls is their potential to automate 
humans out of the system. The guidelines for ABC systems highlight that “a single border guard can 
typically supervise from three to ten e-Gates”115. The security benefits are then two-fold; fostering 
the convergence of diverse bordering practices, and cutting-down on the costs of border work.  
Integrated border management has become more or less established as a factor 
contributing to the overall security of the Schengen area. In that sense, growing uses of 
computerized border technologies promote security by implementing universal techniques. ABC 
systems “have been elaborated in an effort to achieve harmonization of practice, similar travel 
experience, and consistent security levels at the different border crossing points of the European 
Union/Schengen area.”116 Human agency is antagonistic to these aims, seen as one of the major 
sources of divergent border practice; humans are influencing and are influenced by their particular 
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domestic contexts, which direct different approaches on “how the work should be done.”117 Frontex 
heads several efforts to address this differentiation, from the establishment of a European Day for 
Border Guards, to common training sessions and the development of a Common Core Curriculum 
standardising basic training. However, erasing national divergence by means of teaching and 
socialisation cannot be absolute. For instance, common training standards are supposed to be taken 
into consideration in the domestic level, but the responsibility of adopting them ultimately lies with 
the member-states and it is often only partial.118 Furthermore, the process of automation also 
entails, a reduction of border staff costs. This is a point that the Commission has also stressed when 
defending the expenditure of the ‘SMART’ package As Malmström stated “[t]he costs must also be 
seen in conjunction with the savings that will follow more effective border checks. The new systems 
will boost the ability to handle growing number of travellers without having to increase the number 
of border guards.”119  
Market forces appear to be another source of momentum for the proliferation of data 
technologies at the border. The Commission adopted a Security Industrial Policy (SIP)in 2012,120 
which aimed to boost the European security-market, allegedly to the dual benefit of society, both in 
terms of having access to a range of ‘security products’ to enhance citizens’ security, as well as 
through growth and employment opportunities:  
We need to be aware of the fact that no technology will ever guarantee a 
100% security, but at the same time, no security concept is thinkable 
without the adequate technologies. A competitive EU security industry is 
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the conditio sine qua non of any viable European security policy and for 
economic growth in general.121 (my emphasis) 
In this respect, the SIP outlined action in order to address a range of issues: ‘market 
fragmentation’, standardization, EU-wide certification procedures, synergistic capability 
development between the civil and military domains, bridging research and market activities. 
However, and as noted by critical observers, the SIP also “goes some way to meeting the demands of 
the security industry” seeking to assist companies in expanding their business.122  
These tensions are far from new, as shown by the case of SIS II which is briefly outlined here, 
as indicative of the stakes and stakeholders. The need for an upgrade to the SIS database was 
identified in 2001, in view of the 2004 enlargement which would create additional capacity 
requirements to the existing infrastructure. A decision was taken to develop a system with greater 
capacity, to be launched by 2007.123 The SIS II however was delivered in 2013, six years later than 
planned and eight times costlier than the initially estimated 68 million. According to a 2014 report by 
the European Court of Auditors,124 the costs of SIS II were not justifiable in relation to the foreseen 
benefits. This report, sympathetically titled “Lessons from the European Commission’s Development 
of the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)”, found a series of reasons for the 
delay and expenditure, which appear like ‘honest’ mistakes; the project’s initial timeframe and costs 
had been underestimated, not enough staff with the right expertise had been hired, and the overall 
work was not well-coordinated also due to poor working relations between the Commission. What 
the auditors also noted however was that the main justification for the SIS II, to offer increased 
connectivity capacity, had ceased to exist when an upgrade to the previous system called SISone4all 
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allowed for additional member-states to connect to the central computer. At that point, the report 
continues, the Commission failed to reassess the business case, even when the changes to the costs 
and expected benefits became clear. The reasons justifying continuation of the development had 
more to do with developing new functionalities-including a search engine for biometric identifiers, 
as well as with salvaging the reputation of the Commission. Finally, the investigation also found that 
delays also occurred because the contractor, Hewlett-Packard and Steria (HPS), had performed 
poorly in the first phase of the project, but was in a ‘powerful negotiating position.’ 
Doing research for this chapter, the name of consultancy firm Unisys appeared often in the 
related documents, having been in charge of all the outsourced projects thus far discussed - as 
quality assurance contractor for the development of SIS II, and as contractor for the ESBG and 
‘SMART’ borders feasibility studies - as well as on several other Commission projects involving the 
use of biometric data, including criminal records. This company is one of many players participating 
in the EU’s security industrial nexus, whereby long-standing partnerships are developed, along with 
other leading names such as G4S, PwC and Accenture. These private actors become involved in the 
production of border knowledge, as impartial third-party observers who can overcome complex 
political sensitivities, branding them as ‘problems’ to which solutions may be applied. However, as 
an aspect of the professionalisation of border policy, this turn to the industry can also be 
problematic since, unsurprisingly, there are irregularities to note as regards contracting projects and 
using their end-results.125  
Some Borders are just Smarter than Others 
What is also important to note with regards to the ‘smartening’ of the EU’s borders is that 
most of these technologies have little to offer in terms of irregular migration in the first instance; 
since it only affects crossings at the official BCPs, the majority of migrants and refugees arriving at 
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the Mediterranean shores fall outside its scope. The ‘smart’ package is rather intended to track 
‘overstayers’ (those remaining in the EU beyond the validity period of their visas) - who arguably 
make-up the largest proportion of ‘illegal’ detections in EU territory, but who are not considered an 
urgent security threat given that they have already been security-cleared through the visa 
application. However, the way that the ‘smart’ proposal has been argued for has not done much to 
clarify this important distinction. Although it is acknowledged in official documents that the so-called 
migration crisis and the ‘smartening’ of the EU border are not directly related, the Commission has 
admitted to being aware that public support for measures on the external borders draws on such an 
association. 126 Conflating the two in this way, it arrives at unchallenged conclusions such as that 
“The question whether an Entry Exit System is necessary and desirable is no longer in the centre of 
political debate. The real issue … is how such a system should be developed.”127  
It thus appears that the border’s ‘performance’ at pace with technological development has 
become a ‘generally good idea’ and an aim of its own rather than the pursuit of a specific security 
outcome, drawing validity from a generalized security discourse without requiring a detailed 
justification for newly introduced practices in each narrow area of border control separately. In 
other words, the foreseen impact of technologies such as the ABC and ‘SMART’ do not respond 
directly to the traditional security problems featuring in the rhetoric that legitimised them. What is 
being obscured however is the ways in which the external borders are becoming differentiated. The 
application of advanced biometric technologies at the airport, compared with the militarization of 
the Southern sea-borders, makes obvious and fosters a separation between the ‘high-tech’ and 
human-less borders for regular flows and wealthy tourists from the traditionally guarded irregular 
                                                             
126
 European Commission, “Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation on 
Establishing an Entry/exit System to Register Entry and Exit Data of Third-Country Nationals Crossing the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.” 
127
 European Commission, “Impact Assessment Report on the Establishment of an EU Entry Exit System,” 
SWD(2016) 115 final, (April 6, 2016), 2, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/securing-
eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/20160406/smart_borders_package_-_20160406_-_impact_assessment_-
_part_1_en.pdf. 
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ports of entry where economic migrants and asylum-seekers are expected, thus further fragmenting 
the common EU perimeter. 
Conclusions 
“It’s like this. I have been appointed judge in the penal colony. In spite of my youth. Because 
I assisted the former commandant and also, I have the best understanding of the machine.” 
Frontex, much like Kafka’s officer in The Penal Colony, is a relatively young organisation in 
the EU architecture and indeed thought of by many as the most informed, relevant and capable 
actor, owing to their knowledge of the EU ‘border machinery’. However, a systematic look into the 
complexities of the EU’s borderwork quickly reveals that neither is this gathered technical 
knowledge unproblematic, nor can it override political obstacles and lead to direct implementation 
of top-down decisions. 
This chapter has focused on the daily operations, the partners, stakes, and tensions 
surrounding Frontex, to make a number of observations. Firstly, Frontex’s apolitical profile is found 
to be at odds with its highly politicised institutional position, having to juggle conflicting pressures 
and expectations of different stakeholders. Caught between the Commission’s centralising approach 
and the Council’s commonly intergovernmental but heterogeneous interests, Frontex has to 
demonstrate impact and decisiveness, as well as exercise caution and avoid overstepping member-
states’ sovereign remits. As such, it operates both as an external security instrument, concerned 
with mitigating threats coming from the EU’s ‘outside’, as well as an internal security instrument, 
concerned with fostering cooperation and security across an ‘internal’ EU territory. 
These tensions resonate with Frontex’s ambiguous organisational identity, oscillating 
between the intelligence-driven Agency framework and the gradual but perceptible development of 
operational capacities. As regards the first of those elements, its analytical work in producing 
specialised border knowledge is presented as factual, truthful, and apolitical. This is in spite of the 
fact these analyses rely on a decontextualised reading of the migration and political landscape, and 
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produce fragmented visions of the EU’s perimeter. What is more, the depoliticised vein has also 
sustained an ambiguous context of accountability, allowing the Agency to identify as a ‘technician’ of 
border-crafting and claim a lack of responsibility for what eventually happens at the border sites.  
The role of an expanding security industry needs to be appreciated in the same context, 
signifying the entry of private profit in the politicised area of border controls. While the effects of 
these technologies are meant to be homogenising, in bringing uniform techniques of automation, it 
has been argued that in some ways they are divisive; the ‘smart’ border technologies that the 
external borders of regular mobilities are being invested with are at odds with the traditional 
‘hardening’ of the Southern sea borders.  
Frontex hardly engages in political talk but its work is directly connected to and productive 
of multiple borders, and multiple delineations of Europe: external and internal borders; sea, land 
and air borders; borders in varying tiers of threat; borders of different operational areas; borders 
that are smart and borders that are less so. These lines and the spaces they produce are not owing 
to a standing geography but to a political consciousness which is made geographical. To appreciate 
them however theory needs to detach from certain deeply rooted spatio-conceptual assumptions 
regarding how these spaces relate to each other, as for instance the idea of effortlessly inscribing 
the geographically small into the geographically large, in the case of the EU and member-state 
spatial relationship. Engaging with the vocabulary of Frontex, where many of the standard 
categorizations are relativized, allows us to see not only how member states are geopolitically 
constructed as parts of the EU but how the EU is similarly being constructed in part at the member-
state and local border-site level, giving way to a fragmented geographical imaginary, a European-
wide heterotopia of fragmented space. 
These observations have been connected to a risk-based rationality, a particular way of 
thinking and practicing security, which involves attempts to chart the multiple, minimise the 
uncertain, draft versions of the future and prepare responses to hypothesised threats. Some of 
these observations are taken further in the following chapter, which examines an additional border 
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category produced within the context of riskified border security, that of the inclusive external 
border.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Local Border Traffic Agreement in Kaliningrad 
Governing through Mobility and Inclusion 
Introduction 
Having examined the ways in which a risk-based framework drives the EU’s border security 
logics, this chapter goes on to examine the Local Border Traffic policy of the EU, and its 
implementation on the border between Poland and the Kaliningrad oblast of the Russian federation, 
as an example of a flexible ‘riskified’ border technology. The EU's Regulation 1931/2006 on Local 
Border Traffic is a peculiar act of legislation, dealing with the specific case of local cross-border 
mobility. It enables member-states to conclude bilateral agreements with their non-EU neighbours 
under the Schengen regime, easing crossings for local residents who want to move within the border 
area. Practically, it amounts to a softening of the border, replacing the formal requirement for a 
Schengen visa with the LBT permit, a document that is cheaper and easier to obtain, and entitles 
holders to dedicated lanes and border crossing points (BCPs), as well as multiple crossings. 
Legislatively, this translates into a derogation from the standard Schengen rule on crossing external 
borders for third country nationals (TCN), established through an amendment to the Schengen 
Convention. The Regulation provides a set of common parameters regarding eligibility and costs for 
a permit, and how far from the border permit holders can travel; border residents should have been 
lawfully resident in the area for a minimum of one year, the cost of the permit should not exceed the 
cost of short-term multiple-entry visas, while border areas may extend up to 50 km from the border. 
The exact specifications however are decided in individual agreements, signed by the two 
neighbouring countries. The EU is not party to these agreements.  
The LBT raises some interesting questions regarding the security logics it works with. Firstly, 
it contradicts Schengen’s logic of flanking measures, whereby opening internal borders is 
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compensated by strengthening external ones. Secondly, it is at odds with Schengen’s key objective 
of standardisation and harmonisation, which dictates that the shared external perimeter operates 
the same way across its length. Thirdly, it contradicts the understanding of Schengen’s integration as 
a cumulative transference of competences to the community level. Moreover, while the Regulation 
is geographically neutral, its application has had a clear geographical scope; the member-states that 
have signed such agreements to day 1 are all in eastern and north-eastern Europe.2 
There has been little discussion of this interesting policy. The EU’s framing does not go 
beyond the narrative of openness, “to ensure that the borders with its neighbours are not a barrier 
to trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation.”3 Media accounts have reproduced 
this framing, while mainly focusing on the politics behind individual bilateral agreements, rather 
than the LBT as a whole. As such the view of the LBT has remained obscure, uncritical, and 
fragmented.4 The persons concerned are only a small fragment of the EU’s regular flows from third-
countries, with an overall 500,000 permits issued between 2008 and 20145- by comparison, 
member-state consulates issued 15,684,796 Schengen visas in 2014 alone.6 However, the LBT 
accounts for 7.5 to 10 million crossings per annum.7  
Amongst the general neglect of the LBT policy, the 2011 Russo-Polish agreement on 
Kaliningrad has attracted some attention from the media. One reason for this is the general 
sensationalism that surrounds Kaliningrad as a geographical and political anomaly in the middle of 
Europe. The westernmost federal subject of Russia, Kaliningrad is an exclave with no direct land 
                                                             
1
The member-states which have concluded LBT agreements are: Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Croatia, Poland, 
Norway and Slovakia.  
2
 The local border traffic regime that Spain operates on its enclaves, Ceuta and Melila, has remained outside 
this regulation, operating under its own special rules. 
3
 Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 2006 Laying down Rules on Local Border Traffic at the External Land Borders of the 
Member States and Amending the Provisions of the Schengen Convention,” accessed September 20, 2016, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:405:0001:0022:EN:PDF. 
4
 An exception to this neglect, offering a good overview of LBT agreements can be found in Andrei Yeliseyeu, 
“Keeping the Door Ajar: Local Border Traffic Regimes on the EU’s Eastern Borders” (Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, June 25, 2014), http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/429/keeping_the_door_ajar/. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Visa statistics for consulates 2014, available at www.ec.europa.eu [accessed on 10/07/2015] 
7
 PwC, “Technical Study on Smart Borders–Cost Analysis,” October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/docs/smart_borders_costs_study_en.pdf. 
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connections to the Russian mainland, and also a European enclave, wedged between EU member-
states Poland and Lithuania. Due to its history as a militarised territory during the Cold War, and its 
modern reputation as corrupt and deprived, Kaliningrad became a security issue for the EU as the 
2004 eastern enlargement was approaching. Since 2008, in the context of Russia's assertive conduct 
in Eastern Europe and Caucasus, it has also become a source of anxiety across the Euro-Atlantic area, 
due to its use by Putin's administration as a station for nuclear warheads. Anxieties about 
Kaliningrad only intensified after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, raising questions on the 
strategic role that both could perform, as military outposts in Europe.8 
In this tense geopolitical frame of reference, the LBT agreement concerning Kaliningrad has 
been reported in obscuring simplicity, as a one-way concession mechanism; treated sympathetically 
as a “crack in the EU” by Der Spiegel,9and as granting Russian citizens “very tangible access to the 
West”, by the Economist.10 Polish leadership has mostly affirmed this framing;  
When I’m told by politicians that local border traffic should be stopped 
because Russia doesn’t act fair towards Ukraine and shows its worse face, I 
have one answer: Why residents of Bartoszyce, Elbląg, Olsztyn, Tri-city or 
ordinary residents of Kaliningrad would have to pay for Putin’s wrong 
decisions and Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine?11  
                                                             
8
 RT International, “Russia to Boost Military Capabilities in Crimea, Kaliningrad, Arctic,” January 14, 2015, 
https://www.rt.com/news/222371-russian-defense-plan-2015/. 
9
 Spiegel Online, “Crack in the EU: Poland and Kaliningrad Open Borders for Locals,” August 2, 2012, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/poland-and-russia-test-visa-free-travel-a-847828.html. 
10
The Economist, “Small Border Traffic,” The Economist, October 8, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/poland-and-kaliningrad. 
11
Secretariat of the Prime Minister, “Prime Minister in Warmińsko – Mazurskie Province: Local Border Traffic Is 
Not at Risk | Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów,” 2014, https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/prime-
minister-in-warminsko-mazurskie-province-local-border-traffic-is-not-at-risk.html. 
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At the same time, Poland’s recent decision to build six 160-feet-high watchtowers across the 
border, with a total cost of 3,7 million euros, 75% of it to be shouldered by the EU, suggests that this 
line of thinking at least co-exists with considerable insecurities.12 
The simplistic framing of an inclusive mechanism sits uncomfortably with such geopolitical 
tensions, and the external border security benchmarks that the EU has otherwise displayed. The aim 
of this chapter is therefore to provide a more nuanced account, arguing for the LBT as an 
inclusionary policy which is not divorced from the geopolitical context but rather formulated as a 
response to it. It is suggested that the policy is best understood as a versatile security technology, 
which operates in three different ways. Firstly, as a place-making instrument, which (re)produces 
precarious spaces as standardised borderlands, projecting the EU’s governability beyond its external 
borders, and consolidating its wider geopolitical activities in the north-eastern neighbourhood. 
Secondly, as a member-state and EU foreign policy tool, and an opportunity for engagement and 
cooperation with neighbouring third countries. Thirdly, as a further step in the Schengenisation of 
border policy, whereby the EU and member-states are sharing sovereign control over external 
border crossing exceptions.  
To demonstrate this argument, the chapter proceeds in four sections. A first part 
conceptualises the binary tensions surrounding the LBT as a dialectic of rule/exception and 
openness/insecurity, and brings in the risk-based framework discussed in Chapter 3 to chart the 
three security functions; borderland standardisation, local desecuritisation, and population 
surveillance. Building on these elements, the LBT is subsequently situated within three different 
stories of security politics. The second section outlines the history of boundary shifts and geopolitical 
reinventions over the Russo-Polish border area in the last century, and teases out the major EU 
geopolitical norms in the north-eastern neighbourhood. Section three, turns to the Poland-EU-Russia 
foreign policy matrix. It traces the early development of an EU policy towards Kaliningrad since 2001, 
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 Agence Agence France-Presse, “Poland to Build Watchtowers at Russia’s Kaliningrad Border,” The Guardian, 
April 7, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/poland-to-build-watchtowers-at-russias-
kaliningrad-border. 
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in the context of EU-Russia relations, as well as the formation of the Polish foreign policy agenda 
after its EU accession, focusing on how Kaliningrad has featured along its strategic priorities. A fourth 
and final section examines the development of an LBT acquis alongside Schengen's development of a 
common visa policy and system for data collection, and teases out the intergovernmental 
sensitivities that surround the decision on exceptions to external border crossings. 
What Kind of Exception for what Kind of Security 
In addition to offering a rich security context for an analysis of the LBT, the agreement in 
Kaliningrad is also an illustrative example of the policy’s ratio legis. An outcome of Polish diplomatic 
efforts, the agreement goes beyond the standard LBT rules and operates by means of a granted 
exception across a border area much larger than what the Regulation stipulates as ‘standard’. The 
extended agreement, includes the entire Kaliningrad oblast and an equal in size zone in Poland, and 
it has been established as a one-time, no-precedent act, through an amendment of the Regulation. 
In this sense, it is the only case which mirrors the LBT’s derogatory logic.  
Some research which has been conducted in the field of European law, has emphasized the 
unusual character of member-state legislation with an effect on common EU rules.13 From this 
perspective, Dubowski has identified a dialectic rationality in the LBT:  
[T]he LBT appears to be … an important factor determining the whole 
system of Union’s external borders … At the same time, the LBT should be 
perceived multi-dimensionally and may be treated as one of these EU law 
institutions which concentrates in itself the tangential points of spheres 
seemingly distinct.14 
                                                             
13
 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
14
 Tomasz Dubowski, “Local Border Traffic – European Union and Member States’ Perspective (Based on Polish 
Experience),” European Journal of Migration and Law 14, no. 4 (January 1, 2012): 367–91, 
doi:10.1163/15718166-12342014. 
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Such reasoning resonates with the risk-management mentality discussed in chapter 3, and 
its preference for flexible solutions. Whilst derogating from the standard rules of the Schengen 
acquis, the LBT is at the same time a further step in its overall diversified development. This 
rationality applies on the case of Kaliningrad as well, exempted from the common rules, but at the 
same time included into the policy in a more conclusive manner. The argument emerging from such 
a take on the LBT, and its means of managing the insecurity/openness and the rule/exception 
tensions, is that it is best conceptualised as a flexible technology of risk-based security.  
A first of three security advantages to the LBT is to work towards the discursive and 
legislative standardisation of borderlands, and do so in a flexible way, leaving room for states to 
devise responses to local needs. By introducing the categories of the ‘border area’, the ‘border 
population’, and the ‘local border traffic’ as a form of circulation, it has added new core terms to the 
Schengen manual, improving coherence, communication and compatibility. At the same time, under 
these standard parameters, variance exists between agreements. For instance, Poland allows an 
uninterrupted stay of 30 days maximum in the agreement with Kaliningrad, and up to 60 days in the 
agreement with Ukraine but in both the total amount of time spent on Polish territory should not 
exceed 90 days per six month period. Slovakia allows uninterrupted stays equal to a maximum of 90 
days over six months. Norway only allows 15 day stays each time, but imposes no limit on the overall 
period of stay within the validity of a permit.15 These specific provisions act as means for member-
states to operationalise their desired degree and form of openness. 
Secondly, the LBT regime practice has a desecuritising effect, relieving divisive elements 
within the area concerned. It has provided further reasons for the regular communication and 
cooperation between authorities, as consulates maintain communication channels to exchange 
specimens of documents and information on possible abuse cases, while the border authorities 
organise combined trainings for border-guards enforcing the policy. Increased crossings are fostering 
people-to-people contacts, as local groups visit touristic locations, and attend local cultural events. 
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 Russian Visa Office in the Kingdom of Norway, “Local Border Traffic,” Invisa Fiduciary Services, accessed 
September 21, 2016, http://www.ifs-norway.com/main.php?id=m-razreshenie&lang=en. 
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Routine shopping trips across the border provide for economic stimulation in local businesses. This 
also has a mitigating effect on the issue of smuggled excise goods, a commonly detected form of 
cross-border crime on the eastern external borders. Providing regular channels for the purchases of 
tobacco, alcohol, and petrol for individual consumption, the local activity of illegal networks is 
curbed by reducing demand. The effects of these routine practices amount to a process well-
described by Joenniemi, whereby access into a local society’s territory translates into “fewer 
confrontational situations and less emphasis on the exact location of frontiers.”16 
Finally, the LBT has added to the monitoring capacity over the border area. The arrangement 
has not only enabled, but in fact encouraged the crossings for inhabitants of border areas. In the first 
year of the regime, the Polish consulate in Kaliningrad issued more than 100,000 permits and 
crossings increased by 74%, from 2.3 million people in 2011 to 4.1 million in 2012.17 These numbers 
have meant increased opportunities for data collection and identification. A comprehensive 
application process involves depositing of biographic and biometric data18, SIS checks, and the 
compilation of a national LBT database which can be used for enhanced risk analyses, while frequent 
crossings translate into instances where permit holders present themselves at border posts for 
identification. Moreover, dedicated mobile units are deployed to patrol the area, and specialised law 
enforcement staff are trained to handle abuses of the regime. This nexus of securities/insecurities 
that the LBT addresses does not emerge in a vacuum, but rather upon a rich geopolitical history of 
population movements and spatial re-arrangements, which are examined below. 
  
                                                             
16
 Perti Joenniemi, “Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battlefield,” in Cooperation, Environment, and Sustainability in 
Border Regions, ed. Paul Ganster (San Diego: San Diego State Univ, 2002), 321. 
17
“100,000 Cards Issued by WFP in Kaliningrad,” Polish Consulate in Kaliningrad, July 31, 2013, 
http://kaliningrad.msz.gov.pl/ru/p/kaliningrad_ru_k_ru/news/100_000_mrg_in_kaliningrad. 
18
  The LBT permits were not machine readable at first. The 2013 Polish Act on Foreigners introduced the use 
of biometrics, effective as of May 1st 2014. 
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The Border Area and its Population 
The constituent parts of the Russo-Polish LBT border area are: the Kaliningrad Oblast, the 
northern half of Warmia-Masuria province, and part of Pomerania in the north-east.19 Establishing 
this border area, is incompatible with a basic rule of the LBT regulation, which is the standardized 
delineation of 'border areas'. According to this rule, designated border areas may extend a standard 
30 km from the demarcating line, which may be extended to a maximum of 50km in the event that a 
town or city ends up divided. As per Regulation  
a Member State wishing to conclude a bilateral agreement must choose 
administrative districts which are at least partially within the 30-kilometre 
zone and which do not extend beyond the 50-kilometre zone, thus 
ensuring that the entire district may be designated as border area20 
 The capital city of Kaliningrad, situated at 35 km from the demarcating line, fell outside the 
scope of the regulation, and should the rules be applied there as prescribed, its half million 
inhabitants could not be considered for LBT permits. Moreover, under the current rules, the overlap 
with an LBT agreement with Lithuania would divide Kaliningrad’s population into four tiers, with 
different travel access according to their location; those in the Russo-Polish area, those in the Russo-
Lithuanian, those in both, and those in none.  
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 The Polish Administrative Districts and individual populations are listed in Annex 1 
20
 Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 December 2006 Laying down Rules on Local Border Traffic at the External Land Borders of the 
Member States and Amending the Provisions of the Schengen Convention.” 
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Regulation 1342/2011 was therefore introduced, allowing exceptionally for all of Kaliningrad 
Oblast to be considered as a border zone, to prevent creating an artificial division through a policy 
aimed at overcoming barriers.21 In respect of the principle of mutuality, the border zone definition 
has been extended for the Polish side as well. In the combined border area of 32,400 km2, the 
national constituents of the area are roughly equivalent in size (Kaliningrad at 15,100 km2 and Polish 
lands at 17,300 km2). However, within the 2,859,762 border resident population, the eligible persons 
on the Polish side are more than double those on the Russian (1,918,762 and 941,000 respectively).  
 
Figure 4.1: The Local Border Traffic area in Kaliningrad22  
 
This border area, where the geographical and personal scope become intertwined, is 
considered “a single, unique and particular case”23 for EU border policy. The singularity reference 
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 Some flexibility with regards to the border area delineation had already been established in practice. By 
2011, out of the 4 agreements that had come into force (between Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Ukraine; and 
between Romania and Moldova), only the one between Romania and Moldova was in full compliance with the 
regulation as regards the 30-50 km rule. European Commission, “Second Report on the Implementation and 
Functioning of the Local Border Traffic Regime Set up by Regulation No 1931/2006,” COM(2011) 47 final, 
(February 9, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/news/intro/docs/comm_pdf_com_2011_0047_f_en_rapport.pdf. 
22
 Source: Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Agnieszka Łada, and Łukasz Wenerski, “The Borderlands Landscape: Prospects 
and Experiences of the Functioning of the Local Border Traffic Regime with the Kaliningrad Region” (Warsaw: 
Instytut Spraw Publicznych [Institute for Public Affairs], 2013), 
http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/1273460855.pdf. 
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deserves some unpacking. Some basic structural similarities exist across these districts; their 
economies face similar struggles associated with their geographical position in the periphery,24 while 
as parts of their respective states they both enjoy the stability of ethnic homogeneity and face no 
irregular migration pressures. Yet, deeper-reaching connections appear if the border area in its given 
shape, taken as a heterotopia, is put in historical perspective. The LBT lines become a cartographical 
reminder of the unity this area experienced before the European wars of the 20th century, and add 
to the long sequence of boundary shifts in the region, which is discussed in the following section. 
Dissecting the Border Area: From German Empire to the 2004 EU Enlargement 
The shared past of the border area begins with the 1790 partition of Poland and the 
expansion of the German Kingdom of Prussia, which became part of the German empire with the 
1871 unification. More specifically, today’s Tricity area was part of the province of West Prussia, 
with Danzig (now Gdansk) as its capital. The remaining lands formed most of the province of East 
Prussia, with Kaliningrad acting as its capital, then under the name of Königsberg. Following the end 
of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles effected three important territorial and political changes in 
the area. Firstly, it re-established the Polish state, drawing its eastern boundary south of Grodno, 
through Brest-Litovsk, and along the Bug River. Defeated Germany ceded to the new Polish state the 
area of Soldau (now Działdowo) in East Prussia, and some territories of the eastern part of West 
Prussia and of the southern part of East Prussia in Warmia and Masuria. German East Prussia thus 
became detached from the rest of Germany. Secondly, it provided for the establishment of the Free 
City of Danzig in 1920, which was to be separate from both Germany and Poland, and under the 
control of the League of Nations, although Poland was granted some rights over the territory and 
included it in a customs union, securing access to its port. Thirdly, it initiated preparations for the 
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Council of the European Union, “Addendum to Draft Minutes of the 3134th Meeting (Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy),” 18504/11 ADD 1, (March 21, 2012), 4, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-18504-2011-ADD-1/en/pdf. 
24
 Vincent Lamande, Ivan Samson, and Evgeny Vinokurov, “Measuring Regional Economic Development in 
Russia: The Case of the Kaliningrad Oblast,” European Urban and Regional Studies 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 
71–80, doi:10.1177/0969776404039145. 
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East Prussian Plebiscite for self-determination, to resolve the German-Polish dispute over areas in 
Warmia and Masuria. The plebiscite was held in 1920 and while it gave German East Prussia a solid 
victory with 363,209 votes against 7,980 for Poland,25 it still reflected a highly tense decision; it was 
conducted in the shadow of the ongoing Soviet-Polish war, and overseen by German authorities who 
pursued an aggressive and violent anti-Polish campaign. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The border area after Versailles (1923)26 
 
In the interwar period, the region became a melting pot for the contact and negotiation of 
hybrid German and Polish identities, influenced by local patterns of language, religion, and daily 
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 Peter Thaler, “Fluid Identities in Central European Borderlands,” European History Quarterly 31, no. 4 
(October 1, 2001): 523–28, doi:10.1177/026569140103100402. 
26
 Map procured by the author, designed by Javier Baluja 
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interaction, but also by wider ethno-national movements.27 Königsberg acted as the unofficial 
birthplace of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), after Hitler's historical speech in 
1934, and with a strong local majority aligning behind NSDAP it was dubbed Hitler's Fortress City.28 
During the war the city was targeted and severely bombed by the British Air Force, destroying most 
of its infrastructure, including historical landmarks such as the famous Königsberg castle. It was 
subsequently annexed until surrender by the Soviets during the East Prussian Offensive on the 9th of 
April 1945. The Treaty of Potsdam outlined a three-way partition for East Prussia; it incorporated the 
northern part, over the line extending from Braniewo to Goldap, into the Russian federal entity, the 
southern East Prussian lands to Poland, and the Klaipeda region in the north to the soon to be 
Lithuanian Soviet Republic.29 The Free city of Danzig was also appended to Poland. Even though the 
announced peace conference which would formalise the Russian acquisition of Königsberg was 
never held, and an explicit transfer of sovereign rights has still not occurred, Russia's hold was 
quickly established, enabled by the preoccupation of Europeans at the time, to prevent the re-
growth of a revanchist Germany.  
In the postwar period, the human landscape of the region had been radically homogenised, 
following the extermination of Jewish communities, and the forced migration of ethnic Germans out 
of Eastern Europe in the final years of the war. The handover of Königsberg was an extreme case, as 
the Soviet presence there was firmed through militarisation, and establishment of a centralising 
hold, upheld throughout the socialist era. The region and its capital city were both renamed 
Kaliningrad, honouring one of the original Bolsheviks and Soviet Head of State Mikhail Kalinin. The 
territory closed off to foreigners and most Russians in 1948, as weaponry and troops were 
strategically positioned throughout the area, and whole districts became military quarters 
inaccessible even to the locals. Almost a third of its territory became the object of travel regulations 
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or other limitations with regards to economic activity30. Material reconstruction accompanied the 
de-germanisation of the area, which was principally pursued via ethnic cleansing. It is estimated that 
1,8 million ethnic Germans from East Prussia were deported, massacred or forced to flee between 
1944 and 1960, whilst several thousands were sent to labour camps.31 More than 400,000 Soviets 
were recruited to re-populate Kaliningrad between 1946-1950, the majority of whom were families 
of farmers and other vulnerable individuals from formerly Nazi-occupied regions of Russia, the Baltic 
Republics, Belarus and Ukraine.32 This population was highly mobile, with large numbers of travelling 
military personnel moving between Kaliningrad and Soviet Russia’s mainland, whilst civilians were 
also to an extent transient, because of the difficult living conditions in the oblast.33 Therefore, while 
the post-war period saw the region unified as intra-soviet space, and in this sense the area's borders 
decreased in relevance, the character of Kaliningrad as a sealed-off military outpost meant that it 
was at the same time significantly isolated. 
Walesa's new Polish government in 1990 and the eventual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 
1991 effected a renewed fragmentation in the area, but also created some new passageways. 
Kaliningrad became separated from Russia ‘proper’, as Poland, Lithuania and Belarus reclaimed their 
sovereignty, but agreements were conducted quickly for easier travel through the three 
neighbouring states. Kaliningrad’s city council came to a decision to open its borders to foreign 
visitors, and a direct train service from Berlin was re-established, for the first time since 1945. The 
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emergence of issues such as the expensive and complicated transport of goods, further highlighted 
the need for cross-border contacts, and political cooperation in the region. In the words of Krickus, 
Kaliningrad’s future depended “as much upon the good will of Kaliningrad’s neighbours as upon 
Moscow’s capability to nurture Russia’s westernmost enclave.”34  
In those first post-Soviet years, and while the newly independent eastern European 
governments and re-unified Germany engaged in state-building which would restore stability, 
Kaliningrad was acquiring an increasingly experimental character. In 1996 the introduction of the 
Yantar Economic Zone, a customs-free regime designed to encourage foreign investment, initiated 
new phraseologies of Kaliningrad as a haven for business opportunity, the ‘Hong Kong of the 
Baltic’.35 At the same time, a series of discourses emerged contesting Kaliningrad’s rightful 
ownership. Yuri Matochkin, appointed by Yeltsin as the first governor of Kaliningrad in the post-
soviet era, threatened in 1993 with a regional referendum to increase the region’s autonomy to the 
status of a republic within the Russian federation.36 At the same time some territorial claims came 
from neighbouring Lithuania by Stasys Lozoraitis, candidate in the 1993 presidential elections and 
former Lithuanian Ambassador to the US, who spoke about including ‘Lithuania Minor’ into the 
newly independent Lithuanian state.37 Phraseologies emerged speaking of Kaliningrad as a potential 
‘fourth Baltic Republic’, an American plan in 1995 suggested Kaliningrad became a demilitarised 
zone under international supervision, and rumours of a Polish plan also received some attention, 
talking about subdividing the region, into Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian sections.38 
While these plans remained at the fringes of official discourse, and the de facto control that Russia 
had established over Kaliningrad was not aggressively questioned, they highlighted the relation of its 
                                                             
34
Richard J. Krickus, The Kaliningrad Question, New International Relations of Europe (Lanham, Md. ; Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 
35
 Stephen Castle, “Kaliningrad: From Russian Relic to Baltic Boom Town,” The Independent, March 23, 2006, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kaliningrad-from-russian-relic-to-baltic-boom-town-
6105839.html. 
36
 Brian Vitunic, “Enclave to Exclave: Kaliningrad between Russia and the European Union,” Intermarium 6, no. 
1 (2003): 11. 
37
Raimundas Lopata and Vladas Sirutavičius, “Lithuania and the Kaliningrad Oblast: A Clearer Frame for 
Cooperation,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 3 (1999): 51–66. 
38
 Ibid. 
Chapter Four 
186 
 
exclavity to the potential for separatism. Kaliningrad’s bizarre combination of economic contacts and 
defensive geopolitics, allowed for the oblast to be considered by its neighbours in the area as 
inconclusively incorporated into the Russian state.   
Following the economic downturn of the 1990s in Kaliningrad, and with the prospect of the 
EU's enlargement drawing closer, a series of discourses emerged framing Kaliningrad as a Russian 
‘experimental space’ for cooperation, a ‘pilot region’, or a window of communication between 
Europe and Russia.39 These discourses however co-existed with a firm federal approach of the 
Russian government after Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000. Putin had been supportive of a 
pro-EU governor in Kaliningrad, former Admiral of the Baltic Fleet Vladimir Yegorov, a reformist who 
intended to foster closer ties with the surrounding member-states and accession countries, but 
whose loyalty could not be questioned. Characteristically, when asked about the issue of visa-free 
travel for residents of Kaliningrad prior to the 2001 EU-Russia summit, Yegorov had employed a 
sharp discourse which emphasized the importance of being closer to Russia and phrased the issue in 
hard geopolitical terms; "You don't have to ask for a neighbor's permission to enter your home (…) 
Russia must defend its sovereignty once and for all and shouldn't make any concessions on that."40  
Putin's policy sustained the narrative of cautious international economic cooperation, but subdued it 
to the priorities of a homogenising policy across regional subjects. For example, the new presidency 
opposed the Yantar Economic Zone, with official voices in Kremlin citing the costs that it imposed to 
the federal budget. They questioned its effectiveness, as it had an import instead of export intensive 
character, and expressed fears that it encouraged a subservient economy in Kaliningrad.41  
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As has been argued in policy literature, the Russian centre’s main concern remained that the 
Zone might be used by regional authorities as an instrument to increase their autonomy.42 As such, it 
was eventually replaced with the 2006 Special Economic Zone (SEZ) regime, which offered tax 
allowances instead of the more attractive customs-benefits, and significantly raised the threshold for 
investment for interested businesses.43 The shift from Yantar to the SEZ reflected russifying over 
internationalising dynamics in Kaliningrad’s economy, since most ‘resident’ businesses taking 
advantage of the SEZ benefits were big Russian companies instead of foreign Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) who had benefited from Yantar.44 Additional restraining policies had come with 
the 2001 financial and administrative reforms which restricted the local government’s rights to 
receive taxes directly, and reduced the amount of subsidies which would be governed by the federal 
law. Not only would Kaliningrad’s regional government have a smaller capacity to generate its own 
funds, but large parts of the centrally subsidised funds would now be granted on an ad hoc basis.45 
With these contradictions of centralisation/internationalisation at play, but also against the fait 
accompli of Schengen’s enlargement, aspirations for Kaliningrad to become an experimental space 
for EU-Russian cooperation and re-integrate in some form with its surroundings, conveyed limited 
certainty.  
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Production of Border-Space in the EU’s East and North-East 
While the LBT has been framed in an isolated and practical manner, as a legal exception to 
Schengen rules which resolves the specific problem of frequent needs for local travel, it belongs to 
and depends upon a wider normative context. In the words of Prospel Weil “the capacity of the 
international legal order to attain the objectives it was set up for will largely depend on the quality 
of its constituent norms.”46  
The EU’s geopolitical norms in the north-eastern neighbourhood have been studied in 
regional projects such as the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), European Territorial Cooperation 
(ETC), and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) where the issue of mobility has featured in 
varying degrees. Scholarship on regional policy has largely made use of a tri-fold theoretical 
typology47 to conceptualise the ways the EU exercises geopolitical agency, and the cognitive maps 
that it works with. The first, taking after Ruggie’s postmodern EU polity argument,48 is the neo-
medieval model of rule, which reworks territories and borders into networks, creates hybrid entities 
and identities, and spreads power in a diffused manner rather than projecting it from a fixed centre. 
The second is a modernist Westphalian model which affirms a statist territorial polity, through 
external border fortification, ‘othering’ logics, and concentration of power in EU administrative 
capitals. As elaborated by Caporaso, according to this model, the EU possesses three different 
dimensions, a Westphalian, a regulatory, and a post-modern, which he conceptualises as variations 
of ‘stylised forms of state’. 49  This account however has been more prevalent amongst practitioners 
than academics, present in Schengen’s securitising discourses, and premised upon the inside/outside 
distinction. The third model is an EU imperial model, where territoriality stems from a centre and 
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unfolds in concentric zones. In this model, borders become ‘fuzzy’ and the imperial centre’s hold 
decreases with physical distance.50  
It has been pointed out that these theoretically contained models co-exist in actual 
geopolitical practice, and scholars have shared a call to disentangle from their implicit ideas of 
geopolitical fixity, and absolute territorialisations or de-territorialisations. Instead these models 
should be taken as shifting visions or discourses, which may or may not materialise in concrete form. 
Amongst these calls for flexible conceptualisations, Kaliningrad, with its unlikely enclavity/exclavity 
situation and precarious sovereignty, is a useful case study, which can be (and has been) used not 
only to demonstrate the gap between neat models and messy realities, but also to identify particular 
patterns of interaction between the geopolitical dynamics that the three models encompass. In the 
short literature and policy review that follows, three EU norms are drawn out from the NDI, ETC, and 
the ENP respectively, as they are examined alongside the Kaliningrad question: geopolitical 
intersubjectivity; externalisation of internal ordering; and a differential geopolitical consciousness. 
Northern Dimension Initiative and Geopolitical Intersubjectivity  
The Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) was launched in 1997, upon a proposal of Finland 
following its EU accession. Its stated aim was to enhance cooperation and forge close economic and 
political ties between the EU and individual member-states on one hand and the northern 
neighbours, Norway, Russia, and Iceland on the other, as well as with regional actors in the northern 
neighbourhood, such as the Barents EuroArctic Regional Council, and the Council of Baltic Sea States. 
It was renewed in the Helsinki Summit in November 2006, during Finland’s presidency. Its activities 
include co-financing of programmes in four areas: environment; public health and social well-being; 
transport and logistics; culture. While covering a wide geographical area,51 the focus of the NDI has 
been on north-western Russia where it borders the EU, with a special note on Kaliningrad. In this 
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sense, the NDI has acted as another expression of EU/Russia relations. According to Sergounin, it is 
“the first attempt to acknowledge that the EU and Russia may need to apply special cooperation at 
the regional or sub-regional level.”52 Moreover, this cooperation, based on the principle of co-
financing, aspires to an 'equal partnership'. Smith claims the NDI owes its successes precisely to this 
mode of cooperation without integration expectations, which minimises the sensitivities of political 
and identity questions.53 This wide range of actors involved and the de-politicised discourse of 
common interests and shared ownership has supported conceptions of the NDI in neo-medieval 
terms, as a form of ‘new regionalism’, and an “innovative network governance strategy.”54 
Nevertheless, its impact should not be overstated. The NDI has been held back by the lack of support 
from member-states other than northerners, Finland Sweden and Denmark.55 Moreover, while this 
‘new regionalism’ approach may be well-suited for federal Russia’s foreign policy, this has not been 
the case for Brussels, the EU position being against too much decentralisation: the NDI “should not 
be seen as a new regional initiative, which in the Commission's view is not necessary.”56 As Vahl has 
noted, since the early days of the NDI’s conception “it appears that the ambitions concerning the 
Northern Dimension initiative have been lowered and that the discrepancy between [its] (perhaps) 
overly ambitious aims and the resources the EU has been willing to put into the initiative has been 
reduced.”57 
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 Aalto however takes a more nuanced view of the geopolitical objectives of the EU in 
embracing northerners’ concerns, and pursuing the Northern Dimension.58 He sees it as an example 
of an ‘imperial’ centre exporting its practices in the near abroad, which is also underlined by a 
traditional geopolitical actorness assumption, namely the EU’s intention to have regional impact. 
That this mix of geopolitical models has not materialised in more coherent institutionalisation, he 
argues, owes only partly to difficulties in raising similar levels of social resonance across EU member-
states. The broader reason to consider, is the EU’s own ‘geopolitical subjectivity’, a meta-concept 
which Aalto introduces to capture the combined effects of popular, formal, and practical geopolitical 
discourses. Geopolitical subjectivity corresponds to the perceived and actual capacity for “ordering 
of territories and political spaces, extending from one’s own sphere of sovereign rule to broader 
regional contexts” 59 aiming to create “a certain pattern of social and material relations.”60 Turning to 
the EU’s conduct with regards to Kaliningrad, he observes that while the EU had been recognised by 
Russia and other international actors as a legitimate partner in the development of joint policies for 
Kaliningrad, and was therefore invested with a great degree of geopolitical subjectivity’, the 
Commission refrained from providing effective responses, and thus the EU has appeared unwilling to 
act in a “proper ‘geopolitical’ manner.”61 Aalto argues however, that the EU was already having 
considerable ordering impact on Kaliningrad implicitly, through Schengen policy, and in this sense 
those instances of EU-passivity do not stand for an absence of geopolitical agency, but rather 
illustrate the intersubjective constitution of the EU as a geopolitical subject. In the case of 
Kaliningrad, and this can be somehow generalised for the Northern Dimension as well, evolving 
interaction with Russia has been more significant than the EU’s narrow interests in the oblast. The 
‘lenient’, dialogue-promoting nature of the NDI, it’s contested potential for decentralised forms of 
ordering, and the fragile internal EU geopolitical constitution vis a vis Russia as discussed by Aalto, 
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have meant that no NDI initiative could actually push beyond the circumstantial constraints of the 
wider EU-Russia state of affairs. It is therefore not surprising that while the NDI makes some modest 
references to enhancing people-to-people contacts in the north, the issue of enabling mobility in 
Kaliningrad has not been discussed explicitly, beyond the context of EU-Russia visa-talks at large. 
European Territorial Cooperation – Externalising Internal Ordering 
European Territorial Cooperation, better known as Interreg, was launched in 1990 to 
implement cross-border cooperation programmes at internal and external EU borders after the 
dismantling of the Berlin wall. In subsequent years, and especially after 2004, it was reframed as a 
mostly internal instrument for territorial cohesion and regional development in deprived areas. It is 
a key objective of the Cohesion Policy, funded by the European Regional Development Fund, and is 
closely linked to the European Spatial Development Perspective goal to bring greater socio-economic 
homogeneity across EU territory. Its motto, "more growth and jobs for all regions and cities of the 
European Union” (my emphasis), highlights that this internal logic is at least discursively prevalent.  
In practice, a great degree of externalisation takes place under the ETC framework. Three 
strands make-up the structure of the ETC; cross-border (Interreg A), transnational (Interreg B), and 
interregional (Interreg C). Interreg A is the largest one and entails a great degree of cooperation with 
public authorities of neighbouring third countries and programmes on their territories. Provisions 
have been made to allow third countries’ authorities to participate in the European Territorial 
Groupings of Cooperation, the transnational legal entities who can act jointly for the implementation 
of programmes, which were initially open only to member-states.62 As of 2013, externalisation has 
been geographically expressed in the so-called ‘macroregional strategies’; integrated frameworks 
addressing “common challenges faced by a defined geographical area relating to member-states and 
third countries located in the same geographical area.”63 The creation of these purpose-specific 
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programme areas, the Euroregions, and the projection of the EU’s inner spatial workings upon them 
in a flexible manner, suggest relevance for the neo-medieval geopolitical paradigm. At the same 
time, the policy is laced with the language of territory, and its primary objective remains that of 
territorial consolidation however loosely defined, demonstrating that Westphalian 
conceptualisations are not entirely absent.  
Kaliningrad participates in Euroregion Baltic as the only non-EU partner, along with border 
areas of Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden.64 Under the Lithuania-Poland-Russia Cross-border 
Cooperation Programme (2007-2013),65 which was funded with 132 million EUR, projects in 
Kaliningrad have extended into a wide range of areas; “Development of Co-operation in Order to 
Improve Health and Safety of the Population of the Russian – Lithuanian – Polish Borderland”, "Sport 
education on cross-border territory”, "Energy-efficient resource management” and "Good 
governance and cooperation- response to common challenges in public finance". However, the key 
objective has been to turn the border region into “the node of East-West and North-South transport 
axes and trade and tourism routes”,66 and efforts have been made to this end, to improve the 
accessibility and capacity of border-crossing points (BCPs). Externalisation of EU’s internal territorial 
policy has had a quiet but profound effect on representations of Kaliningrad, offering one rare 
depiction of it as integrated in rather than singled out by its environs. 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of European Territorial Cooperation67 
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European Neighbourhood Policy – Differential Geopolitical Consciousness 
The European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004, with greater scope and ambition 
than the fragmented and somehow shadow-working ETC. As stated on the ENP website, the policy 
aims at "avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours, 
and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all.” Covering all neighbouring 
states,68 but not the NDI countries, it has been characterised as a security response to the new 
proximity to ‘unstable’ regions in the east and south, and as an incentive for integration, alternative 
to the prospect of full EU membership which seemed increasingly unlikely for these states after the 
2004 ‘big-bang’ enlargement.69 Many pointed out at the time that the ENP operated as a one-size 
fits all policy; with five eastern and seven southern partnering states, it had a geographical scope 
much too large and diverse to be effective.70 Indeed, its first two years saw some states committing 
to Action plans and others remaining reluctant, and by 2006 proposals were being made for an ‘ENP 
plus’ which would allow for greater differentiation.71 
The ENP presents an interesting blend of all three geopolitical paradigms. It has been 
conceptualised as a protective buffer zone, a so-called ‘ring of friends’, standing between the EU, 
and the new neighbours’ further neighbours. The ‘ring of friends’ analogy, along with official 
promises of the ENP as a deal offering “everything but institutions”72 has invited imperial 
explanations, and Waever’s schema of concentric circles with zones less EUropeanised moving 
outwards from the centre. At the same time however, the ENP’s proposed understanding of border 
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regions, as “regions defined around a border rather than divided by a border”73 suggests neo-
medieval understandings of hybrid territories and productive borders are at play. And finally, 
Westphalian inclusions/exclusions are also present; by singling out their ‘friends’, the EU has created 
a distinction between ENP members and countries further out, making those non-EU borders into 
lines of ‘othering’, and the space beyond them into an outside field.  
For Browning and Joenniemi, the ENP “has in essence been about borders and bordering”,74 
and requires far more nuanced lenses. In their paper, Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, they add to the three-fold geopolitical framework, by drawing in Walters’ schema of four 
geostrategies to constructing boundaries: the globalised networked (non)border, the outwards 
pushing colonial frontier, the indinstinct security zone of the march, and the finite, edge-like lime. 
These four approaches, they argue, “exist in multiplicity, and while informed by particular 
geopolitical models/visions they are also fluid enough to adopt to different geographical contexts" 
(p. 4). The authors then suggest that while the overarching geopolitical vision of the ENP can be 
likened to that of an empire, within this paradigm we can still think of a prevalent geostrategy of a 
lime, coexisting with geostrategies of the march and the colonial frontier. 
A link was first established between the LBT and the ENP, with the famous 2003 ‘Wider 
Europe’ communication which states that; “an efficient and user-friendly system for small border 
traffic is an essential part of any regional development policy.”75 This link has been further 
unpacked; 
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 The Union cannot fully deliver on many aspects of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy if the ability to undertake legitimate short-term 
travel is as constrained as it is currently. Yet our existing visa policies and 
practices often impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel. 
Long queues in front of EU consulates are a highly visible sign of the 
barriers to entry into the Union. Whether for business purposes, for 
purposes of education or tourism, science and research, for civil society 
conferences or even for official meetings at national or local government 
level, the ability to obtain short-term visas in reasonable time at 
reasonable cost will be an indicator of the strength of our European 
Neighbourhood Policy.76  
However, Russia is the big absentee from the EU’s ENP partners, and its cooperation with 
the EU comes through a separate bilateral framework (further elaborated later on). Therefore, 
Kaliningrad might seem like an odd place to look for insights into the ENP. Nevertheless, there are 
many useful links to be drawn from examining the two alongside. First of all, the ENP has further 
intensified Kaliningrad's encirclement by space that is in some way governed by the EU. The ENP 
delineation marks out Kaliningrad not only as the odd one out amongst EU-members, but also 
amongst EU friends. Secondly the issue of Kaliningrad's mobility has been situated within a broader 
regional context, resonating with the ENP’s challenging objectives. A third synergy between the ENP 
and the Kaliningrad question is however more subtle and deep-reaching, having to do with the need 
for the EU to display a more differential geopolitical consciousness in order to achieve its security 
objectives in the region. This much has become evident in Russia's refusal to participate in the ENP, 
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and its underlying assumption that the EU was not recognising for Russia a status which corresponds 
to its size and international standing.77  
The theoretical implications of this link are implicitly present in Browning and Joenniemmi's 
earlier work, and the paper titled Contending Discourses on Marginality: The case of Kaliningrad.78 
The article starts by problematising the concept of marginality which is present in geopolitical 
analyses of Kaliningrad. The modernist geopolitical accounts have attached a definitive peripherality 
to margins, whereby the relationship to the centre of the state to which the margin belongs is the 
dominant source of the margin’s (lack of) agency. As a result, the margin assumes not only an 
inferior position with regards to exercising influence, but also an all-consuming identity as the core’s 
outpost or edge. To contest this narrow view to marginality, the two authors turn to Noel Parker’s 
postmodern approach. Parker distinguishes between borders, boundaries, frontiers, margins, and 
peripheries in his analysis. Whereas the first three are more attached to the concept of the line, the 
latter two take on existence as “territories in their own right”. Between those two then, a further 
distinction is drawn, with margins possessing the capacity to use their position at the edge as 
leverage in order to challenge the centre’s order; a capacity which is missing from the less 
autonomous peripheries. This is the point where Browning and Joenniemi depart from Parker’s 
thinking. As they note, Parker’s account allows us to think of margins in a more flexible way; it makes 
room for the margin’s possible attachment to more than one core, and can potentially 
accommodate conceptions of overlapping spaces. However, as the emphasis on the 
margin/periphery distinction suggests, a systematising hierarchical logic of concepts is still at play, 
and therefore “Parker remains ontologically stuck in the modernist predilection for trying to fix 
meaning.”99 The paper then draws inspiration from Kaliningrad to suggest a more reflective view on 
margins, introducing marginality, as a discursive and dynamic concept engaged in discursive 
contestations. They identify three factors, which have influenced Kaliningrad’s capacity to exert 
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influence. The first is the presence of a distinct identity and a positive conceptualisation within the 
margin, which has determined the ability of Kaliningrad to argue its case convincingly vis a vis 
Moscow and Brussels. The second is the structure of the wider discursive environment, and what 
kind of discourses on marginality it has favoured at different times; defensive modernist outposts or 
experimental postmodernist 'third spaces'. The third is the deposit of historical narratives, and how 
they have been utilised to support the particular framing of marginality that the regional actors 
played on.  
Browning and Joenniemi suggest a discursive understanding of marginality, and illustrate 
firstly how, in spite of their neglect, margins can have impact in world politics, and secondly, how 
marginality has worked in determining the political agendas on Kaliningrad. In this way however, 
while they provide Kaliningrad with an account unique to its circumstances, they also construct a 
marginality unique to Kaliningrad, which can be difficult to embed in wider contexts. For instance, 
how does this marginality interact with other marginalities? Moreover, how can these marginalities 
be brought together conceptually, as they do in practice in the ETC framework which groups internal 
and external margins in maps, discourse and practice? This setback owes to the policy prescriptive 
nature of their research; "Our argument is that whilst marginality can be utilised as a resource for 
the benefit of such regions, some discourses of marginality are likely to be more successful than 
others." Rather than an exposition of the EU's concepts and tools for ordering space, the argument is 
meant to work as a word of caution "for the regional elites to make the best of their situation." 
However, the need for the EU to display differential geopolitical consciousness, which has been at 
the background of their analysis, resonates with the wider geopolitical and territory-making 
activities in the eastern neighbourhood, and particularly with the ENP.  
 EU External Relations and Polish Foreign Policy 
Within foreign policy debates, the LBT has operated as a token of good will between the 
contracting parties. This security function is particularly relevant in those cases where tensions 
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between security narratives exist, and in the Russo-Polish case, this web of competing security 
narratives requires considerable untangling. In the amending LBT regulation 1342/2011, we find 
that:  
This Regulation contributes to further promoting the strategic partnership 
between the European Union and the Russian Federation, in line with the 
priorities set out in the Roadmap of the Common Space on Freedom, 
Security and Justice, and takes into account the overall relationship 
between the European Union and the Russian Federation.79 
To this correlation, we need to append the complex relationships with the involved 
constituent parts, the Republic of Poland, and the Kaliningrad Oblast; four entities of a different 
political, administrative and geographical nature, who have pursued distinct agendas in different 
ways. To illustrate some of these tensions, we examine firstly the development of an explicit EU 
policy towards Kaliningrad and the mobility of their population, in the wider context of EU-Russia 
relations, and secondly the development of a Polish foreign and border policy with respect to Russia, 
in the context of Poland’s EU integration after accession.  
Kaliningrad in EU-Russia Relations 
Modern Russia is the only state with which the EU holds two summits a year, as the two 
maintain ties of mutual dependence; currently EU member-states account for the biggest part of 
foreign investment in Russia, while Europe relies upon Russia to cover more than a quarter of its 
energy needs. The 2014 diplomatic breakdown, epitomised in president Putin’s annexation of 
Crimea and the EU’s response with severe sanctions against Russia, has been dramatic evidence of 
this relationship being uneasy. For Europeans Russia represents a less than established democracy, 
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while Russia views the EU as an expansive agent with Atlanticist loyalties. Within these broad-brush 
parameters, bilateral relations have had distinct phases since cooperation commenced in the early 
1990s; an early cautious and exploratory period where cooperation was loosely pursued, followed 
by a latter more engaged period where cooperation increased alongside building geopolitical 
tensions, leading to the confrontational post-2008 environment. Throughout all periods, the position 
of Kaliningrad and of the bigger question of visa-free travel between Schengen and Russia, has been 
a permanent point of friction in the agenda, dependent upon and constitutive of the overall state of 
bilateral affairs. 
Unengaged Associates 
By the end of the first post-Soviet decade, Kaliningrad enjoyed a not-so-flattering reputation 
as an economic and social black hole in the middle of Europe, presenting most challenges that the 
EU identified with its dangerous outside. Organised crime, structural poverty, smuggling, 
prostitution, pollution, diseases such as tuberculosis and diphtheria, and one of the highest HIV rates 
in Europe, made the oblast a considerable security nuisance for the EU. As Commissioner for 
External Relations Chris Patten was stating during his official visit in 2001; “We should help-and not 
just out of altruism. These problems have obvious transborder implications.”80 In turn, the EU would 
bring particular problems to Kaliningrad after the accession of Poland and Lithuania. Firstly, the 
Schengen benchmarks would nullify an existing arrangement thanks to which Kaliningraders could 
travel to Poland and Lithuania on internal ID documents. Instead, expensive passport- and visa-
demands would be introduced, restricting travel to mainland Russia which required transiting 
through EU territory. In Vitunic’s words, the enlargement would “isolate with a paper wall the 
900,000 Kaliningrad residents from their own country of citizenship”81 Moreover, the accession of 
the two states would exacerbate regional differences, and it would affect important sources of local 
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income, restricting the considerable grey-scale economy such as shuttle-trading across borders with 
these states, and impeding regional tourism.82  
As has been argued in the literature, the Commission’s initial responses to these concerns 
trivialised the problems that the EU was bringing to Kaliningrad.83 The 2001 communication titled 
The EU and Kaliningrad, stated that “the enlargement of the EU will be a positive development for 
its neighbours, contributing to stability and prosperity. Russia stands to benefit substantially from 
enlargement and regions such as Kaliningrad are well placed to take advantage of the new 
opportunities which will be created.”84 Predicated upon an assumed favourable climate, the 
communication outlined ideas such as working groups to devise solutions for the movement of 
goods, or a TACIS-funded study on energy needs to investigate energy potential and possible 
scenarios. Suggestions stopped short of any special Kaliningrad treatment. A trade regime was 
deemed unlikely by the Commission; “Kaliningrad is an integral part of Russia, it would be difficult to 
grant any special status, such as free trade or a customs union. This would raise a number of political 
and legal issues apart from the fact that Russia is unlikely to grant the necessary degree of autonomy 
to Kaliningrad.”85 Similarly, the question of mobility was also inhibited. While the possibility of 
examining small border traffic in the future was mentioned in the communication, what the 
Commission emphasized was the existing acquis provisions for visas, as well as the possibility of 
funding towards improving border infrastructure. A re-admission agreement for the EU to return 
irregular migrants via Russia was twice stressed as a condition to open any kind of visa-talks. 
Three major limitations, drawing on an existing tradition of interaction, can be identified as 
precluding a more decisive approach: a loose EU-Russia cooperation framework; ambivalence with 
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regards to Putin's first presidency; and concerns for Schengen coherence in the early days of its 
development. 
EU-Russia cooperation was at the time premised on the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), which pursued projects on market liberalisation but also social, institutional and 
administrative reforms. Funding for these projects came from the EU’s TACIS programme (Technical 
Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) which had been adopted in the final months of 
the USSR, to assist economic growth in the soon-to-be-former Soviet republics.86 While significant 
readjustments had to be made to the programme in its first year to fit the realities of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) -now Newly Independent States (NIS)-, and an explicit 
goal of re-alignment with the EU emerged quickly, the TACIS projects remained tied to a soft and 
detached disciplining logic: 
The programme aim[ed] at developing the local skills and know-how 
required for the acceleration of the economic reform process in the NIS 
through the provision of advice, know-how and practical experience 
necessary for the effective functioning and management of a market-based 
economy and related democratic institutional structures.87 
The normative/schooling nature of the aid mostly failed to foster engaged cooperation,88 as 
it was also accompanied by modest funds for Russia in general and particularly weak financial 
‘carrots’ for Kaliningrad- no more than 30 million euros per annum allocated on Kaliningrad cross-
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border cooperation programs.89 This approach was derived from a simplistic understanding of 
Russia’s interests, as Aalto notes, a “universalising discourse” which treated Russia as an ‘other’ 
lacking in agency.90 The Common Strategy on Russia which was developed in 1999, the first under 
the CFSP’s new instrument of common strategies, reproduced a simplistic discourse of Russia and its 
“return to its rightful place in the European family”,91 and was criticised as having little operational 
potential.92  
Secondly, Putin's election in the Russian presidency in 2000 created new dynamics and 
ambivalence. In Europe and the US both positive and negative expectations of the new presidency 
existed, especially regarding Russia's liberal democratisation process. While Putin's victory 
represented the first proper transference of mandate through free elections in Russia, he was 
himself closely linked with the previous regime led by president Yeltsin. An analysis of the Carnegie 
Endowment, an American think-tank, is illustrative of the uncertainty at the time:  
Putin may turn out to be Russia's Milosevic. He may develop into a weak 
leader presiding over a feudal order, dominated by oligarchs and regional 
barons, in which the people have little say. But he may also lead Russia out 
of its chaotic, revolutionary, and anarchic recent past and into a more 
stable decade of economic growth and political stability. And economic 
growth and political stability can help to consolidate democratic 
institutions. At the same time, Putin has provided mixed signals on which 
direction he wants to take Russia and demonstrated a real indifference to 
democracy. Consequently, the only honest assessment to be made at the 
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early period of the Putin era is to assert that democracy in Russia is not 
lost, but its future is still uncertain.93 
Along this contingency, whilst hope existed that Putin's presidency would bolster 
negotiations on Kaliningrad,94 his firm federal approach towards the oblasts was signalling a narrow 
range of possible solutions. 
 Finally, the debate was inevitably tied to the much wider and still unexplored questions of 
an EU-wide knowledge and legal basis for elaborate border management solutions. Borrowing 
Joenniemmi et al’s formulation, resolving Kaliningrad’s issue required of the parties a clarity “about 
their approaches as to the construction of political space and borders that to some extent deviate 
from each other.”95 As is further discussed in the following section, Schengen legislation at the post-
Amsterdam treaty consultation stages, had an undeveloped capacity for custom-answers to specific 
problems. The EU’s policy for Kaliningraders' mobility would necessarily follow the pace of wider 
border and place-making mechanisms within the basic parameters of the Schengen Convention. The 
detached framework of cooperation, uncertainty about Putin's agenda, and the ongoing process of 
Schengen's integration led to a modest first attempt to deal with the Kaliningrad problem. The issue 
was to become part of a heated discussion as the EU and Russia were finding themselves coming 
increasingly close at the turn of the century. 
Necessary Partners 
The need for proper bilateral engagement due to the proximity that the enlargement was 
bringing, was further stressed by the global security context. A renewed commitment for 
cooperation was reflected in the Joint statement adopted at the EU-Russia summit in October 2001, 
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which emphasized the need for closer ties in matters of security and forming a response to the fight 
against terrorism.96 Increased focus on biltateral relations in JHA also drew further attention to 
Kaliningrad. Point 52 of the conclusions of the Laeken Council in December 2001 made an explicit 
reference to Kaliningrad; in April 2002 the Council issued a document dealing specifically with 
matters of transit;97 and in June, the Seville European Council listed the oblast as the first item under 
‘External Relations’ and invited “effective and flexible” solutions.98 A special meeting of the visa 
working party which had been held a few weeks earlier had seen member-states disagree over two 
proposals, made by the delegations of Germany and Netherlands and suggesting special travel 
documents and an individual arrangement for the specific travel routes from the oblast to mainland 
Russia.99  
In bilateral fora, the EU and Russia had been stirring the discussion in different directions. 
Premised on the equitable view of all its subjects, Russia was insisting that the Kaliningrad problem 
should be resolved via visa-talks that would cover all of its citizens, and that while cooperation was 
desirable, the implication of Kaliningrad’s further separation from Russia was not. As Federal 
Minister German Graf was stating at the time “Kaliningrad is a part of Russia. It cannot move 
towards merging with the EU more rapidly than the rest of the country. The region will integrate 
with the European Union at the same speed as the whole country.”100 These arguments were 
articulated in a highly politicised context, in terms of a discrimination and violation of human rights 
against Russian citizens, with Russian officials stressing that such arrangements existed even at the 
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height of the Cold War for the isolated West Berliners, and presently between Schengen states and 
Switzerland.101  
On the other hand, the EU’s primary concern for the coherence of Schengen meant that 
solutions would be sought in administrative form, dealing with the costs of visas and time-delays of 
crossings. In a spirit of bureaucratic solutions, the Commission’s Kaliningrad: Transit communication 
of September 2002 separated the ‘urgent’ issue of transit between Russia and Kaliningrad from the 
issue of cross-border contacts for economic or cultural reasons. The first of these issues was 
discussed in the EU-Russia summit of November 2002, which produced the “Joint Statement on 
Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation.”102 In addition to no-
cost visas for Kaliningraders, it introduced the Facilitated Travel Document (FTD) and the Facilitated 
Rail Transit Document (FRTD); special forms which enabled simplified travel to Russia via land routes 
(private cars, buses and special non-stop trains). It further clarified that travelling between 
Kaliningrad and Russia does not necessarily require passing through Polish territory and therefore 
Poland need not partake in these discussions as a transit country, like Lithuania, but as a 
neighbouring one. The border traffic issue on the other hand was deemed “not specific to the 
situation of Kaliningrad” and would therefore be considered “on a horizontal basis for all the new 
border regions of the enlarged Union.”103 The communication also stated that the Commission “does 
not start from the premise that the acquis is so inflexible that it cannot cater for special 
circumstances.”104 But with separating the two problems, the scope of issues which would require 
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solutions truly unique to Kaliningrad had been reduced, and contained within Lithuania’s accession 
negotiations.  
A more comprehensive EU-Russia framework of cooperation, to replace the ambiguous PCA, 
was announced in May 2003, and its roadmaps were agreed two years later in the May 2005 EU-
Russia summit. The negotiations for these roadmaps, the four so-called Common Spaces, had been 
laborious. A 2004 communication, titled On relations with Russia was reporting a bilateral context 
“under increasing strain, with divergence between EU and Russia positions on a number of issues” 
and particularly noting the “more assertive Russian stance towards a number of acceding countries 
and the NIS”.105 With such challenges at hand, the four spaces were an effort to declare intentions 
and to make cooperation practical: they put greater emphasis on creating binding legal obligations, 
outlining numerous areas for cooperation, and expanding the focus on matters broadly defined as 
security.  At the same time, the artificial nature of the drive for closer cooperation became more 
evident as the ambiguity surrounding the PCA was crystallising in a deeper normative rift; Russia's 
insistence for bilateral cooperation that reflects an equal partnership and a recognition of its own 
significant international standing, against the EU's counter-vision to proceed with horizontal policies 
towards its partners and bring them to convergence with EU governance. This rift had wider 
operational implications, viewed in the context of Russia's refusal to participate in the aggregative 
ENP policy, and the EU's inclusion of funding for Russia's PCA programmes under the ENPI (European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), the financial arm of the ENP.106 As Emerson notes, the 
common spaces demonstrated still that the two partners “know that they have to try to make the 
best of living together in the same European home, but do not yet know how to do it.”107 
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Disillusioned Neighbours 
The deficiencies of the cooperation framework, and its failure to commit the EU and Russia 
into a reliable partnership, became more problematic in the post-enlargement era. The June 2008 
EU-Russia Summit launched negotiations on the new agreement, in the midst of the emerging 
geopolitical security dilemma over the establishment of influence across contested north-eastern 
European and Eurasian lands. The EU's concerns of a growingly assertive Russia were aggravated 
after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Moreover, Putin's threatening stance against Ukraine and its 
NATO candidacy, Russian involvement in nationalist instability in Crimea, and the frozen conflict in 
Transnistria, were seen as outright antagonistic to the EU's democratisation plans for the Western 
CIS countries. The Russian concerns over EU expansionist activity were exacerbated by the 
establishment of the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. A parallel sub-project of the ENP, the 
EaP removed the very different Mediterranean neighbouring states from its focus, and aimed to 
foster closer ties with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Due to the exclusive 
nature of these association agreements, which prevent EaP states from participating in similar 
economic projects with Russia,108 the initiative was received by Kremlin as intrusion into Russia's 
vital space and disruption of balance, drawing these 'buffer' states deep into the Western 
geopolitical orbit. Following the concerted EU efforts in the eastern neighbourhood, the horizontal 
LBT regulation was passed in December 2006, and the first draft agreement, between Hungary and 
Moldova, was submitted for consultation as soon as May 2007.  
Growing EU-Russia irritation only stalled further action on Kaliningrad, as its potential 
strategic and military uses for Russia in this renewed confrontational environment had to be 
considered. In November 2008, a day after the US presidential elections, President Dmitry 
Medvedev announced the deployment of short-range nuclear missile heads in Kaliningrad, in 
response to NATO’s plans to build an anti-missile shield in Europe with defense sites in Poland and 
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Czech Republic.109 The oblast’s geostrategic purpose was re-affirmed in 2010 with the inclusion of 
the dedicated Kaliningrad Special Region in Russia’s Western Military District.110 The perceived re-
militarisation led international observers to speak of Kaliningrad as the “frontline of the new cold 
war”,111 observing growing unease in neighbouring Baltic states. With Kaliningrad becoming a centre 
for regional insecurity discourses, EU policy had reasons to boost cooperation there, but also 
difficulties in mustering member-state resonance. As such, a reluctant pace continued, with aid 
through cross-border programmes and improvement of infrastructure, such as the 8 million euro 
Chernyshevskoye border crossing point on the Lithuanian border, which was opened in 2009. Talks 
about exceptions in border crossings through an LBT arrangement, dependent upon state initiative, 
would not commence until domestic politics created favourable circumstances. 
Kaliningrad in the Polish Foreign Policy Mix 
As discussed thus far, the LBT has emerged as an opportunity for the EU to assert 
geopolitical actorness in the contested eastern European borderlands, by consolidating region-
building, but also an opportunity to engage with Russia and display a singular voice within an 
increasingly confrontational international environment. This second exercise however has had its 
distinct intergovernmental complications, in this case Poland's own border politics and security 
narratives. As Carr notes “in a country whose frontiers have been forcibly re-arranged by invasions 
and occupations by its more powerful neighbours, and which has twice been erased from the map of 
Europe, it is perhaps not surprising that Poland takes the security of its borders very seriously.”112 
The border politics of modern Poland have followed the country's strategies of political re-invention, 
and re-positioning in the international sphere once it regained its independence in 1991. This 
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involved a multifaceted struggle, to detach from the Soviet past, establish itself firmly into the 
Western economic and security networks, but also to maintain a strong national identity.  
Poland became one of the first three Central and Eastern European countries to enter NATO 
in 1999, along with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Since joining the EU, it has succeeded in aligning its 
economy with the directions of the Copenhagen economic criteria more than any other accession 
state, and has proved resilient throughout the 2008 economic recession. This redefinition of the 
Polish state has been embraced internally. In the 2014 Eurobarometer, 77% of the Polish nationals 
polled said that they feel themselves to be citizens of Europe, well above the EU average of 65% and 
ahead of older EU member-states such as Greece, Italy, France or the Netherlands. Polish foreign 
minister, on the 10th anniversary of EU membership was claiming that “2004 enabled us to 
accelerate our unprecedented civilisational development.”113 For these reasons, its record of 
membership has been widely framed as a model transition and integration example,114 so much so 
that it has come to be thought of as a bringer of EU norms to the rest of Eastern Europe.115  
Poland's strategic objective to re-orient itself with the West, has coexisted however with a 
populist current to maintain its national, religious, and cultural identity. Polish government officials 
of the liberal Civic Platform have maintained some of the strongest anti-immigrant rhetorics in the 
EU, while Poland’s last presidential elections were won by eurosceptic Andrzej Duda of the right-
wing Law and Justice party, on a conservative nationalist and anti-Russian agenda. These tensions 
were visible already prior to accession, when significant in numbers groups in Poland were wary of 
the expected rise in the presence of foreigners. A 2003 Aliens Act had tightened control on migration 
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and border-traffic, with noticeable results in decreasing numbers of settlement permits, as the state 
turned to more temporary solutions to accommodate foreigners.116  
This dual approach of being open to economic opportunity and able to spread European 
norms, but doing so with a strong ethno-national protectionist instinct, has been definitive of 
Poland's stance towards Kaliningrad. The latter has involved contradictory elements, at times pre-
occupied with their own investments in the Baltic region, and at others with maintaining proper 
distances from Russia. For instance, while the Foreign Ministry had refused to allow transit through 
Polish territory pre-accession, they also postponed the introduction of proper border controls, 
initially planned for July 2003, to avoid disrupting the tourism season, while Poland had been 
supportive of an agreement to provide visas free of charge. Despite these efforts, Poland’s accession 
was followed by a sharp decrease in the number of crossings on the Kaliningrad border, dropping 
from 9.1 million in 2002 to 7 million in 2004.117  
The premiership of Donald Tusk of the liberal conservative Civic Platform after November 
2007 was a catalyst for the launch of Russo-Polish negotiations, which began in 2008 and lasted for 
two years. Tusk, a devoted Europeanist who has since moved on to the Presidency of the European 
Council, stood for a re-balancing of Poland’s traditionally U.S.-focused foreign policy, embedded 
within a narrative of openness and innovation in international cooperation. The latter was most 
characteristically demonstrated in Poland’s principal role in the development of the Eastern 
Partnership proposal, devised jointly with Sweden, which involved measures such as liberalised visa 
regimes or free trade zones.118 On this extrovert foreign policy agenda, the normalisation of Russo-
Polish affairs was also a priority, and LBT negotiations acted as an opportunity for dialogue. The 
initial consultations resulted in April 2010 in a joint letter signed by Polish and Russian foreign 
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ministers, Sikorski and Lavrov, and addressed to EU Higher Representative Ashton, asking for an 
exception which would allow for the atypical border area to be established.119  
Following this early demonstration of consensus, Tusk’s line was met with resistance from 
multiple sides. Only a few days later, the crash of an airplane that carried Poland’s President Lech 
Kaczynski and his delegation to an official visit in Smolensk120 caused great disturbance in bilateral 
relations, and fuelled anti-Russian sentiments within. Some groups in Poland aligned behind the late-
President’s brother, who claimed that the crash was in fact an assassination orchestrated by 
Kremlin.121 Lithuania, also dealing with its own security issues with Russia, was drafting an LBT 
agreement for Kaliningrad and was generally not opposed to regulated border traffic. It was hostile 
however to the proposal for an extended border-zone and refused to co-sign the joint Russo-Polish 
letter, claiming that any exceptions would effect unnecessary complications. On the side of Russia, 
inconsistencies were also appearing, with Putin shifting his position according to opportunity; while 
he had expressed continuous support for the LBT in Kaliningrad since 2008, and that was a time 
when four crucial deals between Gazprom and Warsaw were on the line, he eventually opposed the 
policy ahead of the June 2011 EU-Russia summit, a move interpreted as pressure towards the 
Commission to accelerate visa-free travel negotiations for all Russians.  
Unreliable support had led Tusk’s government to a firm position on this matter, with 
minister Sikorski declaring that “we are prepared to take the risk of undertaking such an agreement 
even if some people in Brussels don't like it.”122 The openness doctrine was forcefully re-affirmed 
during Poland’s first EU Presidency in the second half of 2011 with an inaugural address that urged 
against fear-driven, defensive foreign policy where “the worst we can do is fill the moat of our 
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nation-state castle, raise the draw bridge and fortify ourselves within its walls.”123 This line was 
repeated in the context of LBT negotiations, with a senior Polish diplomat stating in 2011: "We 
believe in dismantling obstacles to freedom of tourists and businessmen to travel ... If some of our 
member-states want to move on visa liberalisation with Russia, good, Poland is at the spearhead [of 
the process] with the local border traffic agreement for Kaliningrad."124 When the Commission 
eventually consented to treat the entire Kaliningrad region as a border area in July 2011, the 
decision was widely interpreted as “in accordance with the wishes of the Polish EU Presidency which 
intended to make a goodwill gesture in a difficult moment for Russia-Polish relations.”125   
Situating the LBT in the Schengen Acquis 
The common visa policy126 of the EU has become one of the most europeanised areas of 
Schengen cooperation, following the priorities set in the 2004 Hague programme, which emphasized 
the need for harmonisation and parallel use of information technologies in visa-matters. The LBT 
however falls at the intersection of two areas of the Schengen acquis: the more integrated and less 
controversial visa policy; and the more sensitive issue of border checks. As such, its development has 
been a matter of finding the right balance between the two areas integrating at different speeds, 
also inviting the question of exclusive competence between member-states and the EU. 
Visa Policy Harmonisation 
The ‘smartening’ EU’s border is meant to work alongside a common visa policy, aiming at 
efficient control of regular flows, detection of irregular flows, and prevention of the possibility that 
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the regular become irregular in the future - i.e. overstayers violating the temporal conditions of their 
visa.127 As we have seen, in the SMART framework, universal entry-exit monitoring (EES) for all non-
EU nationals performs a particular role in preventing overstaying, as an automated system replaces 
the manual process of calculating length of stay based on stamps. However, while exhaustive in its 
scope, EES operates only at the time and place of the crossing, and therefore does nothing to “avoid 
the painful and expensive problems in sending [people] back if they are not the one who should be 
travelling.”128 On the other hand, the pre-vetting of travellers (RTP) which does entail the pre-
emptive element, has a very limited scope, as it only concerns those who already have a good track 
record of entering Schengen. Therefore, the SMART border can only operate on top of a 
comprehensive visa policy that ensures effective controls in advance of the crossing and for all. The 
development of the EU's visa policy to work to this end has been a dual project of standardisation 
and diversification, predicated upon extensive data mining.  
The first of three elements of visa standardisation is Schengen's basic distinction of 
positive/negative third countries, introduced in 2001, and initially formulated as a black/white list.129 
It separates the states whose nationals must have a visa when crossing the external borders 
(Regulation’s Annex I), from those who are exempt (Regulation’s Annex II). The geopolitical and 
discriminatory implications of this stratification have been discussed, by van Houtum,130 who 
observed that most Muslim and poor states are placed in the ‘black list’, while the criteria for the 
initial entry or subsequent transfer into the EU's ‘white list’ have not been made adequately explicit, 
the Regulation vaguely referring to the risks of illegal immigration from that state. His argument 
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then is that with its sharp distinction, the EU “inscribes an unambiguous di-visionary borderline on 
the planet” which amounts to a global apartheid. A 2014 amendment to Regulation 539/2001 
provided some insight into the criteria upon which positive/negative allocation is decided.  
From now on the determination of the third countries whose nationals are 
subject to, or exempt from, the visa requirement should be governed by a 
considered, case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating, inter 
alia, to illegal immigration, public policy and security, the economic 
benefits, in particular in terms of tourism and foreign trade, and the 
Union's external relations with the relevant third countries including, in 
particular, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.131 
The outlining of these criteria was meant to add transparency to Schengen’s stratification, 
and while the case-by-case consideration clause and the particular criteria outlined, did not imply 
any changes in the exclusionary logic, what they did underline is its dynamic nature.132 In addition to 
the exclusionary function however, the bureaucratic security reasoning behind the binary 
classification has been one of coherence and commonality. The goal of this list has been as much 
about separating the ‘wanted’ from the ‘unwanted’ as it has been about member-states reaching an 
agreement as to who is and will continue to be the former and who the latter.  
The second element of Schengen's visa framework has been the EU Visa Code (Regulation 
810/2009), governing the issuing of short-stay visas. It defines the responsible state/consulate for 
the processing of a visa application, the requirements of the applications (personal documents, 
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collection of fingerprints, and the set visa-fee), as well as guidelines for examining and 
accepting/refusing an application. Importantly, the EU visa code clarifies when and how the Visa 
Information System (VIS), the common identification system for visa data, will be consulted. The VIS, 
launched in advance of the visa code in 2008, consists of a centralised architecture made up of a 
core EU hub, the Central Visa Information System (CS-VIS) and the member-state National Interfaces 
(NI-VIS), streamlining visa data from consulates and all external BCPs.133 It stores both the biographic 
information collected through the visa application form, as well as biometric information which is 
processed by a Biometric Matching System (BMS). 
The third component is the uniform format for the visa sticker, which was introduced in 
1995.134 The sticker was mainly designed as a security precaution, to meet specific technical 
standards that safeguard against document falsification, and it was upgraded in 2002 to meet newer 
security standards such as integration of machine readable photographs. Today, its security 
functions are becoming increasingly obsolete, replaced by the VIS functionalities, as it does not store 
biometric identifiers. The sticker is still useful however not only because it contains information 
necessary to the traveller which is visible to the eye (dates of entry, territorial validity and type of 
visa), but also in creating a uniform appearance. 
Within the Schengen visa framework, which standardises the documents produced, the 
processing and storage, and the operative stratification, several diversifications have been pursued. 
A first area encompasses the various types of visas which correspond to the specific travel needs. A 
third country national may apply for one of seven types of visas, providing for different types of 
access: 
                                                             
133
 European Commission, “Decision Laying down the Physical Architecture and Requirements of the National 
Interfaces and of the Communication Infrastructure between the Central VIS and the National Interfaces for 
the Development Phase,” 2008/602/EC, (June 17, 2008), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:194:0003:0008:EN:PDF. 
134
 Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 Laying down a Uniform 
Format for Visas,” accessed September 20, 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:31995R1683. 
Chapter Four 
218 
 
 the standard Uniform Schengen Visa (USV), which comes in three forms: a Type A 
(airport transit), Type B (transit visa), and type C (short stay) itself broken down into, 
single-entry, double-entry, and multiple entry; 
 the Limited Territorial Validity VISA (LTV), for travel to one Schengen state, to be used 
in emergency situations and/or when humanitarian reasons apply; 
 and the National Visa, also known as type-D, which applies to specific categories of 
people such as students or workers who need to reside for a longer period of time in 
one Schengen state. 
A second area of diversification, known as the Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFA), extends 
into the issuing process, and essentially into the rigid classification of third countries, beyond the 
visa-bound/visa-exempt distinction.135 Based on the condition that readmission agreements are in 
place between the EU and the contracting state, VFAs reduce or waive short-stay visa fees and 
reduce processing times for certain categories of people (such as students, diplomats, or business 
people) if they are also holders of biometric passports. Across VFAs, still greater variation can be 
found, as they are devised individually for each third country. Trauner and Kruse observed in their 
2008 study  that although all agreements to date had stated the eventual goal of visa-free travel, 
more or less vague wording was used, suggesting a different timeline and determination for each 
case.136 Moreover, they found that the agreements where more encouraging language was used, 
(i.e. the VFA with the Western Balkan States which refers to the “first concrete step towards the visa 
free travel regime”), tended to be the most comprehensive in terms of categories of people to be 
included, whereas agreements framed in less promising terms (i.e. the Russian VFA which speaks of 
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the generic “intention to establish the visa-free travel”) were the least inclusive.137 The VFA 
framework has been viewed in many ways, often rather critically. Some view it as yet another 
'carrot', a negotiating tool that the EU uses to entice foreign governments to conclude readmission 
agreements, and assume responsibility for large numbers of persons found in an irregular situation 
in the EU.138 Importantly, as Boratynski et al note, their fragmented scope can appear to create “a 
feeling of discrimination” and the idea that “the European Union is interested only in the […] 
elite.”139 And in spite of their tailor-made character, they may still fail to resolve local problems, as in 
the case of Kaliningrad, where the VFA replaced the 2002 no-cost visa arrangement, and eventually 
functioned as a restricting measure.140 Finally, as the Commission has admitted at times, flexibilities 
in the visa policy, such as the VFAs, “go a long way in improving access to the territory of the Union 
for large groups of travellers but have not been matched so far by any efforts to simplify the actual 
border crossing for those groups.”141 
The high degree of diversification within the standardised visa framework raises questions as 
to why the LBT became a distinct legislative arrangement rather than another visa sub-category, 
even though, in the consultations until 2004, it had been proposed as a special 'L' type visa. The LBT 
differs from VFAs in that its scope is territorial rather than personal; it covers all residents of a 
certain area of a state, rather than certain categories of people across an entire state. Moreover, it 
goes a step further than the VFAs in blurring the Schengen black/white classification, as it commands 
amendments to Schengen's positive/negative lists. Yet, in many ways, it works just as another type 
of visa-diversification rather than a separate regime of control; coming at a cost, even if reduced, 
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allowing for the standard maximum 90/180 day length of stay, and involving a similar application 
process at the consular offices which includes depositing of biometric identifiers. 
One reason why the LBT has become a separate arrangement has been the desire to 
enhance its inclusionary character. Framed and publicised as a visa-free mechanism, it remains 
outside the criticised visa-facilitation framework as it avoids its discriminatory effects, and it further 
supports the EU's narrative of openness in its north-eastern neighbourhood. In the same vein, it also 
responds to a voiced concern of the Commission that “the European Union's all-or-nothing consular 
approach to visas means that either all nationals of a non-EU Member Country are subject to the 
visa requirement or they are not” while “those who are not, are not subject to any checks before 
they arrive at the destination Member State.”142 However, the most important reason for the LBT to 
remain outside the communautarised visa-framework has been to maintain a high level of member-
state competence; while visa-liberalisation and VFAs are signed between the EU and the third 
country concerned, the LBTs have states as signatories. To understand the limitations in 
communautarising the particular area of local mobility exceptions, it is helpful to outline the 
particular development of the LBT acquis within the wider Schengen framework. 
Local Border Traffic Acquis: Who decides on the Exception? 
As Peers notes, whether the EU has exclusive powers on a particular area of external 
relations depends on the extend of harmonisation of this area in internal law, and even when it 
comes to areas fully harmonised, it is still open to interpretation, since exclusivity of such powers 
comes about through exercise rather than nature.143 An early idea of a community Local Border 
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Traffic appeared already in the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC).144 In several 
member-states, agreements facilitating border region mobility already existed, in their various ways 
overriding the principle of crossing external borders only at BCPs and during the fixed opening hours. 
Article 3 of SIC opened the door for the Executive Committee to adopt common provisions, 
exceptions, and arrangements governing such agreements, and article 136 laid the complementary 
rule that “no contracting party shall conclude with one or more third states agreements simplifying 
or abolishing border checks without the prior agreement of the other Contracting Parties”, 145 unless 
these were small border traffic agreements complying with the rules to be adopted. The provision 
was left idle, and small border traffic remained solely a member-state concern until 2002. 
Concerning the sensitive issue of bilateral relations with neighbouring third countries as regards 
their fringe populations, local border traffic has been in some ways a stronghold of 
intergovernmentalism in Schengen border policy, telling of the challenges in the Schengen Area's 
integration itself. 
 The first reason why a community Local Border Traffic stalled, had to do with the overall 
selective pattern of implementation of the Convention, after its entry into force in 1995. The 
intergovernmental obstacles were visible even in internal crossing practices; at the Austro-Italian 
internal border, overzealous customs staff had been implementing the Schengen rules in such a way 
that the actual crossings were in fact delayed,146 while France retained its internal border controls 
with the Benelux countries until well into 1995. The annexed protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which brought Schengen legislation under the community framework, endowed the EU with powers 
on external borders. It was a product of laborious negotiations, which envisioned greater coherence, 
transparency and enforceability, transferring implementing powers previously reserved for the 
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intergovernmental and somehow secretive Schengen Executive Committee to the Council of 
Ministers.147 Integration of the Schengen acquis implied an overall reshaping of policy in the areas of 
free movement of persons; checks at external borders; asylum, immigration and protection for the 
rights of nationals of non-member countries; and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It required 
scrutinising the fragmented acquis, a bulk of agreements, conventions and accessions, identifying 
the ones which would be redundant, individually determining a legal basis to those provisions 
deemed relevant, and allocating the latter either to the first, more tightly integrated pillar, or to the 
third which allowed for greater flexibility and retained a substantial degree of national control. 
At the Inter-Governmental Conference preceding the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 
June 1997, the debate over the allocation of the provisions demonstrated their highly politicised 
nature.148 Member-states who held the opinion that the intergovernmental approach had been but 
the early 'trial phase' of a Schengen Laboratory, supported the partial deliverance of competencies 
to the EU level. With a majority of 12 out of 15, they decided on the transference to the first pillar of 
the measures regarding internal controls. The compensatory 'flanking' measures concerning external 
borders, would come under the third, and several relevant provisions remained classified and were 
not included in the Decision defining the Schengen acquis.149 This included small border traffic, at 
the time in place in Germany, France, Italy, and Austria. Denmark, objecting to any transference of 
competencies, and the UK and Ireland, wishing to maintain authority over border controls, opted 
out of Title IV. 
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In the ensuing 5-year Schengen transitional period, during which member-states could put 
forward comments and proposals and the Council appropriate amendments and updates, further 
practicalities were worked out and some important commonalities were introduced. In addition to 
the Schengen positive/negative list, a set of Common Consular Instructions on issuing visas was 
introduced in 2002.150 In the same year, the communication on Integrated Management of External 
Borders151 enabled the implementation of further practical provisions, introducing a set of best 
practices and a handbook for border guards, and also recasting and an old and legally dubious 
Common Manual (CM) on Checks at the External Borders which outlined conditions for entry and 
rules for checks and surveillance.152 The new CM repeated the call for developing a common set of 
exceptions and arrangements for local border traffic, acknowledging that the existing agreements 
presented significant differences concerning the geographical area, length of stay, eligibility criteria, 
and document requirements. While the CM initially listed in attached annexes the existing 
agreements, along with the penalties each state imposed for unauthorised crossings, both items 
were withdrawn at member-state request due to their confidential nature, in a Council Decision 
which also amended/deleted the parts of the Common Manual referring to crossing the border at 
places other than authorised border crossing points.153 
These early attempts for a community local border traffic opened up a debate, which was 
becoming increasingly relevant as the 2004 enlargement approached. On one hand, the 
enlargement prospect added to the matter some urgency, as most of the accession states (Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania) also had highly diverse agreements with 
their neighbours. A preliminary paper released by the Commission in 2002 repeated the need for 
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minimum common principles noting that the future member-states “will not only need clear 
guidance as regards rules on local border traffic with their neighbouring countries, but also need to 
be closely involved in drawing up such rules.”154 On the other hand, the particular timeline of the 
enlargement as regards Schengen accession made matters more complicated. In the 2003 
Commission proposal155 in addition to the main regulation on the establishment of a local border 
traffic regime, a second complementary regulation was necessary, to allow for such agreements to 
be concluded on the “temporary external” land borders between member-states, during the 
acceding countries' two-step process of implementing the Schengen acquis.156  
The Commission urged for the two proposals to be adopted before the 1st of May 2004, to 
avoid further complications. The main regulation itself had two parts; a first part based on Article 
62(2)(a) (EC) which concerns standards of border checks, establishing the exception of the 
provisions, and a second part based on Article 62(2)(b) (EC), establishing a specific “L” visa to be 
issued for the purpose of local border traffic.157 After the May 1st deadline, measures related to the 
increasingly harmonised area of issuing visas would be adopted in accordance with the co-decision 
procedure, whilst measures related to the more sensitive area of border checks would still need to 
be adopted unanimously by the Council. Due to their incompatibility, the two elements of the main 
proposal would have to be further broken down into two separate proposals. The Commission's 
deadline was not met, as discussions proved very difficult and progress towards achieving unanimity 
was slow. The Hague programme of 2004 however extended the co-decision procedure to cover the 
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relevant provisions pertaining to border checks,158 and a new 'merged' proposal was drafted in 2005, 
covering existing as well as temporary external borders, and provisions on both border checks and 
conditions on issuing the special “L” visas. The Regulation affirmed the particular power-sharing that 
the LBT would involve: 
While this Regulation sets a Community regime on local border traffic, thus 
conferring on the Community external competence on this matter, it has 
been considered appropriate- taking into account the specific nature of a 
local border traffic regime, whose establishment largely depends on local 
geographical, social, economic and other considerations-to delegate to 
Member-states the actual implementation of such regime via bilateral 
agreements.159 
While the Hague Programme provided a technical legislative solution to the lag between 
visas and border checks harmonisation, and provided for a formula distributing competence, it did 
not resolve the underlying tensions. In practical terms this meant difficulties in reconciling the 
Commission's more centralised approach with a focus on securing the border, with the member-
states' more flexible views that emphasized diversity in order to provide greater benefits to the 
border residents. According to the Committee on Civil Liberties (LIBE Committee), the Commission’s 
proposal still “placed serious demands on the people who live along the European Union’s external 
borders.”160 Following further rounds of harmonisation negotiations, an amendment was achieved, 
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so that instead of the special ‘L visa’, a local border traffic permit would be issued, not in uniform 
format and not to be stamped upon entry and exit. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has unpacked the conceptual tensions surrounding the LBT, identifying the EU’s 
dialectic conduct of dealing with exceptions via rules and dealing with insecurity via openness, which 
invites a risk-based framework to conceptualise its security logics. The security functions of the LBT 
have been analysed according to three different perspectives and geographical scales. The chapter 
first considered the border area itself in heterotopological terms, in order to tease out the historical 
resonances of the contemporary security complexes Kaliningrad has been entrenched in. Visiting this 
area’s past, a view of it emerges as a historically ‘odd’ deployable territory enmeshed in multiple 
geopolitical agendas. In turn, this situates the border-area it in the wider, north-eastern place-
making processes of the EU, which can shed light on the functions of the LBT as a regional 
instrument that extends the EU’s reach by standardising borderlands at the EU’s external perimeter, 
consolidating Schengen’s coherence, and investing a European sameness upon spaces that are 
‘different’ in a north-eastern way.  
Secondly, it has been observed that the LBT in Kaliningrad has functioned as discursive 
currency in support of particular international cooperation narratives, by the actors involved. 
Negotiations for an LBT have been dependent upon the overall state of EU-Russia relations, 
embedded within the wider questions of visa-free travel for Russian citizens. However, and 
especially in the years following 2008 and the increasingly confrontational Russo-Polish bilateral 
environment, it was rather Poland, driven by its own security concerns, which brought momentum 
to the stalling issue of Kaliningraders’ movement, seeing in the LBT a means of diffusing tensions at 
its borders in a secure way. 
 Thirdly, the LBT has been examined alongside Schengen’s integration, as part of the 
common instruments to regulate non-clandestine movement. As discussed, the common visa policy 
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framework seems well-equipped to provide the facilitations of the LBT, while ensuring effective data 
collection and monitoring. That the LBT has remained outside of this highly integrated Schengen 
area seems to owe to the particularly sensitive nature of its policy scope, the intergovernmental 
stronghold of border exceptions, and can thus be conceptualised as the present threshold of border 
integration. 
The heterotopological analysis of the border area in Kaliningrad, which historicizes the 
geopolitical/biopolitical interplay in this part of Europe, also allows us to view a particular 
geographical imaginary of the EU, a heterotopia fragmented along a north/south divide. This chapter 
has provided one example of the different security logics that apply on either side of the divide, and 
that is the inverted practice of exception. In the LBT context, member-states are exceptionally 
softening the Schengen external border regime in order to be inclusive towards their neighbours. 
This has been taking place at the time of fences and returning internal border controls, as a response 
to threats coming from the south. What is more interesting however is the subtle similarities that 
exist between the LBT and the southern-focused Eurosur as discussed in chapter 3; they both have a 
fragmenting effect, which involves a break-down of the external perimeter into distinct sections, 
according to local security parameters. These observations add to the argument that the risk-based 
framework for border security and its flexible responses may entail coherence at the executive level 
but it is a coherence which is grounded in technical knowledge rather than politics, and as such fails 
to translate into a versatile but singular perimeter, mirroring the challenges of creating the EU itself 
as a diverse but united whole. 
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Conclusions 
Introvert Continent 
 
Abusaleh, a 26-year-old Syrian refugee with a Master’s degree and excellent English, began his 
journey from Aleppo in March 2013, and worked in Turkey for a year before deciding to attempt the 
Aegean crossing to go to Europe. He hired the services of a smuggler, found through a Facebook group, 
and paid 300 euros for a ‘guaranteed’ Aegean crossing, meaning that even if their dinghy was 
apprehended and returned to Turkey, they would try again at no extra charge. Abusaleh had to learn 
how to swim the day before their departure, and as it turned out that last-minute lesson may have 
saved his life. The overcrowded dinghy was indeed apprehended mid-sea by the Hellenic Coast Guard, 
its passengers invited to climb onto the larger vessel and take off their life vests. They were then asked 
to jump back into the water, the only consideration for their safety being one officer who asked whether 
the group had a working phone in order to get in touch with the Turkish Coast Guard and be rescued. 
Abusaleh tried twice more before his boat was rescued by a Hellenic Coast Guard vessel that transferred 
him and his fellow travellers to one of the Greek islands, and subsequently to Athens. He stayed there 
for approximately six months, in hotels, rented flats, and friendly houses, and made four attempts to 
board a flight to Italy. Each time cost him the price of the flight and an extra 100 euros for a fake ID card, 
supplied by Pakistani migrants settled in Athens, and once delivered with spelling errors. Being 
apprehended at the airport, he recounts, was a very different experience than in the sea. “The border 
guards were OK. They said ‘Come back another day’ or ‘Get a better document.’”1 
On his fifth attempt, and shortly before the money that was given to him by his family ran out, Abusaleh 
managed to fly into Rome, cross into Nice, and from there to make his way into Germany where he 
finally applied for the refugee status. Our interview was conducted shortly after one of the failed 
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attempts, and in a spirit of disillusionment. During our conversation, I asked Abusaleh about the reasons 
that make the EU an attractive destination for him, to which he responded “Nothing, I just want to go to 
Germany”.2  
Abusaleh’s views on the relevance (or lack thereof) of the EU do not differ much to those of the 
European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker. In his 2015 State of the Union speech, titled “Time 
for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity”, Juncker defined the crisis in the EU in terms of a triple lack; lack of 
honesty in the Union, lack of Europe in the Union, and lack of union in the Union. The remedy suggested 
was a return to politics, as opposed to the routine depoliticised work of the EU’s executive in ‘normal’ 
times. 
This is why I said last September before this House that I wanted to lead a 
political Commission. A very political Commission. I said this not because I 
believe we can and should politicise everything. I said it because I believe the 
immense challenges Europe is currently facing – both internally and externally 
– leave us no choice but to address them from a very political perspective, in a 
very political manner and having the political consequences of our decisions 
very much in mind. Recent events have confirmed the urgent need for such a 
political approach in the European Union. This is not the time for business as 
usual.3 
What these two different testimonies alert us to, are the ways in which the recent waves of 
migration into the EU, and the ways of (mis)handling them, have had the capacity to reflect back to us as 
observers and to those more directly involved, the gaps and excesses of the European project itself.  
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The thesis has focused on such gaps and excesses, asking: what happens in border spaces at 
Europe’s edge, when geographical particularity and local history meet abstract security logics of risk? To 
answer this question, the heterotopia has been put forth as an analytical tool. Heterotopias, taken as 
dialectical spaces with loose spatial and temporal boundaries, provide a means to capture and 
conceptually operationalise the differentiated and fragmented nature of EU space. Four Chapters, have 
addressed distinct aspects of this differentiation.  
Chapter One started by introducing and interrogating the ‘migration crisis’ context, zooming in 
on the case of Greece, a member-state at the frontline of migration flows and in the heart of the EU 
‘crisis’ debates. The chapter focused on the uses of exclusion and immobility, techniques of governing 
borders which have seen dramatic growth in the EU during the years of the ‘crisis’. Findings suggested 
that the proliferation of practices of surveillance, identification, and detention represent a particular 
response to the perceived threat of irregular migration, the making of ‘knowns’ out of ‘unknowns’ 
through a deployment of immobility. It has been argued however that these are not the sole product of 
the EU’s interventions, or the ‘urgency’ context of the crisis, but also represent continuities of the 
national migration context and local gatekeeping regime. The chapter explored Greece’s own logics of 
spatial and temporal immobility, its exclavic geography, ambiguous belonging to Europe, and lingering 
insecurity stemming from the Greco-Turkish conflict. It concluded that in this case, Greece’s own 
predicament has aligned with the EU’s border objectives, resulting in an amplification of immobilising 
practices and particularly in the use of detention as a tool for managing migration flows.   
Chapter Two unpacked the practice of immobility further, focusing on the paradigmatic space of 
the camp, and on transformations which require going beyond the conventional scholarly 
understandings of camps grounded in exceptionalism and sovereign excess. The informal camp of 
Piraeus, was used as an example of the diversity of forms that camps take, as they expand, multiply and 
enter the spaces of daily life. The chapter made two further points in respect of the EU’s border policy. 
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Firstly, it has been argued that the paradoxical proximity of refugee tents and executive border 
watchtowers is an exposition of the arbitrary logics of discrimination at work in the EU; residing in de-
politicised logics of population distribution, and rendering some lives as more worthy of living than 
others. Secondly, it has demonstrated how these de-politicised logics blend with local history and 
present political struggles in malleable ways, allowing for local patterns of class, race, or national 
identity lines to dictate particular configurations at spaces associated with EU power. 
Chapter Three considered the EU’s modes of producing ‘border-knowledge’, making its 
elaborate border machinery possible. The case study of Frontex demonstrated the diverse context of 
actors within which this knowledge production has been taking place; the EU institutions, law 
enforcement, and the security industry. It was found that the tensions surrounding Frontex’s identity; as 
an intelligence agency and an operational actor at once, resonate with the ‘riskification’ of the EU’s 
borders; the turn to management logics, the orientation towards the future, and the de-construction 
and re-construction of the EU ‘territorial self’. The main findings concentrated on ideas about the 
geography of the EU that are produced, and demonstrate the operational reconstitution of the EU as 
fragmented space. 
Chapter Four focused on the politics of inclusion produced by the risk-based border logics, 
considering the Local Border Traffic (LBT) regulation of the EU, and its application in Kaliningrad, a case 
selected due to its unusual geopolitical situation. The LBT has been examined as a policy that ‘softens’ 
the border, and enables the regulation and monitoring of sensitive areas in the EU’s northeast.  This 
case-study enabled three interesting observations. Firstly, the ways in which Kaliningrad’s spatial 
memories re-appeared in official EU maps, showed the limits of the EU’s border policy and its potential 
to have a radically transformative effect over historical and local geopolitical patterns. Secondly, 
Kaliningrad’s appropriation as EU ‘experimental’ space and ground of cooperation with Russia has 
demonstrated one of the ways in which foreign policy and border security intersect. Thirdly, the 
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exceptionally extended allowances of this particular LBT agreement illustrated the flexibility of the 
policy as a technology of risk-based security. Overall, the chapter brought forth some of the ways in 
which EU border security is also pursued through mobility and inclusion. 
Three interconnected analytical strands bring these chapters together; a) borders as constitutive 
processes in the production of difference/sameness b) borders as instruments to delineate spaces for 
the containment and management of threats c) borders as objects and as sources of knowledge. Taken 
together, the three conceptual strands and the empirical findings suggest that the EU has related to its 
borders (and its neighbours) in a rather introvert way. Borders have been used in the EU not simply to 
filter ‘wanted’ from ‘unwanted’ mobilities, but also to constitute the EU itself as a political actor by 
means of geographically organising its difference from its ‘outside’. By scanning its doorstep in excess 
detail, and subsequently assigning levels of threat to parts of the world, a degree of Otherness is 
asserted; by deploying regimes of immobility/exclusion and mobility/inclusion the distance between the 
self and the Other is regulated accordingly. However, while this EU border politics has been productive 
of many and different border-spaces, within which lives and relations of power are meant to unfold in a 
biopolitically pre-configured manner, the latter are already enmeshed in established patterns, shaped by 
history and geography. The ways in which the EU’s border politics blend with these patterns, at times 
aligning and at others antagonising local lines of difference and otherness, and the ways in which the 
local in turn transforms the EUropean and its relationship to the outside, mirrors the very complexity as 
well as the fragility of the EU project.  
Contribution to the Literature 
The thesis has sought to add to the Critical Border Studies agenda by contributing a set of case 
studies on border spaces, adding a commentary question to the ‘borders are everywhere’ thesis, and 
asking “but where exactly?” I have attempted to contextualise biopolitical borders in local history and 
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geography, as a means of going beyond the geopolitics/biopolitics dilemma. This has been done by 
focusing on the ways in which biopolitical and geopolitical logics have used one another as vessels, 
settling on distinct configurations of hard and soft, ‘smart’ and ‘old-fashioned’, territorially fixed and 
diffused bordering processes.  
The re-worked concept of Foucault’s heterotopia can be useful to border studies in three ways. 
Firstly, to conceptualise the production of multiple difference at the micro-level, as the difference of a 
part which belongs to multiple wholes. Secondly, to trace the ways in which temporal and spatial logics 
intersect, embedding the borders of the past into the present realities, and illustrating continuities that 
would have gone amiss if studied in a purely biopolitical way. Thirdly, to enable a particular ‘loosening’ 
of the fixity and location of borders, without disposing of them entirely, bringing forth ways in which 
bounded entities can disappear and re-emerge within diverse spatial contexts.  
Whilst a Foucauldian streak runs through the thesis, the latter has not been loyal to one 
analytical approach, to one method, or one archive. I left instead each chapter take its own course and 
the empirical material to spell-out the theories, concepts, and ‘data-banks’ that best brought out its 
nuances. As such, the project also makes multiple small contributions to the different fields that it has 
taken from. Chapter one may be of interest to students of Modern Greece who are interested in the 
recent stages of its European trajectory, and the effects of the recent migration patterns on its EU 
integration. Chapter two might have some useful materials for scholars working on post-industrial urban 
spaces or port-cities, by offering a contemporary Mediterranean example. Chapter three may hold some 
value for researchers questioning the EU institutions from an organisational and modernisation theory 
perspective, and researching ways in which these institutions respond to processes of globalisation, 
expanding uses of information technologies, and neoliberal ideologies of profit. Chapter four should 
hold some insights for historical geographers of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as for political 
scientists looking into the particularities of Kaliningrad’s modern history and identity. 
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Reflections-Limitations 
The argument of this thesis shall be read with the following three limitations in mind. 
One, I have used throughout the thesis thick signifiers which have not been elaborated further. 
The terms and concepts of area, place, and space are subjects of debate amongst geographers, and they 
carry indeed different connotations; scientific, political, and affective. Given the focus of this thesis on 
the politics of crafting particular geographical imaginaries in every day settings, I have rather relied on 
context to bring out the meaning of these terms, which is not necessarily the same across the different 
parts of the thesis, or in the discourses that these parts engage with. Another concept that has been 
used without definition is that of dialectic/dialectics. Between Adorno’s negative dialectics and 
Bourdieu’s affirmative dialectics, there is a whole rich field of interpretations premised upon this term. I 
have used dialectics in a lay manner here, inspired instead by Schopenhauer’s dialectics of practice as 
the ‘art of disputation.’ The term is therefore meant to denote an irreducible conceptual conversation 
that unfolds in juxtapositions, and the productive effects of which are rooted in context rather than 
logic.  
Two, as I came to realise at a late stage in the thesis, the ways in which the EU has treated some 
of its many geographical ‘irregularities’, the policies of ordering, monitoring and disciplining that it has 
deployed towards these spaces, are more grounded in Europe’s colonial past than commonly thought. I 
have tried to engage this idea, albeit implicitly in Chapter two, by taking note of the origins of the camp 
in European colonial history, but also through the particular heterotopology that has been suggested; a 
way of doing spatial history by locating the specific sites of historical struggles within present landscapes 
of power. 
Three, should there be no time or space constraints, I would have liked to focus more on the 
anthropological aspects of my research question, and the agency of migrants and their communities in 
particular. Literature has had unproblematised recourse to the ‘migrant’, the mobile, rootless subject, in 
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order to construct otherwise very nuanced arguments. This is a limitation that my thesis has not 
altogether avoided. Through empirical research I came to understand that moral positions, aggregating 
a vast assemblage of personal circumstances, backgrounds, and political positions into a single narrative 
of privilege/oppression are to a great extent ‘easy answers’, and often themselves mirror the repressive 
policies that they criticize, producing and reproducing individuals into subjects that resemble textual 
bare lives. Although this has not been discussed explicitly in a dedicated chapter or section, l have tried 
to address it to some degree through the overall argument that is advanced here, on dismantling 
homogenising categories, be they in policy prescriptions or scholarly discourses, and paying closer 
attention to instances of individual difference. 
Implications and Questions for further research 
Building on the findings of this project, and taking cue from its limitations, some avenues for 
further empirical and theoretical research emerge. Firstly, the theoretical implications of the concept of 
a heterotopia could be taken further, and its potential as a bridge between post-modern networked 
space and the legacies of colonial geographies could be investigated. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla, or the French Guadeloupe in the Caribbean make for particularly interesting cases that could 
inform such research. What does Europeanisation translate into in those spaces which are 
geographically detached from the EU and projected into its ‘outside’? What forms of identity and 
subjectivity are thereby produced as a result of EU membership, in a geographical and political context 
where Europe’s colonial past cannot be ignored?  
A second direction that this thesis has pointed me towards concerns personalised internet 
technologies, and the ways in which they become implicated in the phenomenon of migration, enabling 
mobilities and immobilities, and problematizing understandings of ‘access’. Some of the themes to 
investigate would be the ways in which smartphone, GPS and map technologies are used by migrants to 
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enter the physical spaces from which they are excluded; or how Facebook, as open and accessible 
virtual space, is used by migrants, smugglers, and border guards to coordinate their activities. 
A third theme that has emerged through this research is the ongoing competition that exists 
between EU law enforcement and smuggling networks, as regards the regulation of international 
mobility. When viewed from the perspective of migrant mobility, the Mediterranean represents not only 
a contested juridical space of multiple and fluid sovereignties, but also a highly profitable market. 
Questions that could thereby be asked are; how do EU neoliberal logics that outsource state-functions 
to private enterprise inform the logics of the smuggling market? How does the construction of the 
‘smuggler’ as the EU’s ‘enemy’ and Other relate to the EU’s own lack of power to enforce manageable 
systems of regulating mobility? 
In conclusion, the thesis has argued for the need to embed the study of the EU’s biopolitical 
borders within geographical and historical analytical frames. Taking a contextualising approach to the 
delineation of EU borders and border spaces can offer a political interpretation of the de-politicised 
logics of risk. Mobility and immobility, inclusion and exclusion are then not merely acts that permit and 
forbid bodies from accessing an internal and prosperous sub-world, but performances of difference and 
otherness in the process of constituting the EU as such.  
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Appendices 
Annex I 
List of Interviews 
Hellenic Police official, 17 April 2012, Alexandroupolis, Greece. 
Hellenic Police official, 20 April 2012, Thessaloniki, Greece. 
Hellenic Police official seconded by Frontex, 22 April 2012, Thessaloniki, Greece. 
Frontex official, 28 October 2013, Warsaw, Poland. 
Frontex official, 30 October 2013, Warsaw, Poland. 
Frontex official, 1 November 2013, Warsaw Poland. 
Syrian asylum-seeker, 26 October 2014, Athens, Greece. 
Pakistani migrant, Athens, 4 November 2014, Athens, Greece. 
Syrian asylum-seeker, 10 December 2014, Athens, Greece. 
Frontex official, 20 April 2015, Piraeus, Greece. 
Hellenic Police official, 11 June 2015, Athens, Greece. 
Volunteer in Piraeus port, 21 March 2016, Piraeus, Greece. 
  
Annex II 
The EU’s Decentralised Agencies  
 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)  Ljubljana, Slovenia  
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)  Riga, Latvia  
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)  Angers, France  
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)  Bilbao, Spain  
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders  
(FRONTEX)  
Warsaw, Poland  
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European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)  
Tallinn, Estonia  
European Asylum Support Office (EASO)  Valetta, Malta  
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)  Cologne, Germany  
European Banking Authority (EBA)  London, UK  
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)  Stockholm, Sweden  
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP)  Thessaloniki, Greece  
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)  Helsinki, Finland  
European Environment Agency (EEA)  Copenhagen, Denmark  
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA)  Vigo, Spain  
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  Parma, Italy  
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(EUROFOUND)  
Dublin, Ireland  
European GNSS Agency (GSA)  Prague, Czech Rep.  
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)  Vilnius, Lithuania  
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)   Frankfurt, Germany  
European Maritime Safety Agency, (EMSA)  Lisbon, Portugal  
European Medicines Agency (EMA)  London, UK  
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)  Lisbon, Portugal  
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)  Heraclion, Greece  
European Police College (CEPOL)  Budapest, Hungary  
European Police Office (EUROPOL)  Hague, Netherlands  
European Public Prosecutors Office (EPPO)  (To Be Announced)  
European Railway Agency (ERA)  Valenciennes, France  
European Securities and Markets Authorities (ESMA)  Paris, France  
European Training Foundation (ETF)  Torino, Italy  
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)  Vienna, Austria  
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPA)  Alicante, Spain  
Single Resolution Port (SRB)  Brussels, Belgium  
European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)  Hague, Netherlands  
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT)  Luxemburg, Luxemburg  
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Annex III 
Border Area on the territory of Poland; administrative units and population  
Pomerania 
COUNTY  POPULATION  
 Puck (town)    82414  
 Gdynia (commune)  247820  
 Sopot (town)  37654  
 Gdańsk (town)  461489  
 Gdańsk (commune)  107382  
 Malbork (commune)  64257  
 Nowy Dwór Gdański   36254  
  
Warmia-Masuria 
 
COUNTY  POPULATION  
 Elbląg (town)  122368  
 Elbląg (commune)  58174  
 Braniewo (commune)  42469  
 Lidzbark (commune)  42506  
 Bartoszyce (commune)  59830  
 Olsztyn (town)  173831  
 Olsztyn (commune)  123049  
 Kętrzyn (commune)  65040  
 Mrągowo (commune)  50901  
 Węgorzewo (commune)  23604  
 Giżycko (commune)  57562  
 Gołdap (commune)  27353  
APPENDICES 
241 
 
 Olecko (commune)   34805  
 
 Total of Polish Border Residents: 1.918.762 
Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland; Local Data Bank, available at www.stat.gov.pl   
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